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Overview
At the start of 1997, state unemployment insurance (UI) programs 
in the United States had combined trust fund balances of $38.6 billion, 
and every state trust fund had a positive balance. During the recession 
of 1990-1992, nearly all states fully financed their added benefit pay 
outs from their own trust fund reserves. Just seven states needed loans 
from the U.S. Treasury to pay benefits, and total borrowing was less 
than $5.0 billion. Only two states, Connecticut and Massachusetts, had 
serious funding problems during that recession.
The vast majority of states have not had major problems with UI 
funding for more than a decade. The latest macroeconomic expansion 
has lasted more than five full years, and some high-level public offi 
cials have even suggested that the business cycle may be a thing of the 
past. The macroeconomy at the end of 1996 was operating close to, or 
at, full employment. More significantly, full employment was reached 
without the usual problem of high and/or accelerating inflation. Many 
states have reduced UI taxes in recent years, and such reductions were 
especially frequent in early 1997.
This background could be used to argue that UI financing prob 
lems will be less serious in the future than in the past. While future 
recessions may be less serious, it is not a certainty; only time will tell. 
To the extent that the recent past is not prologue, states could need 
large UI trust fund reserves, perhaps even before the 21st century.
This book explores the financing of state UI programs, and it has 
two general purposes. The first purpose is to assess recent financing 
experiences and to examine UI funding historically. Chapter 1 intro 
duces the reader to alternative financing strategies and discusses fund 
adequacy. The chapter also reviews key federal statutes that affect UI 
taxes and state trust funds. The last half of Chapter 1 reviews the his 
tory of UI funding, with particular emphasis on the funding problems 
of the 1970s and the 1980s and experiences during the 1990-1992 
recession. It provides an interpretation of why financing problems 
were so minor during the early 1990s. Finally, it reviews the slow pace 
of post-recession trust fund building during 1993-1996 and reports the 
results of a simulation analysis of potential future funding problems.
2 Overview
The overall conclusion of Chapter 1 is that states will continue to need 
to maintain large trust fund balances to forestall potential financing 
problems during a future recession.
The second purpose of this book is to examine specific methods of 
financing that could be important for states considering changes in 
their UI tax statutes and/or their approach to trust fund management. 
Chapters 2 and 3, respectively, study flexible trust fund financing and 
tax-base indexing. One or both of these financing features are already 
present in many states. Each feature has implications for the size of a 
state©s desired trust fund balance and for the responsiveness of its reve 
nues during both recessions and sustained economic expansions. Two 
major conclusions from these chapters should be noted.
1. Flexible financing features such as so-called solvency taxes, 
while used by many states, have only a limited macro impact. 
Further, it does not appear that flexible financing has increased 
significantly in importance over the past 20 years. The preva 
lence and potential effects of flexible financing have not grown 
since the late 1980s. Hence, the need for large reserves is no 
less now than it was before the recession of 1990-1992. Chap 
ter 2 also discusses the impact that flexible financing has on 
maintaining family income and on providing for the built-in 
(or automatic) stability of the macroeconomy. Both are tradi 
tional UI objectives and both would be impaired by growth in 
flexible financing.
2. Tax-base indexing (having a tax base that automatically rises 
with the level of wages) has a number of favorable effects on 
state UI financing. Especially in states that have an indexed 
maximum weekly benefit, an indexed tax base helps to ensure 
that, over the long run, revenues grow at the same rate as bene 
fit payments. Having a balanced growth of revenues and pay 
ments helps to ensure that trust fund balances also grow as 
state economies expand.
Chapters 4 and 5 study two much more specialized methods of 
financing: debt financing through state bond issues and the establish 
ment of state UI reserve funds. State reserve funds are state-controlled, 
state-administered, and supported by UI taxes. Both chapters are
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based on small samples of state experiences: only three states have 
issued their own bonds to repay UI debts, and only four have estab 
lished state reserve funds. Two major conclusions from these chapters 
are that
1. Bond financing has disadvantages as well as advantages when 
compared with debt financing with loans from the U.S. Trea 
sury; the choice between the two involves much more than a 
simple comparison of interest rates.
2. For states with reasonably large UI trust fund balances, the 
creation of a state reserve fund allows for a proactive use of 
reserves, such as financing worker training and/or supplement 
ing the administrative budgets of employment security agen 
cies.
Finally, Chapter 6 offers conclusions and some policy recommendations. 
Two broad conclusions of this study should be emphasized. First, 
states continue to need to rely heavily on advance funding, or forward 
funding, to finance recession-related drawdowns of UI trust fund 
reserves. The experiences of the 1990-1992 recession do not indicate 
the scale of potential drawdowns during a future recession. Prudent 
state policy would maintain UI trust fund balances that meet standard 
actuarial definitions of fund adequacy. The federal government could 
help the states in this area by providing active guidance on trust fund 
adequacy. Second, individual states continue to experiment with UI 
financing arrangements. Some of these experiments are worth emulat 
ing, while others should be avoided. On balance, tax-base indexing 
merits widespread adoption, as does the use of reserve funds by states 
with high levels of reserves. The risks in relying on flexible financing 
should be recognized. At the same time, issuing state bonds to finance 
trust fund debts also entails risks. Ultimately, of course, individual 
states will decide on the desirability of each UI financing arrangement.

Unemployment insurance is an important and long-standing social 
insurance program in the United States. Created by the Social Security 
Act of 1935, UI pays benefits to 15 to 20 million claimants in most 
years, benefits financed mainly by payroll taxes levied on covered 
employers. Employer contributions deposited into state trust fund 
accounts at the U.S. Treasury are the source for cash benefit payments 
to claimants.
Unemployment insurance is often described as having three pri 
mary objectives. First among these is to "alleviate the hardships that 
result from loss of wage income during unemployment" (Haber and 
Murray 1966, p. 26). The cash benefits paid provide partial wage-loss 
replacement and help to maintain the income and purchasing power of 
eligible unemployed persons and their families. Payments typically 
are made to individuals who have lost jobs through no fault of their 
own, that is, those on layoff, and benefits are received for temporary 
periods. The second objective is to help stabilize the macroeconomy 
through the maintenance of aggregate consumer purchasing power dur 
ing recessions, when the production of goods and services declines. 
The third objective is to help stabilize employment by experience-rat 
ing of individual, covered employers. Employers who, through layoffs 
and other job separations, cause large payments in UI benefits then pay 
higher UI taxes than employers who initiate fewer job separations.
THE LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
In the United States, unemployment insurance features a blend of 
federal and state responsibilities. The states administer benefit pay 
ments and tax collections and determine most of the statutory provi 
sions related to those activities. There are also federal responsibilities, 
the most important of which charges the U.S. Secretary of Labor with 
ensuring the prompt and efficient administration of the UI program.
6 The History of State UI Financing
Three tiers of benefit payments are provided. Tier one is the regu 
lar benefit program, which operates continuously and pays benefits for 
up to 26 weeks in most states. Regular UI is financed by state-level 
employer taxes. The second tier is the federal-state extended benefit 
(or EB) program, which may pay up to an additional 13 weeks of bene 
fits. This program, activated when states reach set rates of unemploy 
ment, is financed equally by state and federal UI taxes. The third tier, 
temporary benefits, becomes available through special federal legisla 
tion during recessions. The most recent temporary program, Emer 
gency Unemployment Compensation, paid benefits from November 
1991 through April 1994. Traditionally, such benefits have been 
financed completely from federal funds. This book is concerned with 
state-level financing, that is, the financing of regular UI benefits plus 
half of the EB benefits.
A unique feature of state UI financing in the United States is the 
reliance on experience-rating to set contribution rates for covered 
employers. Benefit payments are charged against individual employ 
ers, and higher payouts result in increased state UI taxes.
UI programs try to achieve their three main objectives through stat 
utory provisions and administrative procedures that specify coverage, 
employer contributions, benefit eligibility, and trust fund management 
practices. Coverage of wage and salary workers is nearly universal, 
encompassing those who work for private employers, state and local 
governments, and nonprofit organizations.
Regular state UI benefits for eligible unemployed workers are typi 
cally available for up to 26 weeks. Most recipients are on temporary or 
permanent layoff, but others (job leavers and unemployed labor force 
reentrants) may also qualify for benefits under certain circumstances. 
Weekly benefit rates reflect past earnings, typically earnings from the 
highest calendar quarter of a 12-month "base period" that ended before 
the onset of unemployment. In many states, base-period earnings 
determine the maximum duration of benefits and the weekly amount.©
States also set the employer payroll taxes that finance UI pro 
grams. The original authorizing legislation that established UI (Title 
IX of the Social Security Act of 1935) provided for a federal unem 
ployment tax (PUT) of 3.0 percent to be levied on the payrolls of cov 
ered employers. Also authorized, however, was a tax credit offset 
mechanism that allowed employers to take credit for up to 90 percent
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of the PUT (2.7 percent of payrolls) if the state established an accept 
able UI program. One requirement for having an acceptable program 
was that a state must establish an approved mechanism for taxing cov 
ered employers according to their experiences in paying UI benefits. 
The U.S. Secretary of Labor is responsible for judging the acceptabil 
ity of each state©s UI system of experience-rating; the Secretary©s 
responsibilities are discussed later in this chapter. In states with an 
acceptable experience-rating, employers could pay UI taxes into their 
state©s UI trust fund at a rate of less than 2.7 percent but receive the 
full 2.7 percent PUT credit offset. That arrangement provided a strong 
financial incentive for states to establish acceptable programs, and all 
states did this in the late 1930s.
The other 10 percent of the original 3.0 percent PUT (or 0.3 per 
cent of payrolls) remained a federal tax paid into separate federal trust 
fund accounts. The proceeds of this tax were originally used to finance 
UI program administration and the activities of state employment ser 
vices. The federal component of UI taxes was (and continues to be) 
levied at a single flat rate.
Experience-rating applies to the state taxes that finance regular 
state UI benefits and the state©s share of EB benefits. Originally, UI 
taxes were levied on total covered payrolls, but in 1940 the taxable 
wage base was set at the first $3,000 of annual employee earnings, to 
correspond to the taxable wage base under the Old Age and Survivors 
Insurance (OASI), or social security, program.
The state UI trust funds that receive each state©s UI taxes are main 
tained at the U.S. Department of the Treasury. Trust fund balances are 
invested in the U.S. government debt and earn interest income for the 
states.
When a state©s trust fund becomes depleted, there also are provi 
sions governing whether it may borrow from the U.S. Treasury. Bor 
rowing was widespread during the mid 1970s and again during the 
early to mid 1980s. Since the early 1980s, the loans have carried inter 
est charges if such debt is outstanding for more than a year. (The fed 
eral statutes governing UI loans and debt repayment are discussed later 
in this chapter and in Chapter 4. See also Miller, Pavosevich, and Vro- 
man [1997] andVroman [1990]).
Such statutory and institutional arrangements governing federal 
and state UI taxes have persisted from the 1930s to the present. The
8 The History of State UI Financing
federal tax is now 0.8 percent of taxable payrolls, and it is levied on the 
first $7,000 of each worker©s wages and salaries. Proceeds from the 
PUT go to three federal trust funds, to finance such activities as UI pro 
gram administration, the employment service, the federal share of EB 
benefits, and a federal loan fund for states needing loans to pay UI ben 
efits.
In 1985, the maximum PUT credit offset increased to 5.4 percent 
and has remained at that rate to the present. Since 1985, each state has 
been required to have a maximum experience-rated tax rate of at least 
5.4 percent for the UI taxes that finance benefit payments. This implies 
a gross potential (federal plus state) UI tax rate of at least 6.2 percent 
for each state.
Under the Social Security Act, the U.S. Secretary of Labor is 
responsible for the prompt and efficient administration of unemploy 
ment insurance. The Secretary©s responsibility is given concrete mean 
ing through a set of performance indicators which the states must meet. 
There are more than 40 Secretarial "standards" and "desired levels of 
achievement" pertaining to the administration of benefit payments, tax 
collection, and fund management. To have an acceptable program, 
states must achieve target levels of performance for these indicators or 
risk losing the PUT tax credit offset. This represents a large potential 
financial penalty, and it gives the federal government a strong lever for 
influencing state UI program administration.
Certain federal requirements affecting state UI taxes and trust fund 
management are relevant to the analysis presented in this book. Four 
that are important for later chapters are the following:
1. A state is required to have a taxable wage base per employee 
of at least $7,000, that is, it must be at least equal to the level 
of the federal taxable wage base.
2. A state is required to have a maximum experience-rated tax 
rate of at least 5.4 percent of taxable wages.
3. Monies held in the state trust fund account at the U.S. Treasury 
can be withdrawn for a single purpose, to pay benefits to 
claimants. This requirement is known as the "federal with 
drawal standard." The withdrawal standard has influenced a 
few states to establish their own reserve funds, in order to gain
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partial control over the use of UI tax revenues. Chapter 5 
reviews the performance of such funds in three states.
4. States that secure loans from the U.S. Treasury must meet debt 
repayment requirements. Chapter 4 studies state experiences 
in direct bond issues as an alternative to the use of Treasury 
loans.
Forty-one of 53 UI programs operated with tax bases above $7,000 
in 1996. However, the 1996 tax bases exceeded $10,000 in only 20 
states and exceeded $20,000 in just five states. For comparison, the 
1996 Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI; social 
security) tax base was $62,700. Due to generally low taxable wage 
bases, taxable payrolls represented only 35.2 percent of UI covered 
payrolls in 1995. The higher tax bases are found in the 18 programs 
with indexed taxable wage bases. 2 Chapter 3 explores the link between 
the UI tax base and state trust fund adequacy.
In more than half the states, taxes flow into state trust funds from 
two distinct sources. The first (and largest) source is the tax deter 
mined by the state©s system of experience-rating individual employers. 
States typically use three factors to set experience-rated taxes. First, 
most states have a set of tax rate schedules with higher rates in effect 
when trust fund balances are lower. Second, such states use an indica 
tor of the overall trust fund balance on a specific computation date 
(most often June 30th) to determine which rate schedule will be used in 
the coming year. Third, these states assign rates to individual employ 
ers by using an indicator based on each employer©s experience in caus 
ing the payment of benefits. Higher payout rates lead to higher tax 
rates. This institutional arrangement for taxation has been present 
since the founding of the state UI programs. 3
The second source of funds is often called a "solvency tax," and it 
takes effect only when the state©s trust fund has reached such a low 
level that there is serious risk of insolvency. A wide variety of sol 
vency taxes now exists in the states. Some are levied at a single flat 
rate on all employers, while others use an experience indicator to deter 
mine individual employer rates. Some states have a single solvency 
tax, while others have a schedule of such taxes with progressively 
higher tax rates applying as the trust fund balance reaches progres 
sively lower thresholds.
10 The History of State UI Financing
Solvency taxes are part of a larger set of UI financing arrangements 
collectively known as "flexible financing." Flexible financing may also 
extend to a state©s UI tax base and to its benefit payments. An advan 
tage of flexible financing, according to its proponents, is that the state 
can then operate with a lower trust fund balance than it could if it relied 
on the traditional method of UI financing. Flexible financing is exam 
ined in some detail in Chapter 2.
FUNDING STRATEGIES AND CONCEPTS
Advance Funding
The revenues that finance state UI programs come mainly from 
payroll taxes on covered employers. Taxes are deposited into state UI 
trust fund accounts at the U.S. Treasury. These accounts are the source 
for benefit payments.
The funding strategy followed by state UI programs is usually 
characterized as "advance funding" or "forward funding. (A second 
funding strategy, "pay-as-you-go," is discussed later in this section.) 
Trust fund balances are built up before recessions, drawn on during 
recessions, and then rebuilt during the subsequent recoveries. The 
funding arrangement implies that the program acts as an automatic sta 
bilizer of economic activity, that it makes larger benefit payments than 
tax withdrawals during recessions and larger tax withdrawals than ben 
efit payments during economic expansions.
This characterization of advance funding does not accurately 
describe developments during the recessions of the mid 1970s and the 
early 1980s. Pre-recession trust fund balances were not large in several 
states and were too low to pay UI benefits to all eligible claimants. 
Widespread, large-scale, and persistent state borrowing took place dur 
ing both recessions. However, during the 1990-1992 downturn, state 
trust fund reserves were generally sufficient to meet demands for bene 
fit payments without states having to resort to large-scale borrowing.
The adequacy of a state©s reserves during a recession depends upon 
four factors: 1) the absolute size of the" trust fund balance at the start of 
the downturn, 2) the size of the state©s economy, 3) the recession-
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related demand for benefits, that is, the severity and duration of the 
recession, and 4) the speed and size of response of taxes (and possibly 
the response of UI benefits) when reserves are drawn down. A concept 
that has proved useful for assessing state trust fund adequacy is the 
"reserve ratio multiple" (RRM; also called the "high-cost multiple").
The reserve ratio multiple is an actuarial construct that incorpo 
rates the first three of the preceding four factors (the trust fund balance, 
the size of the state economy, and the benefit payout rate). The denom 
inator in the RRM is the highest-cost benefit payout period in the 
state©s history, measured as total benefit payouts over a 12-month 
period and expressed as a percentage of covered wages for that period. 
The interstate range of high-cost percentages extends from a low of 
1.04 percent (in South Dakota between January and December 1964) 
to a high of 4.37 percent (in Rhode Island between January and 
December 1975). The highest-cost period for the United States as a 
whole was 2.22 percent (between January and December 1975).
The numerator of the RRM, termed the reserve ratio, is the year- 
end trust fund balance divided by covered wages for the year and 
expressed as a percentage. As the ratio of these two ratios, the reserve 
ratio multiple is thus a measure whose numerator incorporates infor 
mation on the UI trust fund balance and on the scale of a state©s econ 
omy (as approximated by covered wages), while the denominator is a 
measure of risk (the highest previous 12-month payout rate). In the 
past, some have advocated that states build trust fund reserves to levels 
that produce RRMs of 1.5, that is, levels equal to 18 months of benefits 
paid out at the historically highest payout rate.
As a measure of trust fund adequacy, the RRM has its critics. 
Many analysts consider the 1.5 value too conservative a standard and 
that a prudent state could function with a much lower trust fund bal 
ance and run little or no risk of fund insolvency.
Two specific criticisms of the RRM are often voiced. First, the 
high-cost period in the denominator is often so far in the past (January- 
December 1964 for South Dakota) that it may no longer be a relevant 
indicator of the maximum payout risk. Second, the RRM is a static 
concept and does not adequately account for the dynamic response of 
taxes (and perhaps benefits) when trust funds are depleted. A quick 
response can permit a state to function successfully with a smaller trust 
fund than that suggested by an RRM of 1.5.
12 The History of State UI Financing
While trust fund financing has been practiced since the beginning 
of unemployment insurance, there is no consensus on what constitutes 
an appropriate measure of trust fund adequacy. The recently disbanded 
Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (ACUC) exam 
ined funding in its February 1995 report.4 Chapter 5 of the report ana 
lyzes the funding situation at the end of 1993, using three solvency 
standards. Table 5.3 in the report shows the number of states meeting 
RRM solvency standards for multiples ranging from 0.25 to 1.75, 
based on seven different measures of high costs: the highest 12-month 
costs ever experienced, three involving the highest 12-month costs in 
the past 10 years, and three involving the highest 12-month costs in the 
past 20 years.
The ACUC recommended that states achieve an RRM of 1.0, with 
a state©s high-cost rate measured as the average of the three highest- 
cost 12-month periods in the past 20 years. The ACUC also recom 
mended that the federal government offer specific financial incentives 
to encourage states to meet advance funding goals, including paying 
higher or "preferential" interest rates when large balances (measured as 
RRMS) are achieved and lower interest rates on recession-related bor 
rowing when pre-recession balances equal or exceed solvency stan 
dards. 5 If implemented, the ACUC©s recommendations would improve 
the solvency of many state UI programs. It seems unlikely, however, 
that federal legislation to encourage solvency will be proposed, much 
less enacted, in the near future.
Pay-As-You-Go Funding
A second strategy for funding UI benefits is "pay-as-you-go" fund 
ing. This strategy stresses the response of the funding mechanism dur 
ing a recession-related drawdown.
There are two variants of pay-as-you-go funding. The first stresses 
the automatic responses of taxes and benefits, responses triggered by 
trust fund drawdowns. As the trust fund moves downward past set 
thresholds, a state©s UI law automatically activates responses that raise 
taxes and (perhaps) reduce benefits. Laws in Illinois and Pennsylvania 
include provisions that activate automatic responses. In fact, one 
forceful advocate of this funding strategy is a former director of the 
Illinois UI agency.6
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The second variant can be called "ad-hoc pay-as-you-go." It relies 
on a legislated response mechanism when the trust fund is low or in 
deficit. There is no substantial written literature that advocates this 
strategy, but it could be inferred if a state satisfied specific conditions: 
i.e., 1) limited reserve build-up and a low RRM after a long period of 
economic expansion and 2) the absence of automatic tax and benefit 
response features. In effect, ad-hoc pay-as-you-go funding would 
address the financing problem at the point in time when the problem is 
most pressing.
When the primary objectives of state UI programs are considered, 
the rationale for pay-as-you-go strategies seems questionable. Both 
the temporary replacement of lost earnings for individuals and the 
automatic macro stabilizing effect of UI are weakened if benefits are 
reduced during a recession. It would also seem questionable to 
increase employer taxes in the midst of a recession, when profits are 
already depressed. However, the strategy does offer a rationale for 
operating with lower trust fund balances than advanced funding 
requires. The automatic variant of the pay-as-you-go strategy, flexible 
financing, is examined further in Chapter 2.
In selecting the desired target level for a state©s trust fund, the big 
gest unknown is the size of the trust fund outflow to expect in future 
recessions. There is no easy answer to this question. Selecting the 
highest-ever past rate of outflows may not be useful. For example, 
decreases in manufacturing©s share of total employment and declining 
unionization are now widespread throughout the United States. Both 
unionized and nonunionized manufacturing workers and other union 
ized workers claim UI benefits at above-average rates. This may 
presage lower benefit-cost rates in the future. On the other hand, rely 
ing solely on the experiences of the past 10 years likely means relying 
on too short an interval.
The example of Michigan may be instructive for reviewing high 
costs in past periods. During the 10 years from 1987 through 1996, 
Michigan©s highest 12-month benefit-cost rate was 1.90 percent, in 
1991. However, the past 10 years have been unusual in Michigan, a 
state that continues to rely heavily on the cyclically volatile automobile 
industry. During the 50 years from 1947 to 1996, there were seven 
years when the cost rate was higher than 1.90 percent. The five years 
with the highest percentage cost rates were 1982 (3.72), 1958 (3.69),
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1975 (2.87), 1980 (2.55), and 1961 (2.20). Each year is a recession 
year with a higher payout rate than in 1991. Thus, the highest-ever 
cost rate for Michigan was 3.72 percent, while the highest three-year 
average for the past 20 years (1977 through 1996) was 2.75 percent. 
Both cost rates are considerably higher than 1.90 percent, the highest 
cost rate for 1987 through 1996. It seems clear that experiences cover 
ing more than 10 years are needed to assess the likely recession-related 
costs for a state.
Reserve ratio multiples as measures of adequacy imply large abso 
lute levels of trust fund balances. The 1996 year-end trust fund bal 
ances required in Michigan, based on a high-cost multiple of 1.0 
combined with each of the preceding three high-cost rates (3.72, 2.75, 
and 1.90) were $4.0 billion, $3.0 billion, and $2.1 billion, respectively. 
The state©s actual balance was $1.8 billion. Because the absolute bal 
ance is such a large number (nearly $2.0 billion), some might misinter 
pret the degree of adequacy that it represents. Michigan©s economy 
had roughly $110 billion in covered wages in 1996. A 2.0 percent cost 
rate in 1997 would represent a one-year outflow from its trust fund of 
about $2.2 billion. It is not difficult to imagine a situation in which the 
$1.8 billion trust fund balance would drop to zero during the second 
year of a recession.
MAJOR HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS 
IN STATE TRUST FUNDS
Aggregate trust fund balances totaled $38.6 billion at the end of 
1996. The aggregate balance had been $36.9 million at the end of 
1989, just before the 1990-1992 recession. While the dollar value of 
the 1996 balance was larger by $1.76 billion, it represented a smaller 
percentage of total covered wages and a lower reserve ratio multiple 
than the 1989 balance. The national RRM had been 0.87 at the end of 
1989 but was only 0.64 seven years later.
This section reviews the history of UI financing, with particular 
attention to the problems of the mid 1970s and early 1980s. Develop 
ments during the 1990s are discussed in the following section (p. 21), 
along with an assessment of UI trust fund adequacy at the end of 1996.
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Beginning with the establishment of UI in the late 1930s, there are 
four distinct periods of trust fund financing. Sustained and large accu 
mulations occurred during the earliest years. These accumulations 
were the result of lower benefit costs than originally anticipated when 
UI was established and of the effects of full employment during World 
War II. The aggregate reserve ratio (the total net reserves as a percent 
age of covered wages) reached its all-time peak, 10.4 percent, at the 
end of 1945. Modest absolute growth in reserves continued through 
the end of 1948, when the national total of $7.60 billion represented 
7.91 percent of covered payrolls.
The trust fund accumulations of these years were also the product 
of the strong macroeconomy associated with World War II. Aggregate 
benefit payments, which had averaged about 1.5 percent of covered 
payrolls during 1938-1940, averaged only about 0.5 percent of pay 
rolls during 1941-1945, with especially low payout rates during 1943 
and 1944. Despite large reductions in average tax rates (from 2.69 per 
cent of payroll in 1938 to 1.50 percent in 1945), tax revenues exceeded 
benefits in every year through 1945.
The second period can be called "the long slide." During the 32 
years from 1948 to 1979, growth in UI trust fund reserves lagged sub 
stantially behind growth in the economy. The aggregate reserve ratio 
declined sharply, from 7.91 percent in 1948 to 0.91 percent in 1979. 
Losses in reserves were concentrated during recessions, but accumula 
tions during economic expansions were generally modest. Conse 
quently, the aggregate reserve ratio was lower before each recession 
than it had been before the previous recession. Even during the long 
expansion of the 1960s, the growth in net reserves was no faster than 
that of covered payrolls. Thus, the reserve ratio, which had been 3.57 
percent at the end of 1959, was 3.46 percent at the end of 1969, despite 
the fact that aggregate reserves had nearly doubled, growing from 
$6.67 billion in 1959 to $12.64 billion in 1969.
Because state reserves were so large at the start of the 1948-1979 
period, the decline in reserves did not present financing problems for 
many states until the mid 1970s. Alaska, Michigan, and Pennsylvania 
were the only states that borrowed from the U.S. Treasury to finance 
benefits during the 1950s and 1960s. These loans were fully repaid by 
the late 1960s.
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Substantial drawdowns of state trust funds occurred in the early 
1970s. The first states to require loans were Connecticut, Vermont, and 
Washington during 1972-1974, with reductions in defense-related pro 
curement causing especially high unemployment in Connecticut and 
Washington.
Large-scale borrowing from the U.S. Treasury first became wide 
spread in 1975 as the 1974-1975 recession caused financing problems 
for many states. Nearly half of all UI programs required loans during 
1975-1978, and aggregate borrowing totaled $5.5 billion. Moreover, 
the post-1975 recovery was not robust enough to restore trust fund bal 
ances fully by the end of the 1970s. Several debtor states repaid their 
loans slowly, and aggregate reserves totaled only $8.58 billion at the 
end of 1979. This balance was about $2.3 billion less than it had been 
at the end of 1973 and $4.1 billion less than at the end of 1969. The 
reserve ratio at the end of 1979 was only 0.91 percent, roughly one- 
fourth of the reserve ratio at the end of 1969 (3.46 percent) and only 
about one-eighth of the reserve ratio at the end of 1948 (7.91 percent).
The second period of substantial state borrowing occurred during 
the back-to-back recessions of the early 1980s. Because state pro 
grams entered the 1980-1983 recessions with historically low reserves, 
borrowing was even more widespread and on a larger scale during the 
early 1980s than during the 1970s. Between 1980 and 1987, total bor 
rowing was $24.2 billion, with four states Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, 
and Pennsylvania responsible for over 60 percent of the total. Aggre 
gate reserves reached a low point at the end of 1983, when the nation 
wide total was actually negative: -$5.8 billion. Debtor states brought 
in major tax increases and reduced benefits as they attempted to restore 
trust funds to adequate levels.
The six years starting in 1984 witnessed large-scale trust fund 
building, with the states adding more than $42 billion to net reserves, 
about $7.0 billion per year. This yielded an aggregate balance of $36.9 
billion at the end of 1989. Despite the growth in absolute reserve bal 
ances, the aggregate reserve ratio in 1989 was only 1.92 percent, 
slightly more than half of its 1969 level of 3.46 percent. Taking the 
highest-ever national cost rate (2.22 percent during calendar-year 
1975) as the high-cost rate gives a nationwide reserve ratio multiple of 
0.87 for 1989; this 1989 multiple has not been reached during the 
1990s.
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Thus, 1989 marks the end of the third historical period, a second 
period of substantial trust fund accumulations. While the absolute 
increases in reserves were impressive, the indicators of relative size did 
not grow nearly so dramatically. Compared to the 1948 reserve ratio of 
7.91 percent, the 1989 reserve ratio of 1.92 percent was about one- 
fourth as large. Nonetheless, during the 1990-1992 recession, states 
did not need the large-scale loans they had required during 1974-1978 
and again during 1980-1987. Unlike the 1970s and 1980s, only seven 
states borrowed during 1990-1995, and just two had loans that were 
"large," i.e., more than 1 percent of covered wages.
Another contrast to earlier recessions is that the 1990-1992 down 
turn was unusually mild in most areas of the country. As a conse 
quence, the drawdowns on trust fund balances were unusually small: 
Net reserves decreased by $11.0 billion during 1990-1992, compared 
with $14.4 billion during 1980-1983. We shall return to this topic 
later.
A third contrast between the 1990s and the 1980s is that there was 
no substantial trust fund building during the economic expansion of 
1993-1996. The four-year increase in aggregate net reserves was only 
$12.8 billion, or $3.2 billion per year. This rate of accumulation is less 
than half the annual rate during 1984-1989. As a consequence, the 
aggregate reserve ratio for the economy only grew from 1.20 percent at 
the end of 1992 to 1.43 percent at the end of 1996, and the RRM 
increased only from 0.54 to 0.64. On a relative basis, national reserves 
were about three-quarters as adequate at the end of 1996 as they had 
been at the end of 1989.
The slow pace of reserve accumulation characteristic of the 1990s 
marks this decade as the fourth period in the history of UI trust fund 
reserves. Compared with the long period from 1948 to 1979, the pat 
tern of recession-related reserve losses and subsequent accumulations 
in the 1990s is broadly similar, but it is based on a single recession- 
recovery episode. Trust funds declined during the recession but were 
not restored to pre-recession levels during the subsequent economic 
expansion. A repetition of this recession-recovery pattern could lead to 
renewed large-scale borrowing. Since reserve ratios were so much 
more modest at the end of 1989, compared with those of 1948, the next 
recession may entail the large-scale borrowing that occurred during the 
1970s and 1980s. The slow reserve accumulations during 1993-1996
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and the potential for large-scale borrowing during a future recession 
are discussed in the next section of this chapter.
State borrowing from the U.S. Treasury is not necessarily to be 
avoided at all times. Temporary loans for cash-flow purposes, because 
of differing seasonal patterns of tax revenues and benefit payments, can 
occasionally occur without causing large or persistent indebtedness. 
Interest-free seasonal cash-flow loans have always been available to 
the states. Loans secured but fully repaid before September 30th of the 
same year are interest-free.
Since the early 1980s, however, longer-term indebtedness has car 
ried interest charges. If the debt is outstanding on January 1st of two 
consecutive years and has not been fully repaid by November 10th of 
the second year, an automatic debt repayment process comes into 
effect. On January 1st of the following year, 0.3 percent is added to the 
federal part of each employer©s UI tax obligation, i.e., 1.1 percent 
rather than 0.8 percent on the first $7,000 of earnings for each 
employee. The proceeds of the 0.3 percent penalty tax are used to 
repay the oldest part of a state©s debt. Even higher penalty tax rates 
apply in later years.
Because federal UI penalty taxes are levied at a flat rate, a state 
may prefer to make voluntary repayments with experience-rated state 
UI taxes. These must be levied as new tax obligations (not as with 
drawals from the state©s UI trust fund), and their yield must at least 
equal the yield of the federal penalty tax. Voluntary repayment can 
also be accomplished through a special assessment levied on top of 
regular employer state UI taxes.
Before 1981, debt repayment provisions differed from current pro 
visions in several ways. Two especially important contrasts should be 
noted: 1) loans did not carry interest charges and 2) automatic debt 
repayment through mandatory PUT penalty taxes was suspended by 
emergency federal legislation. In short, debt burdens before 1981 were 
lighter than at present. That the increase in the cost of indebtedness 
helps shape state attitudes towards debt is shown by their debt repay 
ment behavior. 7 Debts incurred in the 1970s were repaid slowly, but 
post-1982 debts were repaid rapidly. Post-1982 debts were often held 
for such short periods that no interest was due.
The faster pace of debt repayment since 1982 partly reflects the 
states© willingness to cut benefit payments while their economies are
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still in recession. Thus, one consequence of trust fund inadequacy is 
that legislation designed to improve fund adequacy typically includes 
benefit reductions as well as tax increases. 8 Another reason to encour 
age the states to build large trust funds is to avoid recession-related 
benefit reductions.
To help illustrate the link between a standard indicator of trust fund 
adequacy and state borrowing, Table 1-1 displays summary data from 
recent recessions of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. The top panel of 
Table 1-1 shows reserve ratio multiples for the ends of the years just 
before the onset of each of the four most recent recessions, plus the 
multiples at the end of 1996. The back-to-back recessions of 1980 and 
1981-1982 are treated as a single, very serious recession. The top 
panel vividly illustrates the loss of reserve adequacy since the end of 
1969. In 1969, only one state had an RRM below 1.0, and 35 had mul 
tiples of 1.5 or larger. By 1979, 10 states had multiples that were nega 
tive and 12 had multiples below 0.50, while only 2 states had multiples 
of 1.5 or larger.
In Table 1-1, note how the reserve accumulations of 1984-1989 
changed the distribution of multiples. While only 4 states had multi 
ples above 1.5 in 1989, 17 others had multiples between 1.0 and 1.49. 
The number of multiples that fell below 0.50 decreased from 22 in 
1979 to 9 in 1989. When the multiples in the individual states are 
examined, the increase in the aggregate RRM between 1979 and 1989 
(from 0.41 to 0.87) shows the expected pattern.
The top panel of Table 1-1 also shows the decline in the distribu 
tion of state RRMs between 1989 and 1996. In both years, nearly all 
programs had multiples in the range of 0.0 to 1.49. In 1996, however, 
eight fewer states had multiples between 1.0 and 1.49 (9 versus 17), 
while while two more had multiples between 0.5 and 0.99 (24 versus 
22) and seven more had multiples between 0.0 and 0.49 (16 versus 9). 
More states had low multiples at the start of 1997 than seven years ear 
lier.
Although it may be obvious to most readers, there is a strong asso 
ciation between the level of a state©s RRM before a recession and the 
likelihood of borrowing during a recession. The lower part of Table 1- 
1 illustrates this association with data on state borrowing from 1974- 
1979, 1980-1987, and 1990-1995. The first row for each period gives 
the initial distribution of state RRMs before the onset of the recession.
Table 1-1 State UI Trust Fund Reserves and Borrowing3
Reserve ratio multiple interval
Time period
End of year
1969
1973
1979
1989
1996
State borrowing,
1974-1979
Initial RRMs
States with loans
States with "large"
loansb
State borrowing,
1980-1987
Initial RRMs
States with loans
States with "large"
loans
Negative
0
1
10
0
0
1
1
1
10
9
2
0.0-0.49
0
4
12
9
16
4
4
4
12
10
6
0.5-0.99
1
14
17
22
24
14
12
8
17
10
5
1.0-1.49
16
12
11
17
9
12
5
1
11
2
1
1.5-1.99
15
12
2
4
2
12
2
1
2
0
0
2.0 and 
higher
20
9
0
0
1
9
0
0
0
0
0
Total number 
of states
52
52
52
52
52
52
24
15
52
31
14
National 
reserve 
ratio 
multiple
1.68
1.04
0.41
0.87
0.64
State borrowing, 
1990-1995
Initial RRMs 0 9 22 17 4 0 52 
States with loans 430007 
States with "large"
loans 0200002 
SOURCE: All data on trust fund reserves and loans are from the UI Service of the U.S. Department of Labor. 
a The 52 programs are those of the 50 states plus the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico. The Virgin Islands are excluded from the
table.
b "Large" loans are defined as the total borrowing over the indicated periods equal to 1 percent or more of total payrolls for a single yeai 
in the periods indicated, 1975, 1984, and 1991, respectively.
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The second row shows how many states in each interval needed any 
loan during the years indicated. The third row shows the number of 
states needing large loans, "large" being defined as total borrowing dur 
ing the entire period equal to 1 percent or more of the total covered 
wages for one year in the period indicated.
During 1974-1979, 24 programs borrowed and 15 needed large 
loans. The probability of a state needing a loan and needing a large 
loan was much higher for states with low initial reserve ratio multiples. 
All five states with multiples below 0.50 borrowed, and all five needed 
large loans during 1974-1979. Of the 21 states with initial RRMs of 
1.5 or larger, only two needed a loan, and just one needed a large loan.
Similar patterns appear for 1980-1987. Nineteen of the 22 states 
with initial multiples below 0.5 borrowed, and eight needed large 
loans. Only two states with multiples initially above 1.0 borrowed, and 
just one needed a large loan. Thus, states with low initial multiples 
borrowed the most.
Of course, because so many states had low and negative net 
reserves at the end of 1979, the scale of borrowing during 1980-1987 
was much larger than during 1974-1979. Loans during 1974-1979 
were $5.5 billion, or 0.94 percent of U.S. total wages in 1975, com 
pared with $24.2 billion during 1980-1987, or 1.77 percent of U.S. 
total wages in 1984.
Relative to 1974-1979 and 1980-1997, borrowing during 1990- 
1995 was small. The seven states that needed loans borrowed only 
$4.8 billion, or 0.22 percent of U.S. total wages in 1991. Note, how 
ever, that borrowing was again concentrated in states with low initial 
RRMs. The loan probabilities in the two lowest intervals during 1990- 
1995 were 0.44 in the 0.0-0.49 interval (4 of 9) and 0.14 in the 0.5- 
0.99 interval (3 of 22).
A vertical scan down the borrowing data of Table 1-1 shows a clear 
pattern of decreasing loan probabilities within a given RRM interval. 
For states falling in the 0.5-0.99 interval, the probability of borrowing 
was 0.86 during 1974-1979 (12 of 14), 0.59 during 1980-1987 (10 of 
17), and 0.14 during 1990-1995 (3 of 22). Another obvious pattern is 
the monotonic relationship in grouped data between the initial RRM 
and the probability of needing a UI loan. States can reduce the risk of 
recession-related borrowing when they have higher initial reserve ratio 
multiples.
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For additional insight into the lack of state borrowing during the 
1990-1992 recession, Table 1-2 provides comparisons of the increases 
in unemployment rates during recessions. It focuses on state-level 
ratios of three-year unemployment rates and it also gives the national 
medians and averages of three-year ratios. The main point is that state- 
level increases in total unemployment rates (or TURs, as measured in 
the Current Population Survey [CPS], the monthly household labor 
force survey)9 were unusually small during 1990-1992. Nineteen 
states actually had lower average TURs during 1990-1992 than during 
1987-1989, that is, ratios below 1.00. The ratios exceeded 1.25 in just 
16 states during 1990-1992, compared with 36, 32, and 37 states, 
respectively, in the three earlier recessions. The concentration of states 
with low increases (and even reductions) in unemployment rates dur 
ing 1990-1992, relative to 1987-1989, underlies the low aggregate 
unemployment ratio in Table 1-2.
A similar pattern appears in Table 1-3 when the changes in reserve 
ratio multiples are compared across the four recessions. Relative to the 
decreases in state-level multiples during 1990-1992, the decreases dur 
ing the preceding three recessions were two to three times larger. The 
national ratios decreased by 0.65 during 1969-1973, by 0.98 during 
1973-1976, and by 0.62 during 1979-1983, but by only 0.33 during 
1989-1992. During the four periods, the number of states in which the 
decreases exceeded 0.75 were 21, 34, 16, and just 1, respectively. Both 
Tables 1-2 and 1-3 clearly show that 1990-1992 was a much milder 
recession than its three immediate predecessors. This must be kept in 
mind in explaining why state UI trust fund borrowing was so infre 
quent and on such a small scale during the 1990s.
TRUST FUND DEVELOPMENTS IN THE 1990s
Table 1-4 provides additional detail on individual state trust fund 
developments during the 1990s, giving the net reserves and RRMs at 
the end of 1989, 1992, and 1996. Trust fund levels and changes for 
these years span the most recent episodes of recession and recovery. 
To characterize the changes in state-level unemployment, the average 
unemployment rates for 1990-1992 and 1987-1989 are shown as a
Table 1-2 Average State Unemployment Rate Ratios during Recent Recessions8
Ratio of three-year rates (number of states)
Ratio periods
1971-1973 over
1967-1969
1974-1976 over
1971-1973
1981-1983 over
1977-1979
1990-1992 over
1987-1989
Below 
0.75
0
0
0
2
0.75 to 
0.999
2
6
2
17
1.00 to 
1.249
12
13
13
16
1.25 to 
1.499
15
21
12
8
1.50 to 
1.749
12
8
12
3
1.75 to 
1.999
3
3
11
2
2.00 and 
above
7
0
1
3
State 
median 
ratio
1.45
1.33
1.52
1.11
Mean 
U.S. 
ratio
1.51
1.33
1.42
1.16
SOURCE: Calculations performed at the Urban Institute using data from the U.S. Department of Labor. State unemployment rate esti 
mates for several smaller states before 1976 were made at the Urban Institute. 
a Calculations are shown for the 50 states plus the District of Columbia.
Table 1-3 Changes in Reserve Ratio Multiples during Recent Recessions3
Change in RRM (number of states)
Year-end change
1969 to 1973
1973 to 1976
1979 to 1983
1989 to 1992
Increase
1
1
11
13
0.00 to
-0.249
4
4
5
20
-0.25 to
-0.499
12
2
10
9
-0.50 to
-0.749
13
10
9
8
-0.75 to
-0.999
9
12
3
1
-1.00 to
1.499
10
13
10
0
-1.50
or more
2
9
3
0
State
median
change
-0.66
-0.92
-0.49
-0.20
Mean
U.S.
change
-0.65
-0.98
-0.62
-0.33
SOURCE: Calculations performed at the Urban Institute using data from the U.S. Department of Labor. 
a Calculations are shown for the 50 states plus the District of Columbia.
Table 1-4 Net Reserves and Reserve Ratio Multiples by State, December 1989 to December 1996
Reserve Ratio Multiples
Net Reserves, Dec. 31 ($mill)
State3
Connecticut5
Maine0
Massachusetts5
New Hampshire
Rhode Island
Vermont
New Jersey
New Yorkc
Pennsylvania
Puerto Rico
Virgin Islands
Illinois
Indiana
Michigan0
Ohio
1989
274
206
909
204
304
197
2,795
3,181
1,616
564
28
1,268
770
370
778
1992
-653
35
-380
130
104
181
2,440
214
808
749
47
848
942
-72
602
1996
278
112
915
268
116
218
2,029
470
2,032
596
42
1,639
1,273
1,831
1,751
1989
0.22
0.94
0.45
0.89
0.92
1.63
1.06
0.76
0.55
1.82
2.67
0.47
1.04
0.13
0.30
Levels
1992
-0.50
0.15
-0.18
0.55
0.32
1.41
0.85
0.05
0.25
2.05
3.21
0.28
1.11
-0.02
0.21
Changes
1996
0.18
0.42
0.35
0.89
0.31
1.41
0.60
0.09
0.53
1.33
2.45
0.44
1.19
0.45
0.49
1989-92
-0.72
-0.78
-0.63
-0.34
-0.60
-0.21
-0.21
-0.71
-0.30
0.24
0.54
-0.19
0.07
-0.15
-0.09
1992-96
0.68
0.27
0.53
0.34
-0.01
-0.00
-0.25
0.04
0.28
-0.72
-0.76
0.16
0.08
0.47
0.28
Ratio of 
unemploy 
ment rates, 
1990-927 
1987-89
1.947
1.632
2.236
2.400
2.227
1.783
1.664
1.476
1.297
NAd
NA
1.035
1.083
1.116
1.037
Wisconsin 1041 1195 1557 0.96 0.93 0.96 -0.03 0.03 1.007
Iowa
Kansas
Minnesota
Missouri0
Nebraska
North Dakota
South Dakota
Delaware
Dist. of Columbia0
Florida
Georgia
Maryland
North Carolina
South Carolina
Virginia
West Virginia
Alabama
Kentucky
Mississippi
518
472
359
372
127
45
45
207
76
2,041
1,018
598
1,471
415
718
146
623
393
388
615
606
224
3
161
50
50
219
-19
1,444
966
146
1,387
433
507
141
550
364
345
719
651
513
308
195
50
50
258
99
1,948
1,634
691
1,336
603
897
157
483
501
553
1.20
1.35
0.52
0.50
0.89
0.70
1.46
1.24
0.40
1.29
0.96
0.75
1.26
0.66
1.17
0.41
1.21
0.69
1.67
1.20
1.47
0.27
0.00
0.94
0.65
1.26
1.18
-0.09
0.79
0.79
0.17
1.03
0.60
0.74
0.35
0.90
0.54
1.26
1.11
1.26
0.48
0.30
0.87
0.49
0.92
1.10
0.41
0.82
0.99
0.67
0.75
0.65
1.03
0.33
0.64
0.58
1.55
0.00
0.12
-0.24
-0.50
0.05
-0.05
-0.20
-0.06
-0.50
-0.50
-0.18
-0.58
-0.23
-0.06
-0.43
-0.06
-0.31
-0.15
-0.42
-0.09
-0.21
0.21
0.30
-0.07
-0.16
-0.34
-0.08
0.50
0.03
0.20
0.50
-0.28
0.05
0.29
-0.02
-0.26
0.04
0.29
0.943
0.943
1.093
1.028
0.671
0.909
0.811
1.685
1.405
1.345
1.032
1.387
1.362
1.154
1.366
1.019
0.965
0.877
0.916
(continued)
Table 1-4 (continued)
Reserve Ratio Multiples
Net Reserves, Dec. 31 ($mill)
State3
Tennessee
Arkansas
Louisiana
Oklahoma
Texas
Arizona
Colorado
Idaho
Montana
Nevada
New Mexico
Utah
Wyoming
Alaska
California
1989
657
131
306
323
989
493
239
220
80
321
174
239
54
180
5,419
1992
603
81
601
419
586
372
339
240
96
234
239
342
110
232
2,787
1996
827
203
1131
564
642
627
511
266
126
348
386
524
147
194
2,877
1989
0.90
0.40
0.43
1.34
0.73
0.84
0.75
1.37
0.63
1.12
1.48
1.25
0.71
0.93
0.92
Levels
1992
0.69
0.20
0.72
1.53
0.36
0.55
0.87
1.16
0.62
0.65
1.69
1.40
1.23
1.06
0.43
Changes
1996
0.72
0.40
1.09
1.71
0.30
0.63
0.94
0.94
0.67
0.64
2.06
1.46
1.39
0.78
0.38
1989-92
-0.21
-0.20
0.29
0.19
-0.37
-0.29
0.12
-0.21
-0.01
-0.47
0.21
0.15
0.52
0.12
-0.48
1992-96
0.03
0.20
0.37
0.18
-0.06
0.08
0.07
-0.22
0.05
-0.01
0.37
0.06
0.16
-0.28
-0.05
Ratio of 
unemploy 
ment rates, 
1990-927 
1987-89
1.041
0.934
0.693
0.910
0.902
1.037
0.796
0.967
0.970
1.047
0.857
0.885
0.756
1.005
1.380
Hawaii
Oregon
Washington
U.S.Total
340
804
1,364
36,871
362
1055
1,766
25,847
211
941
1,333
38,632
1.75
1.35
1.07
0.87
1.68
1.47
1.09
0.54
0.95
0.94
0.66
0.64
-0.07
0.12
0.02
-0.33
-0.73
-0.53
-0.43
0.10
1.058
1.070
0.937
1.156
SOURCE: Data are from the UI Service of the U.S. Department of Labor.
a Alphabetically within Census division.
b States needing large U.S. Treasury loans during 1990-1995.
c States needing small U.S. Treasury loans during 1990-1995.
d NA = data not available.
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ratio. States are arrayed by census division and then alphabetically 
within each of the nine census divisions. Table 1-4 also identifies the 
seven states needing UI trust fund loans during 1991-1995.
Four aspects of these data are noteworthy. First, state-level 
changes in unemployment varied widely during the 1990-1992 down 
turn. While the national average unemployment rate ratio was 1.156, 
the state-level ratios ranged from 2.400 (New Hampshire) to 0.671 
(Nebraska). Second, the highest unemployment rate ratios were found 
in states on the Atlantic coast and in California. The New England and 
Mid Atlantic states had especially large increases in their unemploy 
ment rates; arranging the states geographically helps to emphasize this 
point. Third, the decreases in reserves and reserve ratio multiples were 
disproportionately large in the states with the largest increases in 
unemployment. Of the nine states where multiples decreased by 0.50 
or more between 1989 and 1992, eight had unemployment rate ratios 
of 1.345 or higher. 10 Fourth, RRMs decreased in 22 states between the 
end of 1992 and 1996, a period when trust fund building would have 
been expected. If we take the RRM as a gauge of trust fund adequacy, 
the position of those 22 states deteriorated.
The slow pace of reserve accumulation during 1993-1996 is note 
worthy and deserves emphasis. One way is to highlight developments 
in the 10 largest states, which accounted for 52 percent of taxable cov 
ered employment and 56 percent of covered payrolls in 1996." Five of 
the 10 had smaller reserve balances at the end of 1996 than at the end 
of 1989, and eight had smaller reserve ratio multiples. 12 Weighted by 
1996 payrolls, the average RRM for the 10 dropped from 0.72 at the 
end of 1989 to 0.32 at the end of 1992 and then recovered to 0.41 at the 
end of 1996. Compared with the national average RRM, their average 
was 0.15 lower in 1989 (0.72 compared to 0.87) and 0.23 lower in 
1996 (0.41 compared to 0.64). In 1996, only three of the 10 largest 
states had multiples that exceeded 0.50, while four had multiples below 
0.40. 13 These states were much more vulnerable to the risk of reces 
sion-related financing problems at the start of 1997 than they had been 
in 1990.
A second way to highlight the slow pace of reserve accumulation 
during 1992-1996 is to ask the following question: How long would it 
take to restore reserves to their 1989 level? Between 1992 and 1996, 
the national reserve ratio multiple increased by only 0.10 (from 0.54 to
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0.64), or by an average of 0.025 per year. At that pace of accumula 
tion, more than eight years would be required to achieve a national 
multiple of 0.87 (the 1989 RRM). This would imply an economic 
recovery lasting more than 12 years, or longer than any expansion 
since the establishment of UI in the mid 1930s.
Given the strong pace of economic expansion during 1993-1996, a 
substantial accumulation of reserves would have been anticipated. 
Annual benefit payouts during 1993-1996 averaged $3.8 billion less 
than during 1991-1992. Also, aggregate tax receipts increased sub 
stantially; the three-year average for 1994-1996 of $21.8 billion was 
42 percent higher than the 1989-1991 average of $15.4 billion. 14
What distinguishes the UI tax increases during the most recent 
period of recovery is their comparatively modest size. The analogous 
increases following the downturns of 1974-1975 and 1980-1982 
exceeded 100 percent and 60 percent, respectively. Based on earlier 
recessions, higher UI taxes would have been expected during 1994- 
1996.
While a detailed analysis of recent changes in UI tax laws lies 
beyond the scope of this book, there have been UI tax reductions which 
clearly slowed the pace of trust fund accumulations during 1993-1996. 
Kansas and North Carolina were especially aggressive in lowering UI 
taxes, but tax reductions have been widespread during the 1990s.
The slow pace of trust fund accumulations during 1993-1996 has 
obvious implications for state UI solvency. In particular, it implies 
that at the start of 1997, states were more vulnerable to the threat of 
financing problems than they were seven years earlier, i.e., before the 
onset of the 1990-1992 recession.
To examine risks of insolvency, a series of simulations was under 
taken (details are provided in Appendix A). The simulations used the 
relationship between decreases in state reserve ratio multiples and 
increases in average unemployment rates that prevailed during the 
1990-1992 recession. Historic patterns of increased state unemploy 
ment rates were then fed into this relationship to provide projections of 
trust fund drawdowns for recessions of differing severity.
Two conclusions emerged from the simulation analysis.
1. The absence of widespread financing problems during 1990- 
1992 is attributable to both the mild nature of the recession and
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to the comparatively large initial trust state fund balances. The 
states may not be as lucky in the next recession, for unemploy 
ment may be of greater magnitude.
2. More states needed loans when they entered recessions with 
their 1996 year-end reserve balances than when they entered 
with their 1989 reserve balances.
Based on 1993-1996 rates of trust fund accumulation, several states 
will start the next recession with smaller balances than at the end of 
1989. Other things being equal, the smaller balances caused by the 
slow pace of accumulations during 1993-1996 will cause increased 
borrowing during the next recession.
In conclusion, it is almost certain that states will enter the next 
recession with lower trust fund reserves (reserves as a percentage of 
payroll) than they had before the recession that began in December 
1989. To the extent that tax increases and benefit reductions would 
occur rapidly and in large amounts in a future recession, flexible 
financing would lessen the need to maintain large reserves before a 
recession. Chapter 2 examines flexible financing.
Notes
1. The most common arrangement bases weekly benefits on earnings during the 
highest quarter of the base period, but the weekly benefit is limited to a range 
defined by a minimum and maximum. A recipient©s total potential entitlement 
typically reflects his or her earnings during the entire one-year base period, for 
example, one-third of base-period earnings. The potential duration is then the 
ratio of the potential entitlement to the weekly benefit. The details of monetary 
eligibility provisions vary widely from state to state.
2. Of the 20 programs in which the taxable wage base exceeded $10,000 in 1996, 18 
had indexed tax bases. The other two were Connecticut and Massachusetts.
3. For a recent analysis of experience-rating, particularly on its effects on employer- 
initiated worker turnover and inter-industry cross subsidies, see Vroman (1996).
4. See Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (1995), Chapters 2 and 5 
and Appendix E.
5. These are recommendations 2 through 6 in Chapter 2 of the ACUC report. Sev 
eral of the ACUC recommendations on financial incentives that would encourage 
states to build large trust fund reserves can be found in Vroman (1990).
6. See, for example, the testimony of Ward (1987), director of the Illinois Depart 
ment of Employment Security, before the Committee on Ways and Means of the 
U.S. House of Representatives in December 1987. Her testimony stresses both
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the automatic financing features in Illinois© 1987 UI law and the need for each 
state to determine the level of reserves appropriate to its circumstances.
7. See Miller, Pavosevich, and Vroman (1997), Table 9.3, for a summary of annual 
debt repayment patterns from 1972 to 1994.
8. Legislation of the early 1980s in the states with largest debts almost always 
included both benefit reductions and tax increases. See Vroman (1986), Chapter 2.
9. The CPS estimates for small states are incomplete before 1976. Estimates made 
at the Urban Institute have been used where CPS data were not available.
10. Missouri, the ninth state, had a ratio of only 1.028. The simple correlation between 
the unemployment rate ratios of Table 1-4 and the 1989-1992 change in state 
reserve ratio multiples was -0.627. The correlation was much higher (-0.907) 
when states were weighted by the size of their labor forces.
11. The 10, ranked in descending order according to 1996 payrolls, are California, 
New York, Texas, Illinois, Florida, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Michigan, New Jersey, 
and Massachusetts.
12. Note in Table 1-4 that only Ohio and Michigan had higher reserve ratio multiples 
at the end of 1996 than at the end of 1989.
13. Note California, New York, Texas, and Massachusetts in Table 1-4.
14. Annual data on aggregate UI benefits and employer taxes from 1938 through 1996 
appear in columns (10) and (8), respectively, of U.S. Department of Labor ET 
Handbook 394 (1995) and in later updates to that handbook.

2 Flexible Financing
Because benefit payouts can change sharply from one year to the 
next, UI programs must be prepared to finance potentially large draw 
downs of reserves. Annual benefit payouts can more than double from 
one year to the next, and high payouts can persist for several years. 
Individual states have adopted different strategies for addressing these 
uncertainties. Chapter 1 drew a major distinction between advance (or 
forward) funding and pay-as-you-go funding. To the extent that pay- 
as-you-go implies a smaller fund balance prior to recessions, it also 
implies a higher risk of borrowing during recessions and a greater need 
for a strong revenue response to offset the effects of recession-related 
increases in benefit payouts.
This chapter examines flexible financing. Its main concern is with 
how the UI tax system responds to trust fund drawdowns; it does not 
attempt to define all aspects of flexible financing. There are three pos 
sible parts to a flexible financing strategy. First, and most important, is 
the response of UI taxes to trust fund drawdowns. This includes both 
the response caused by experience-rating and that caused by solvency 
taxes that are automatically triggered when the state©s trust fund falls 
below a designated threshold. The tax response can include the auto 
matic triggering of employee taxes and/or changes in the taxable wage 
base; it can also include changes in employer taxes. Second, when the 
trust fund is depleted, the state might restrict benefit payouts, e.g., 
freeze the maximum weekly benefit. Third, motivated by the trust fund 
drawdown, a state might respond with legislation that includes both tax 
increases and benefit reductions. While the magnitude of a legislative 
response could be measured after the fact, it cannot be forecast and 
receives only limited attention in this chapter. All three responses act 
to reduce the size of the trust fund drawdown during a recession.
Flexible financing is a broader concept than tax responsiveness. 
However, most of this chapter©s analysis focuses on tax responsiveness 
within its cyclical context. Tax-base indexation, a related topic, is 
studied in Chapter 3. The cyclical responsiveness of UI taxes includes 
both the speed and the magnitude of the response. Each receives atten 
tion in this chapter.
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Ultimately, how UI taxes respond to a trust fund drawdown 
depends on the state©s taxation capacity. This capacity, in turn, 
depends on the taxable share of covered wages (the taxable wage pro 
portion, TWP) and the maximum effective tax rate for the maximum 
experience-rated tax rate schedule plus the state©s solvency taxes. That 
product, UI taxes as a percentage of covered wages, is the maximum 
annual rate of inflow that can occur under the given tax statutes. For 
more than a decade, tax capacity has been decreasing in several states 
as a direct consequence of state-level downtrends in the TWP, trends 
that reflect slow adjustments of the tax base over time. In several large 
states, the tax base has remained at $7,000 per worker since 1983 and 
tax capacity has been on a downward trend since 1985. This chapter 
also examines tax capacity.
Since the early 1980s, when the cost of borrowing from the U.S. 
Treasury increased, states have assumed a larger role in ensuring trust 
fund solvency. Having adequate taxation capacity is important for 
ensuring solvency. This chapter traces changes in state-level UI taxes 
and draws inferences about the evolution of UI taxation during this 
time of increased state responsibility.
This chapter is divided into four sections: 1) experience-rated 
taxes, 2) solvency taxes and other solvency measures, 3) the literature 
on tax responsiveness, and 4) a summary of the findings and policy 
implications. The analysis in the first two sections focuses heavily on 
the statutes and on how these have changed over the past 30 years. The 
analysis is useful for documenting what changes have occurred, but it 
does not assess their importance. The general conclusion from the 
empirical studies is that the quantitative importance of flexible financ 
ing is rather small. During a serious downturn, flexible financing 
would not be strong enough to prevent a need for large-scale borrowing 
to pay UI benefits.
EXPERIENCE-RATING STATUTES
Experience-rating is often quite complicated, and mastering all its 
nuances requires extensive study. This section focuses on a few key
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elements of state-level experience-rating, elements that can be traced in 
readily available publications. 1
The four experience-rating features selected for emphasis here are 
not exhaustive, but all are important in answering questions about flex 
ible financing and tax responsiveness. 2 The four are 1) the computa 
tion lag, 2) the range of tax rates in state tax rate schedules, 3) the 
maximum tax rate schedule, and 4) tax capacity. If state systems were 
evolving towards increased tax responsiveness, one would expect to 
observe certain patterns of change.
The Computation Lag
To set tax rates for the coming tax year, a UI program examines the 
overall status of a state©s trust fund and also uses the experience indica 
tors for all rateable employers (those with enough years in operation to 
qualify for experience-rating). The level of the trust fund determines 
the tax schedule to be used. The date for making this determination is 
called the "computation date." For nearly all states, the computation 
date is either June 30th or July 1st. New rates typically become effec 
tive on January 1st of the next year, but a few states change tax sched 
ules on July 1st rather than January 1st.
Employers accrue UI tax obligations on a quarterly basis, and tax 
payments are due one month after the end of each quarter. Except in 
Massachusetts, payments for the first quarter are due on April 30th. 3 
Employers must, therefore, be notified by the end of the first quarter if 
they are to withhold the appropriate amount from their first-quarter 
covered payrolls.
If June 30th is the computation date and January 1st is the new tax 
date, 10 months elapse between the date that the tax schedule is set 
(June 30th) and the date that the first payments for the next year are 
received (April 30th). A recession could begin or could become con 
siderably worse during those 10 months, leading to a reduced trust 
fund balance and making the slated tax schedule and individual 
employer experience-ratings less appropriate than on the preceding 
June 30th. Ten additional months of benefit charging would occur, 
including the first four months of the new year, months in which sea 
sonal benefits are highest.
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States are aware of this situation. One possible response would be 
to move the computation date back six months, to December 31st. 
That would shorten the lag from 10 to 4 months and would still leave a 
state the time to determine the necessary tax rates. Increased state 
interest in flexible financing would, therefore, be expected to shorten 
the computation lag.
Table 2-1 summarizes computation lags from 1966 to 1996. It 
includes data for 1975 and 1986 (just before the period of large-scale 
debt and borrowing of the mid 1970s and after most of the borrowing 
of the early 1980s). The lags shown in Table 2-1 do not reflect the 
four-month lag between the start of quarterly accruals and actual quar 
terly tax payments. Thus, a June 30th computation date, coupled with 
a January 1st effective date for the new tax schedule, appears in Table 
2-1 as a six-month lag.
Table 2-1 shows remarkable stability in the distribution of compu 
tation lags. For every year, almost all programs had lags of zero, three, 
or six months, with about two-thirds of the states having a six-month 
lag. Interestingly, there were more states with a zero lag in 1966 (10 
states) than in 1996 (6 states). There is no evidence that any state has 
shortened its computation lag. On the contrary, note that the average 
lag was slightly longer in 1996 than it was in 1986, 1975, or 1966.
New schedules usually become effective on January 1st. Forty- 
three programs out of 51 used January 1st in 1966, while 48 of 53 used 
January 1st in 1996. Two fewer states used July 1st as the start date for 
the new tax year in 1996 than did in to 1966. Nothing in the data sug 
gests that states have acted to reduce the lag between the computation 
date and the date when new tax schedules take effect.
The Structure of Tax Rates: Minimums, Maximums, and Ranges
States can more effectively assign benefit charges to individual 
employers when operative tax rates span a wider range of potential 
rates. Having a wider range of rates within individual tax schedules 
also adds to tax responsiveness, for it is then easier to raise employer 
rates in response to less favorable individual experience indicators. 4 A 
wider range of rates moves a state©s tax system towards increased tax 
responsiveness. 5
Table 2-1 Computation Lags and New Tax Schedule Dates, 1966 to 1996a
Length of computation lag 
(number of UI programs)
Year
1966
1975
1986
1996
0 months
10
8
8
6
3 months
7
7
7
7
6 months
33
35
33
37
Other
1
1
4
3
Total 
programs
51
51
52
53
Average 
lag 
(months)
4.4
4.6
4.5
4.8
Date new tax schedules 
take effect
Jan. 1
43
44
47
49
April 1
1
1
0
0
July 1
7
6
5
4
Total 
programs
51
51
52
53
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, 1966 and 1975; National Foundation for Unemployment Compensation and Workers© Compensa 
tion, 1986 and 1996.
a The counts show the number of UI programs with the indicated features in each year. Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands are not 
included in 1966 and 1975. Puerto Rico is not included in 1986.
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Because state UI programs operate within a federal-state statutory 
framework, several aspects of UI taxes levied by the states must con 
form with federal requirements. The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsi 
bility Act of 1983, or TEFRA (Public Law 97-248), contained several 
provisions for financing UI. What is most important for the discussion 
here is that the maximum PUT credit offset was increased from 2.7 per 
cent to 5.4 percent effective January 1, 1985. Thus, from that date, to 
have a federally approved experience-rating system, a state UI program 
had to have a maximum experience-rated tax rate of at least 5.4 percent.
To put the effects of TEFRA into perspective, Tables 2-2, 2-3, and 
2-4 give tax rate information for 1966 to 1996, showing the distribu 
tions of minimum tax rates, maximum tax rates, and the range of rates 
on January 1st. The data in these tables reflect the actual tax rate 
schedules in effect in the indicated years. Three-year intervals are 
shown for 1966 to 1978 and two-year intervals thereafter. Because of 
the change mandated by TEFRA, tax rates are given for 1984, 1985, 
and 1986.
As background to the discussion, keep in mind that UI trust funds 
had major drawdowns during 1975-1977 and again during 1980-1983. 
Net reserves also decreased during 1990-1992 but by much smaller 
relative amounts. The years 1962-1969 and 1984-1989 saw large 
increases in trust fund balances. 6
The tax rate distribution remained stable between 1966 and 1972. 
The average minimum tax rate was 0.4 to 0.6 percent, while the aver 
age maximum rate was 3.5 to 3.6 percent, and the average range of 
rates was about 3.0 percent. About three-quarters of the programs had 
a range of tax rates between 2.1 and 4.0 percent.
From 1972 to 1984, the distribution of minimum rates, maximum 
rates, and ranges increased markedly; by 1984, the respective national 
averages were 1.3 percent, 6.1 percent, and 4.8 percent. These 
increases reflect responses to the financing problems of the mid 1970s 
and early 1980s.
The effects of TEFRA on maximum tax rates are obvious in Table 
2-3. Twenty states had a maximum rate below 5.4 percent in 1984. In 
1985, no state had a maximum rate below 5.4 percent, and the average 
maximum rate increased from 6.1 percent to 7.0 percent. Further, the 
average range of tax rates went from 4.8 percent to 6.0 percent (Table 
2-4).
Table 2-2 Distribution of Minimum UI Tax Rates, 1966 to 1996 (number of states)3
Year
1966
1969
1972
1975
1978
1980
1982
1984
1985
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
0
9
12
6
7
3
5
2
1
4
3
4
4
6
7
8
0.1 to
0.2%
12
15
18
11
9
10
12
7
10
11
12
18
15
13
13
0.3 to 
0.6%
11
13
10
8
11
9
9
9
8
12
14
17
15
15
16
0.7 to 
1.0%
8
7
7
8
4
8
10
10
10
7
7
5
6
7
5
1.1 to 
1.5%
8
3
5
8
10
7
7
7
6
7
7
4
4
3
4
1.6 to 
2.0%
2
1
3
2
2
6
3
6
6
7
6
4
2
3
3
2.1 to
2.5%
0
0
1
2
3
2
4
7
5
5
2
0
3
5
3
2.6% 
and above
2
1
2
6
11
6
6
6
4
1
1
1
2
0
1
State 
average (%)
0.6
0.4
0.6
0.9
1.2
1.0
1.1
1.3
1.0
0.9
0.8
0.6
0.7
0.6
0.6
SOURCE: Data from 1966 to 1984 are taken from U.S. Department of Labor, Significant Provisions of State Unemployment Insurance 
Laws, various issues. Data from 1986 to 1996 are taken from National Foundation for Unemployment Compensation and Workers© 
Compensation, Highlights of State Unemployment Compensation Laws, various issues.
a State averages are the unweighted averages for 52 or 53 programs, i.e., they include the Virgin Islands from 1978 onward.
Table 2-3 Distribution of Maximum UI Tax Rates, 1966 to 1996 (number of states)3
Year
1966
1969
1972
1975
1978
1980
1982
1984
1985
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
2.7%
18
15
11
8
5
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2.8 to 
4.0%
23
27
27
25
21
19
16
7
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
4.1 to
5.3%
10
8
13
16
16
13
15
13
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
5.4%
0
0
0
0
1
1
2
3
15
17
18
22
21
18
16
5.5 to 
6.4%
0
1
0
2
6
12
8
9
9
8
9
9
7
8
11
6.5 to
7.4%
1
1
1
1
2
4
6
9
11
8
5
7
9
7
6
7.5 to 
9.0%
0
0
0
0
2
2
5
8
13
12
12
9
10
15
17
9.1% and 
above
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
4
5
8
9
6
6
5
3
State 
average (%)
3.5
3.5
3.6
3.9
4.4
4.8
5.2
6.1
7.0
7.1
7.0
6.7
6.8
7.0
6.9
SOURCE: Data from 1966 to 1984 are taken from U.S. Department of Labor, Significant Provisions of State Unemployment Insurance 
Laws, various issues. Data from 1986 to 1996 are taken from National Foundation for Unemployment Compensation and Workers© 
Compensation, Highlights of State Unemployment Compensation Laws, various issues.
a State averages are the unweighted averages for 52 or 53 programs, i.e., they include the Virgin Islands from 1978 onward.
Table 2-4 Distribution of the Range of UI Tax Rates, 1966 to 1996 (number of states)"
Year
1966
1969
1972
1975
1978
1980
1982
1984
1985
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
0
1
0
1
2
5
3
3
4
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.1 to 
2.0%
6
5
5
9
5
2
4
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2.1 to 
3.0%
26
26
22
17
14
12
7
4
2
2
1
1
1
0
0
3.1 to. 
4.0%
14
16
19
17
17
15
13
15
5
2
4
2
1
0
0
4.1 to 
5.0%
3
3
4
6
5
11
12
6
11
11
7
10
12
10
10
5.1 to 
6.0%
2
2
1
1
4
6
5
6
11
12
16
18
16
20
20
6.1 
to 8.0%
0
0
0
0
3
4
8
15
14
17
14
11
13
11
15
8.1% 
and above
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
2
10
9
11
11
10
12
8
State 
average (%)
2.9
3.1
3.0
2.9
3.2
3.8
4.1
4.8
6.0
6.2
6.2
6.2
6.1
6.3
6.3
SOURCE: Data from 1966 to 1984 are taken from U.S. Department of Labor, Significant Provisions of State Unemployment Insurance 
Laws, various issues. Data from 1986 to 1996 are taken from National Foundation for Unemployment Compensation and Workers© 
Compensation, Highlights of State Unemployment Compensation Laws, various issues.
a State averages are the unweighted averages for 52 or 53 programs, i.e., they include the Virgin Islands from 1978 onward.
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Since 1985, the structure of UI tax rates has been very stable. The 
average maximum rate has been between 6.7 percent and 7.1 percent in 
all subsequent years (Table 2-3). Minimum rates declined somewhat 
after 1985, and the range of rates has remained stable. Beginning with 
1985, the average range was between 6.0 percent and 6.3 percent. 
After TEFRA came into effect, the range of state-level tax rates has 
been consistently about twice that for 1966-1972. Compared to 25 or 
30 years ago, there is now a much wider range of rates over which 
experience-rating can operate. All states had a range of tax rates of at 
least 4.1 percent in 1996, and eight had ranges that exceeded 8.0 per 
cent. TEFRA has clearly improved the effectiveness with which state 
experience-rating systems rate individual employers. This increased 
effectiveness in assigning appropriate rates also implies an increased 
ability for average tax rates (on taxable payrolls) to respond to trust 
fund drawdowns.
Two added points about the tax rate distributions should be noted. 
First, there is always a concentration of states at the minimum accept 
able maximum tax rate, which has been 5.4 percent since 1985 (Table 
2-3). However, only about half of all state maximums have been in the 
range of 5.4 to 6.4 percent in recent years. States vary in how they set 
maximum rates. 7 Second, there was only a modest increase in maxi 
mum rates after the 1990-1992 recession. The average maximum 
increased from 6.7 percent in 1990 to 7.0 percent in 1994 and then 
decreased to 6.9 percent in 1996.
The increases in the maximum tax rates and in the range of tax 
rates after 1984 increase the UI financing system©s cyclical responsive- 
ness to trust fund drawdowns. Quite simply, a wider range of higher 
tax rates can be imposed as state trust fund balances decline and indi 
vidual employer-experience measures deteriorate. This increases the 
cyclical variability of the average tax rate on taxable payrolls.
Maximum Tax Rate Schedules and Tax Capacity
The tax rate distributions summarized in Tables 2-2, 2-3, and 2-4 
are for the tax schedules used between 1966 and 1996. In many states, 
UI tax statutes provide for several tax rate schedules. The schedule for 
a given year is based on the statewide trust fund balance on the compu 
tation date; successively lower balances trigger successively higher tax
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rate schedules. In other words, the experience-rating mechanism that 
sets individual employer tax rates uses both the statewide fund balance 
(to select the appropriate tax schedule) and each employer©s experience 
(reserve ratio or benefit ratio, depending on the state©s experience-rat 
ing system8) to set tax rates for individual employers.
To get an idea of UI taxes that could potentially be collected, one 
must examine the top tax rate schedules and their tax rates. Movement 
to the top schedule would increase a state©s tax revenues. Taxation at 
the top schedule, in conjunction with the taxable wage proportion (the 
TWP, or taxable wages as a fraction of total covered wages), shows the 
maximum potential revenues that could be collected through a state©s 
experience-rating mechanism. Thus, there is interest in the top tax 
schedules both to show UI tax responsiveness and to assess tax capac 
ity for a state.
A UI program©s ability to raise revenues depends on both experi 
ence-rated taxes and solvency taxes. A complete assessment of tax 
responsiveness and tax capacity would consider both types of taxes. 
The following discussion focuses on experience-rated taxes.
It should also be noted that multiple tax rate schedules, although 
contemplated in UI tax statutes, are not always used in practice. Mas 
sachusetts, in the 1990s, provides a vivid example. The current set of 
eight tax rate schedules was to have come into effect in 1992. For each 
of the five years from 1992 to 1996, however, the schedule used was 
lower than the one indicated in the tax statute. Massachusetts enacted 
special legislation to override the statute. The following analysis 
assumes, however, that maximum tax rate schedules actually would be 
imposed if fund balances were depleted to the point where the trigger 
mechanism called for the top schedule.
Table 2-5 shows the maximum tax rates for the top experience-rat 
ing schedules and the factors that determine tax capacity for 1986 and 
1996. Tax capacity (potential tax revenue as a percentage of total 
wages) reflects both the TWP and the average tax rate when taxes are 
levied according to the top schedule. The average rate depends on the 
tax rates in the top schedule and on the distribution of employers (and 
their taxable wages) across individual rate categories. The average 
rates shown in Table 2-5 are simple averages of the minimum and the 
maximum for the top tax rate schedule.
Table 2-5 Tax Capacity for the Top Experience-Rated Tax Schedules, 1986 and 1996
1986
State
Alabama
Alaska3
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii3
Idaho3
Illinois
Indiana
Iowaa
TWP
0.460
0.681
0.405
0.477
0.353
0.415
0.324
0.402
0.351
0.428
0.412
0.686
0.693
0.378
0.372
0.582
Max. 
tax rate 
(%)
5.4
6.5
5.4
6.0
5.4
5.4
6.4
7.0
5.4
5.4
5.7
5.4
6.8
6.6
5.4
7.0
Avg. 
tax rate 
(%)
2.95
3.75
4.15
3.05
3.35
3.05
3.95
3.55
3.10
2.75
3.21
4.00
4.85
3.40
3.35
3.75
Tax 
capacity
1.36
2.55
1.68
1.45
1.18
1.27
1.28
1.43
1.09
1.18
1.32
2.74
3.36
1.29
1.25
2.18
TWP
0.352
0.654
0.316
0.426
0.250
0.383
0.305
0.300
0.267
0.319
0.331
0.711
0.673
0.303
0.293
0.531
1996
Max. 
tax rate 
(%)
6.8
6.5
5.4
6.0
5.4
5.4
6.9
8.0
7.4
5.4
8.1
5.4
6.8
6.6
5.7
9.0
Avg. 
tax rate
(%)
3.73
3.75
4.15
3.05
3.35
2.75
4.45
4.05
4.65
2.75
4.08
3.90
4.85
3.40
3.55
4.50
Tax 
capacity
1.31
2.45
1.31
1.30
0.84
1.05
1.36
1.22
1.24
0.88
1.35
2.77
3.26
1.03
1.04
2.39
Tax capacity
Change
-0.05
-0.10
-0.37
-0.16
-0.35
-0.21
0.08
-0.21
0.15
-0.30
0.03
0.03
-0.10
-0.26
-0.21
0.21
% 
change
-3.4
^.0
-22.0
-10.7
-29.2
-16.8
6.1
-14.9
14.1
-25.5
2.3
1.1
-2.9
-19.8
-16.5
9.5
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota3
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana2
Nebraska
Nevada3
New Hampshire
New Jersey3
New Mexico3
New York
North Carolina3
North Dakota3
Ohio
0.483
0.443
0.396
0.445
0.373
0.385
0.394
0.471
0.465
0.406
0.714
0.421
0.590
0.408
0.456
0.549
0..322
0.515
0.567
0.390
5.4
10.0
6.0
6.5
6.0
7.2
9.0
7.5
6.4
7.8
6.4
5.4
5.4
6.5
6.2
5.4
6.4
5.7
5.0
5.4
2.71
5.50
3.15
4.45
4.40
5.10
4.50
4.25
3.25
3.90
4.05
2.75
3.25
4.65
3.70
4.05
4.25
2.90
2.75
2.80
1.31
2.44
1.25
1.98
1.64
1.96
1.77
2.00
1.51
1.58
2.89
1.16
1.92
1.90
1.69
2.22
1.37
1.49
1.56
1.09
0.416
0.349
0.339
0.330
0.316
0.358
0.308
0.477
0.365
0.333
0.686
0.326
0.579
0.308
0.458
0.541
0.213
0.455
0.548
0.334
6.4
10.0
6.0
7.5
8.9
9.3
9.0
9.0
6.4
7.8
6.4
5.4
5.4
6.5
6.9
5.4
5.4
5.7
5.4
6.5
3.20
5.50
3.15
4.95
5.45
6.35
4.65
4.80
3.25
3.90
4.05
2.75
2.83
3.28
4.00
4.05
3.25
2.85
2.95
3.30
1.33
1.92
1.07
1.63
1.72
2.27
1.43
2.29
1.19
1.30
2.78
0.90
1.64
1.01
1.83
2.19
0.69
1.30
1.62
1.10
0.02
-0.52
-0.18
-0.35
0.08
0.31
-0.34
0.29
-0.33
-0.28
-0.11
-0.26
-0.28
-0.89
0.14
-0.03
-0.68
-0.20
0.06
0.01
1.6
-21.2
-14.4
-17.5
4.9
15.8
-19.2
14.4
-21.5
-18.0
-3.9
-22.6
-14.7
^6.8
8.6
-1.5
^9.4
-13.2
3.7
0.9
Table 2-5 (continued)
1986
State
Oklahoma3
Oregon3
Pennsylvania
Puerto Rico
Rhode Island3
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah3
Vermont
Virginia
Virgin Islands3
Washington3
West Virginia
Wisconsin
TWP
0.462
0.629
0.402
0.588
0.554
0.436
0.465
0.414
0.377
0.576
0.469
0.392
0.778
0.532
0.423
0.500
Max. 
tax rate
(%)
6.2
5.4
9.2
5.4
8.4
5.4
10.5
10.0
6.0
8.0
8.4
6.2
9.0
5.4
7.5
6.7
Avg. 
tax rate 
(%)
3.35
3.80
5.35
4.18
5.35
3.35
6.00
5.25
3.05
4.15
4.85
3.45
4.55
3.94
4.50
3.35
Tax 
capacity
1.55
2.39
2.15
2.45
2.96
1.46
2.79
2.17
1.15
2.39
2.27
1.35
3.54
2.10
1.90
1.68
TWP
0.457
0.607
0.297
0.466
0.556
0.327
0.364
0.306
0.337
0.575
0.351
0.315
0.590
0.584
0.357
0.392
1996
Max. 
tax rate
(%)
9.2
5.4
9.2
5.4
8.3
5.4
9.5
10.0
6.0
8.0
8.4
6.4
9.0
5.4
7.5
8.9
Avg. 
tax rate 
(%)
4.75
3.80
5.35
3.95
5.20
3.32
5.50
5.25
3.00
4.15
4.85
3.35
4.55
3.88
4.50
4.59
Tax 
capacity
2.17
2.31
1.59
1.84
2.89
1.09
2.00
1.61
1.01
2.39
1.70
1.06
2.68
2.27
1.61
1.80
Tax capacity
Change
0.62
-0.08
-0.56
-0.61
-0.07
-0.37
-0.79
-0.57
-0.14
0.00
-0.57
-0.30
-0.86
0.17
-0.30
0.12
% 
change
40.3
-3.5
-26.1
-25.0
-2.5
-25.7
-28.2
-26.1
-12.1
-0.2
-25.2
-22.0
-24.2
8.1
-15.6
7.3
Wyoming3
National
Indexed states
Nonindexed states
0.508
0.408
0.523
0.386
8.5
6.4
6.3
6.5
4.88
3.72
3.75
3.72
2.48
1.52
1.96
1.44
0.485
0.342
0.519
0.306
8.8
6.8
6.8
6.8
4.55
3.85
3.94
3.82
2.21
1.32
2.05
1.17
-0.27
-0.20
0.09
-0.27
-10.9
-13.3
4.3
-18.5
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Comparison of State Unemployment Insurance Laws. 
a States with indexed tax bases.
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Other things being equal, experience-rated UI taxes will be poten 
tially more responsive to a trust fund drawdown when three elements 
are greater. First, the response will be greater when the TWP is greater. 
The TWP declined for most state UI programs (48 of 53) between 
1986 and 1996 (Table 2-5). Nationwide, the decline was from 0.408 to 
0.342, or 16.2 percent. For 28 states, the TWP not only declined, but 
its 1996 value was at least 15 percent less than its 1986 value. Note 
that the average TWP in 1986 for the 18 states with indexed taxable 
wage bases was practically the same as in 1996 (0.523 versus 0.519), 9 
while the average for the other programs declined from 0.386 to 0.306, 
or by 20.7 percent.
A second element influencing the experience-rated tax response is 
the maximum tax rate for the top tax schedule. Between 1986 and 
1996, the maximum rate increased in 19 UI programs, declined in 3, 
and remained unchanged in the remaining 31. The average tax rate for 
the top schedule (the simple average of the minimum and the maxi 
mum rates) increased in 18 programs, decreased in 14, and remained 
unchanged in 21. The average change nationwide was a modest 
increase of 0.13 percentage points (from 3.72 percent of taxable wages 
in 1986 to 3.85 percent in 1996), or 3.5 percent. The average percent 
age change in the top average tax rate was slightly larger for UI pro 
grams with indexed tax bases (from 3.75 to 3.94, or 5.2 percent) than 
for nonindexed programs (3.72 to 3.82, or 2.9 percent). Overall, the 
average tax rate for the top tax schedule changed little.
The third element in tax responsiveness is the trigger that activates 
the highest tax rate schedule. If the trigger increases relative to cov 
ered wages, the state will move to the highest schedule more quickly 
when a recession-related drawdown occurs. States vary in how they 
set the trigger (for example, as an absolute level of the trust fund, as a 
reserve ratio, or as a reserve ratio multiple). Comparisons of 1986 and 
1996 for the 39 programs with triggers expressed as reserve ratio mul 
tiples or reserve ratios show higher triggers in 4 programs, lower trig 
gers in 11, and no change in the remaining 24. 10 On average, triggers 
moved modestly towards a slower response of the top tax schedule.
Given these three elements of experience-rated tax responsiveness, 
overall responsiveness was smaller in 1996 than in 1986, mainly 
because taxable wages grew more slowly than covered wages during 
that period. The decline in the TWP was substantial, over 16 percent
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nationwide, but the average rate for the top tax schedule increased only 
slightly, and the average trigger threshold for the top schedule 
decreased slightly. Individual states had different combinations of 
these changes. Over half the states showed little or no change in the 
average rate for the top tax rate schedule or for the trigger for the top 
rate. Thus, while tax responsiveness cannot be quantified, the trend 
was towards decreased responsiveness, due to the decline in TWP in so 
many programs.
Table 2-5 also shows that tax capacity for experience-rated taxes 
(defined as the TWP times the average tax rate for the top tax rate 
schedule and expressed as a percentage of covered wages) fell between 
1986 and 1996 for most UI programs, 11 primarily due to widespread 
decreases in the TWP. For nonindexed states, the average TWP 
decreased from 0.386 in 1986 to 0.306 in 1996. Nationwide, the aver 
age rate for the top tax schedule increased, but only modestly.
The two right-hand columns in Table 2-5 focus on changes in tax 
capacity between 1986 and 1996. The average national decline was 
13.3 percent (from 1.52 to 1.32, or 0.20 percentage points). Thirty pro 
grams had declines of at least 10.0 percent, while only four had 
increases of 10.0 percent or more. Between 1986 and 1996, the maxi 
mum revenue-generating capacity of the experience-rated portion of 
the UI tax system fell by about 13 percent.
Another interesting feature of Table 2-5 is the contrast in levels and 
trends in tax capacity for indexed and nonindexed states. There were 
18 indexed programs during the decade covered by the table. Indexed 
programs had a higher average tax capacity than nonindexed programs 
in 1986 (1.96 versus 1.44 percent of total wages) and again in 1996 
(2.05 versus 1.17 percent). During 1986-1996, indexed programs 
maintained their tax capacity, but tax capacity fell still further in the 
nonindexed programs: average tax capacity rose by 4.3 percent in 
indexed programs but fell by 18.5 percent in nonindexed ones. (Chap 
ter 3 examines indexation in more detail.)
This analysis of the experience-rating statutes in effect from 1966 
to 1996 provides four main findings.
1. The lag between the computation date and the date that new 
tax rates become effective did not change measurably over the 
past 30 years.
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2. During that period, the maximum tax rates and the range of tax 
rates actually in effect rose substantially. The rise in each 
stems mainly from the TEFRA requirement that the maximum 
experience-rated tax rate be at least 5.4 percent as of 1985. 
Post-1984 increases improved the ability of UI taxes to 
respond to trust fund drawdowns. However, since 1986, the 
distribution of both the maximums and the range of rates has 
been remarkably stable.
3. The share of total taxable wages fell markedly during the past 
decade, which has reduced both tax responsiveness and tax 
capacity since 1986.
4. During the past decade, the maximum experience-rated tax 
rates, the average tax rate on the top tax schedule, and the top 
tax schedule triggers have not changed much on average. 
Clearly, while these three elements can limit tax responsive- 
ness, they do not add to it.
Any conclusion about what the four findings mean when taken 
together must be tentative, but it is likely that the wider range of rates is 
the most important, and the decline in the TWP is next in importance. 
The first and fourth points above are likely of minor importance. On 
balance, when 1986-1996 is compared to earlier periods, it would 
appear that tax responsiveness has increased. However, between 1986 
and 1996, tax responsiveness decreased because the range of rates 
remained stable while the TWP decreased. Since the TWP did not fall 
in indexed programs, the increase in their tax responsiveness around 
1985 was not eroded between the 1986 and 1996.
There are three findings on the tax capacity of experience-rated 
taxes for 1986-1996.
1. Average tax capacity fell over the period.
2. That decline was concentrated in states with nonindexed tax 
bases.
3. The tax capacity of programs having indexed taxable wage 
bases consistently exceeded that of nonindexed programs.
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In 1996, the differential was 0.88 percentage points, or 75 percent 
(2.05 percent of covered wages versus 1.17 percent). States with 
indexed programs were much more successful in sustaining their abil 
ity to generate tax revenues between 1986 and 1996, a decade in which 
their economies grew.
SOLVENCY PROVISIONS IN STATE UI LAWS
Several states now have UI statutes with provisions that automati 
cally raise taxes and/or reduce benefits whenever the trust fund balance 
falls below a certain threshold. These provisions, often called "sol 
vency provisions," operate in addition to experience-rating. In reserve- 
ratio states, which typically have several tax rate schedules, the sol 
vency tax may be a direct extension of the progression of taxes across 
the regular tax rate schedules 12 or it may be separate. In benefit-ratio 
states, solvency taxes often operate apart from experience-rated taxes.
The origins and evolution of solvency provisions vary. Some 
states created ad hoc arrangements, intended as temporary fixes, when 
their trust funds were inadequate. Others have made solvency provi 
sions permanent features of their UI statutes. At least two states, Illi 
nois and Pennsylvania, overhauled their tax and benefit statutes in the 
late 1980s. Both intended to reduce the average trust fund balance over 
the business cycle and add flexibility. Recession-related drawdowns 
were to be countered by automatic tax increases and benefit reductions 
as the fund balance fell past certain thresholds. This section does not 
examine the motivations of individual states; it simply documents vari 
ous solvency features.
There is general acknowledgment that states have increased their 
reliance on solvency taxes and on other provisions for flexible financ 
ing, especially since 1980. Several events in the early 1980s may have 
caused this shift. First, during the back-to-back recessions of 1980- 
1983, 31 states borrowed from the federal loan account to pay benefits. 
Second, federal loan policy became significantly tighter. Deferrals of 
FUTA credit reductions (for loan repayments) were eliminated in 
1980, 13 and interest-free loans (except for very short-term loans) were 
eliminated in 1982. At the time that borrowing became less attractive
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to states, sentiment grew, strongly voiced by the employer community, 
that large trust fund balances might not be desirable. That sentiment 
has also motivated states to make their financing systems more respon 
sive.
Since 1980, many state legislatures, faced with insolvent UI trust 
fund accounts, moved to make their UI tax and/or benefit flows more 
responsive during recessions. Four solvency provisions that can make 
a UI program more responsive are 1) solvency taxes levied on employ 
ers, 2) changes in the taxable wage base, 3) employee taxes, and 4) 
benefit freezes and/or reductions. The common element in all four is a 
trigger that comes into operation when the trust fund balance falls 
below a set threshold (or thresholds). Usually, the trigger is both 
clearly defined in the statute and automatic, but its activation requires a 
decision in a few states. 14
Solvency taxes on employers are the most frequent solvency provi 
sion, and flexible benefit provisions are the second most frequent. 
Flexible employee taxes and flexible tax bases are less common. (The 
flexible tax base, as the term is used in this chapter, refers to a tax base 
that responds to changes in the trust fund balance. Tax-base indexing, 
that it, tying the tax base to average wages in the state, is examined in 
Chapter 3.)
Table 2-6 shows the states that have solvency taxes, the potential 
range of added tax rates, and the actual rates in effect during 1988 and 
1996. The table also shows the first year a state had a solvency provi 
sion, and, for a few states, the last year a solvency tax was authorized. 
Most states with a solvency tax established the tax in the 1980s; of the 
36 states listed in Table 2-6, 23 began the tax in the 1980s, 9 in the 
1970s, and 3 in the 1990s. States that had a solvency tax before 1980 
usually had financing problems during the recessions of the early-to- 
mid 1970s, e.g., five northeastern states and Michigan. 15 Six states 
have allowed their solvency tax to lapse.
Solvency taxes on employers were authorized in 31 states in 1988 
and in 30 states in 1996. Fourteen states collected revenues from their 
solvency taxes in 1988 and 1996. Note that the maximum potential 
solvency tax rate exceeded 1.0 percent of taxable wages for 18 pro 
grams in 1988 and for 20 programs in 1996. In both years, about half 
the states with an active solvency tax levied the tax at a flat rate, while
Table 2-6 Evolution of UI Solvency Taxes
Solvency Taxes in
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Georgia
Hawaii
Illinois
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
First Last 
year year
1984 1990
1981
1975
1985
1990
1974
1961
1980 1992
1985
1977 1991
1982
1983
1993
1989
1972
1983
1985 1994
1983
Present
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Range of 
rates (%)
0.0-0.7
0.4-1.1
0.1-0.5
0.2-0.81
0.0-1.0
1.1-2.5
0.9
0.0-3.24
-0.5 to 2.4
0.0-0.6
0.0-1.8
0.0-2.0
0.0-1.2
1.0
0.0-1.8
1988
Rates in 
1988 (%)
0.0
0.26-0.83
0.4
0.0
0.7
1.1-1.5
0.0
0.0-3.24
0.0
0.4
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
Solvency Taxes in
Present
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Range of 
rates (%)
0.4-1.1
-0.1 to 0.8
0.2-0.81
0.0-1.1
0.0-1.5
0.7-2.5
0.0-2.7
0.0-0.6
0.0-1.8
0.4
0.1-2.0
0.0-2.0
0.0-1.35
0.0-1.8
1996
Rates in 
1996 (%)
0.0
0.4
0.0
0.0
1.5
0.7
0.0-2.7
0.4
0.01-0.21
0.4
0.6
0.0
0.0
0.0-1.8 
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Table 2-6 (continued)
Solvency Taxes in
State
Nebraska
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New York
North Carolina
Ohio
Oklahoma
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Virginia
Virgin Islands
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
First Last 
year year
1996
1976
1984
1973
1984
1972
1984
1979
1975
1985?
1984
1984 1989
1982
1983
1985
1981 1991
1982
1989
Present
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Range of 
rates (%)
0.5
0.0-1.6
O.-l.O
0.0-1.14
0.0-2.55
0.0-2.3
0.5
0.2-1.95
0.35-1.05
0.1-1.5
0.0-0.7
0.0-2.0
0.2
0.5-1.0
0.0-3.1
0.-1.7
1988
Rates in 
1988 (%)
0.0
0.0
1.0
0.0-1.14
0.9-2.6
0.0
0.5
0.2-1.8
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.63-2.0
0.0
0.0
1.0
0.0-1.7
Solvency Taxes in 1996
Present
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Range of 
rates (%)
0.0-1.08
0.5
0.0-0.69
0.1-1.7
0.0-1.14
0.0-2.55
0.0-3.07
-0.01 to 1.61
0.3
0.35-1.05
0.1-1.5
0.0-2.0
0.2
0.5-1.0
0.0-0.9
0.0-1.25
Rates in 
1996 (%)
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.7-1.7
0.0
0.6-2.0
0.0
0.07-0.43
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.18
0.0
0.0
0.0-0.9
0.0
States with solvency
taxes 31 30
States with taxes
activated 14 14
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Comparison of State Unemployment Insurance Laws, National Foundation for Unemployment 
Corporation and Workers© Compensation, Highlights of State Unemployment, and Commerce Clearing House summaries of UI laws in 
individual states.
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about half used a range of rates. Thus, between 1988 and 1996 there 
was no trend in the number of states with solvency taxes.
Many states added solvency taxes as part of more comprehensive 
law reforms dealing with insolvency. Those taxes remain in place and 
serve to decrease the degree of counter-cyclicality in the UI system. 
For instance, after having severe solvency problems in the early 1980s, 
Minnesota raised the trigger for its highest tax-schedule in 1988 from 
$80 million to $200 million, in effect activating the top schedule earlier 
in the face of a trust fund drawdown. Minnesota also added a solvency 
tax that can change quarterly, adding 10 percent to scheduled tax rates 
when the trust fund falls below $150 million and 15 percent (up to 1.35 
percentage points for employers at the maximum tax rate) when the 
fund falls below $75 million. In short, when Minnesota©s trust fund 
balance falls below $75 million, there is a 15 percent add-on to experi 
ence-rated tax rates.
Other solvency features are summarized in Table 2-7. Variable 
employee taxes and flexible tax bases are not common. Only three 
states (Alaska, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania) had a variable employee 
tax in 1996 16 and three (the District of Columbia, Louisiana, and Mis 
souri) had trust-fund-activated flexible tax bases. Several others used 
one of these features in earlier years but have allowed it to lapse.
Flexible benefits are more common. Fourteen states enacted some 
form of flexible benefits between 1983 and 1996, and 11 were still 
using them in 1996. All states but Delaware target high-wage claim 
ants. Typically, the maximum weekly benefit amount (the WBA) can 
be frozen or even reduced if the trust fund drops below a given level or 
levels. Twelve of the 14 states freeze or reduce benefits. Two vary the 
wage replacement rate (benefits as a proportion of lost wages), but 
Pennsylvania does not reduce benefits for low-wage claimants. Minne 
sota raises the replacement rate when its trust fund is depleted.
In 11 of the 14 states, the benefit trigger is either the absolute level 
of the state©s trust fund or its trust fund balance measured as a ratio to 
covered wages (in Pennsylvania, as a ratio to benefit payouts). Other 
elements of the triggers are almost always related to financing vari 
ables, for example, employer tax rates (four states) or outstanding Title 
XII loans (Vermont). The trigger for three states has more than one 
indicator, with the Illinois trigger having three separate elements. 17
Table 2-7 UI Flexible Financing Features Other Than Solvency Taxes on Employers
State
Alabama
Alaska
Delaware
District of Columbia
Georgia
Hawaii
Illinois
Iowa
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Minnesota
Missouri
Montana
New Jersey
First 
year
1988
1989
1991
1987
1996
1992
1983
Flex, benefit 
Flexible benefit features trigger
Reduce Freeze Reduce Reserve 
Last replace- max. max. or reserve All 
year mentrate WBA WBA ratio other
XXX
1991 X X
X XX
X XX
X X
XX X
xa x
Flexible employee tax or 
flexible tax base
First 
year
1938
1955
1994
1988
1984
1996
1985
1975
1938
Last Employee 
year tax
1990 X
X
1996
1991
1986
1977
Note b X
Tax 
base
X
X
X
X
X
X
(continued)
Table 2-7 (continued)
State
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Pennsylvania
Vermont
Washington
West Virginia
Wyoming
Active in 1996
First 
year
1984
1991
1984
1990
1987
1985
1984
Flexible, benefit features
Reduce Freeze
Last replace- max. 
year ment rate WBA
1987 X
X
X
X
1993 X
X
2 7
Flex, benefit 
trigger
Reduce Reserve
max. or reserve 
WBA ratio
X
X
X
X
X
X X
5 7
All 
other
X
X
X
6
Flexible employee tax or 
flexible tax base
First Last Employee 
year year tax
1992 1995
1990 X
1988 1991 X
3
Tax 
base
X
3
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Comparison of State Unemployment Insurance Laws, National Foundation for Unemployment 
Corporation and Workers© Compensation, Highlights of State Unemployment, and Commerce Clearing House summaries of UI laws in 
individual states.
a Replacement rate is increased when trust fund balance falls below a set threshold.
b Employee tax diverted to Health Care Subsidy Fund from April 1996 through December 1997.
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Although flexible benefits were authorized in 11 states in 1996, 
only one state (Maine) actually paid reduced benefits; trust fund bal 
ances exceeded trigger thresholds in the other 10. The fact that 14 
states had an active solvency tax in 1996 indicates that benefit reduc 
tion features have lower thresholds than solvency taxes.
Forty-two UI programs have used at least one of the four solvency 
provisions shown in Tables 2-6 and 2-7. During 1996, 16 states had at 
least one active solvency provision, and 14 levied solvency taxes on 
employers.
According to such standard macroeconomic indicators as the over 
all unemployment rate, the economy was operating at or close to full 
employment in 1996: the unemployment rate for persons aged 16 and 
older was 5.4 percent of the labor force. If solvency taxes were acti 
vated in a year of full employment, how much added revenue would be 
generated from such taxes if the unemployment rate were much higher 
and trust funds were lower? One might have expected that four full 
years after 1992 the year of highest unemployment during the last 
recession very few states would still be relying on solvency taxes. 
Presumably such taxes would be active only when funds were depleted 
by recession-related drawdowns. Since the recession of the early 
1990s was mild in most areas of the country, the term "solvency tax" 
seems something of a misnomer.
In fact, many states have used solvency taxes more as a supplement 
to experience-rated taxes than as separate tax that is activated only in 
the event of a recession. Between 1988 and 1996, the number of UI 
programs that had solvency taxes varied from 29 to 32. Perhaps even 
more revealing is that the number of states with active solvency taxes 
ranged from a low of 10 in 1990 and 1991 to a high of 15 in 1994. On 
average, 11 UI programs had active solvency taxes from 1989 through 
1992. During 1993-1996, after recession-related trust fund draw 
downs, an average of 14 programs had active solvency taxes. These 
findings suggest that solvency taxes were only of modest importance 
during the last recession.
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This section summarizes three empirical analyses of flexible 
financing. The first is a three-part study on tax responsiveness, using 
data going back to 1950 and covering 51 UI programs (Miller, 
Pavosevich, and Vroman 1997). The second is a simulation analysis of 
solvency taxes in six states. It uses simulation models that depict 
important aspects of the labor market, UI benefits, taxes, interest 
income, and trust fund balances in each state (Vroman 1990). The 
third is a model-based simulation of the UI financing system in Penn 
sylvania, following that state©s adoption of flexible financing in 1988 
(Worden and Vroman 199la). All three studies use annual data.
Empirical Measures of Tax Responsiveness
The first analysis, of tax responsiveness, used data from 1950 to 
1994 is TO gauge the response of contributions to increased benefit out 
flows, we used one-, two-, and three-year responsiveness measures. 
Second, we looked at tax responsiveness in 1970 and 1990 for a subset 
of states that had recessions in both years. Third, we fitted regressions 
to estimate possible changes in tax responsiveness.
Since many states have added flexible financing in recent years, 
this analysis tested whether tax responsiveness increased measurably, 
particularly after the loan policy changes of the early 1980s. An 
important limitation is that the economy has had only one, fairly mild, 
recession since 1980-1983. There simply is not enough of a record 
from which to draw inferences.
Measures of tax responsiveness were based on annual data from 
1950 through 1994. Recessions were identified on a state-by-state 
basis, rather than nationally, to capture differences in the timing of 
business cycles across states and differences in local economic down 
turns. Recessions were defined as periods when the increase in the 
benefit-cost rate (benefits as a percentage of total wages) from the base 
year to the trough year was at least 35 percent. The beginning year of 
the recession was identified as the first year in which benefits rose by 
20 percent or more over the previous year (which then became the base 
year). To avoid overlapping response measures, recessions that began 
within three years of the previous recession were eliminated. The
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number of periods meeting all criteria totaled 303, or about 6 per state. 
Forty-seven occurred after 1982.
One-year, two-year, and three-year tax responses were then con 
structed for each recession. The one-year response is the ratio of the 
change in taxes divided by the change in benefits, with a lag of one 
year. The two-year response divided the sum of two years of tax 
changes by two-year benefit changes, again with a one-year lag 
between the first year of increased benefits and the first year of tax 
changes. The three-year response was similarly measured. 19
Measuring tax responsiveness accurately presents some prob 
lems. First, benefit-cost rates frequently fluctuate, even when there is 
no recession; thus, tax rates are never fully in equilibrium. Second, the 
year-to-year pattern of benefit increases, (for example, slow buildup 
versus steep increase) has an effect on the measured response, except 
for the one-year measure. For example, for a given cumulative 
increase in benefits, the three-year measure would be higher for a 
recession in which the first year had the greatest increase than for one 
in which the increases started modestly and then gradually became 
greater. Third, the use of annual data obscures the precise timing of 
benefit increases.
Note that tax responses incorporate three elements experience 
rating, solvency taxes, and legislative responses and all affect tax rev 
enues. Solvency taxes and legislative responses are likely to be pro 
portionately more important for the two-year measure and especially 
important for the three-year measure.
When the individual state measures were examined, they revealed 
a wide range of values, including many outside the expected range of 
0.0 to 1.0. In particular, there were many negative responses. It was 
assumed that extreme values are due to measurement problems, and 
extreme values were eliminated before any analysis took place. A 
recession was included only if all three measures fell within the range 
of acceptable values (including some negative values for the one-year 
and two-year measures). This restriction reduced the number of reces 
sions to 236, with 33 occurring after 1982.
The first analysis examined the simple averages of tax responsive- 
ness measures across states for 1952-1968, 1969-1981, and 1982- 
1991 (Table 2-8). There were no controls for state size or for other fac 
tors.
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Table 2-8 Averages of Tax Responsiveness Measures
Beginning 
year
1952-68
1969-81
1982-91
Number of 
downturns
88
115
33
Rl,
One-year 
response
0.11
0.14
0.15
R2,
Two-year 
response
0.31
0.36
0.34
R3, 
Three-year 
response
0.43
0.54
0.62
Four observations can be made about these averages. First, the 
period from 1952-1968 had the lowest average responsiveness for all 
three measures. Second, the 1982-1991 period had a clear edge over 
the 1969-1981 period only for the three-year measure and even fell 
slightly below it for the two-year measure. Third, the differences in 
responsiveness were the clearest between the first two periods, which 
suggests that most of the increase in responsiveness occurred during 
the 1970s and not the 1980s. Finally, the biggest gains in responsive- 
ness were in the three-year measure.
The second analysis of tax responsiveness measures compared the 
1990 recession to the 1970 recession. The 1970 recession predated 
the widespread financing problems experienced by the states in the 
mid 1970s and early-to-mid 1980s. A key difference between the 
1970 and 1990 recessions was that aggregate reserves, as a percentage 
of total payroll, were almost twice as large in 1969 than in 1989 (see 
Table 1-1).
Twenty-three states met the criteria in both periods, and respon 
siveness measures for the two recessions were compared for each state. 
Among the states for which all three response measures were higher in 
one period than in the other, nine states were more responsive in 1970 
than in 1990, and seven states were more responsive in 1990 than in 
1970.
An important point to note is that the two recessions were signifi 
cantly different in magnitude for many states, which may affect the 
comparisons (see Tables 1-2 and 1-3). Of the 12 states where there 
was both a clear difference in the severity of the two recessions and a 
clear difference in responsiveness, the financing systems in eight were 
more responsive in the milder of the two recessions.
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The third analysis fitted a set of pooled regressions to control for 
factors that might affect measured responsiveness. All three respon- 
siveness measures (Rl, R2, and R3) were used as dependent variables. 
The explanatory variables included the reserve ratio at the beginning of 
the recession, the change in the benefit-cost rate for each year of the 
recession, and dummies for fixed state effects. Time effects were mea 
sured with two binary variables, one for after 1969 and one for years 
after 1982 (see Miller, Pavosevich, and Vroman [1997], Table 9.8).
The regressions show that responsiveness is clearly related to 
reserve levels, with greater responsiveness occurring in states having 
lower reserve ratios. The magnitude of this effect, however, is not very 
large. A 1-percentage-point drop in the reserve ratio had estimated 
effects that ranged from a 3-percentage-point increase in the one-year 
responsiveness measure to a 5- to 6-percentage-point increase in the 
three-year responsiveness measure.
None of the time dummies proved significant. The largest time 
coefficients, in fact, were negative, possibly indicating a reduction in 
tax responsiveness over time, after controlling for reserve levels.
The regressions and the other two analyses suggest that tax respon 
siveness has not increased since the early 1980s.
A Six-State Simulation Analysis of Solvency Taxes
In an earlier book, I examined the effectiveness of solvency taxes 
in preventing trust fund indebtedness in six large states. 20 My 
approach used state-level simulation models and paired simulations for 
1988 to 1997. Within each pair, solvency taxes were either turned on 
and off. The simulations emphasized different experiences, based on 
each state©s own unemployment and on national unemployment during 
the 1970s and the 1980s. Tax receipts, trust fund balances, and bor 
rowing were noted for each simulation, and the differences between 
pairs showed the estimated effects of solvency taxes.
Four features were identified that affect the performance or effec 
tiveness of solvency taxes: 1) the threshold trust fund level that acti 
vates the tax, 2) the range of statutory tax rates, 3) the proportion of 
employers affected, and 4) the possibility of negative as well as posi 
tive adjustments in solvency tax rate. Across the six states, the trust 
fund thresholds ranged from a high of 3.75 percent of covered wages in
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Michigan to a low of a zero fund balance in New Jersey. The range of 
maximum statutory tax rate increases ranged from lows of 0.7 percent 
in New Jersey and 0.8 percent in California to highs of 3.0 percent in 
Michigan and 3.4 percent in Ohio. 21 When activated, a solvency tax 
may apply to all employers or only to selected employers, who are 
identified by the level of their reserve ratio or benefit ratio. Four states 
levied solvency taxes on all employers, while two taxed only selected 
employers. Four states used solvency taxes only to increase UI reve 
nues, while two (Florida and Texas) lowered as well as increased total 
revenues using solvency taxes, i.e., their solvency taxes can have nega 
tive tax rates when trust fund balances are high. 22
To examine the importance of solvency taxes, simulations were 
conducted in which solvency taxes were removed from each state©s tax 
rate structure. The different scenarios included a baseline for each 
state in which the state©s unemployment rate (the TUR) was main 
tained at a steady 5.5 percent from 1988 to 1997. No state required 
loans from the U.S. Treasury for either of its baseline simulations. In 
all six states where there were differences between the baselines when 
solvency taxes were on or off, the differences were small (see Vroman 
[1990], Table 4-7).
When the states were analyzed in terms of the unemployment rates 
during the 1970s and 1980s, the absence of solvency taxes increased 
the volume of borrowing and reduced the ending (1997) trust fund bal 
ance, except in Florida. However, decreases in total borrowing and 
increases in end balances were generally small. In New Jersey, which 
had the lowest solvency tax trigger (a zero fund balance), no simula 
tion showed an effect. The greatest effect of solvency taxes was found 
in Ohio when, under the simulation, the state experienced a repetition 
of state TURs and national TURs from the 1980s. The removal of 
Ohio©s solvency taxes raised total borrowing by more than $1.0 billion 
under both TUR paths and caused the 1997 trust fund balance to be 
nearly $2.0 billion lower. The effect on loans and the 1997 end bal 
ances was smaller in other states, with the effect in Michigan consis 
tently second in magnitude to that in Ohio. 23
Probably the most important finding of the simulations was that 
solvency taxes did not prevent insolvency in any of the six states. 
There were 24 non-baseline simulations (six states, with national and 
state TURs from the 1970s and 1980s), and states needed loans in 7 of
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the 24. For all seven simulations, borrowing occurred both when the 
solvency tax was on and when it was off. The solvency tax modestly 
reduced the volume of borrowing, but it did not prevent indebtedness.
Solvency taxes proved of limited importance for the six states. In 
Ohio, where the effect was largest, borrowing was reduced by $1.1 to 
$1.3 billion and the end balance increased by $1.2 to $1.9 billion over 
the 10 years. The results indicate a serious recession would require 
discretionary action or stronger solvency tax provisions to increase the 
total response of UI taxes and to reduce the volume of borrowing. If 
solvency taxes are to have greater effect than that found in these simu 
lations, they would need to include a more aggressive combination of 
higher trigger thresholds, a wider potential range of tax rates, and 
application to all employers.
Flexible Financing in Pennsylvania
During the late 1980s, UI officials in Illinois and Pennsylvania 
advocated flexible financing for their programs. A quantitative analy 
sis of the Illinois 1987 law conducted at the Urban Institute, however, 
concluded that most of the improvement in solvency was achieved by 
two "permanent" provisions that are not really flexible. In the first, a 
fund-building tax of 0.4 percent was levied on employers. This tax has 
remained in place and used the same tax rate through 1996. In the sec 
ond, the average weekly wage (AWW) used to make indexed increases 
to the maximum weekly benefit was redefined. The redefined AWW 
was 20 percent lower than the actual statewide AWW. There were 
other flexibility features in the Illinois law (including a provision to 
freeze the maximum WBA, as indicated in Table 2-7), but their effects 
on trust fund revenues and benefit outlays were distinctly secondary 
when compared to the two "permanent" revisions. Thus, it seems more 
accurate to consider Pennsylvania©s 1988 law as the best example of a 
flexible financing law.
An analysis by Worden and Vroman (199la) simulated the impact 
of flexible financing provisions in Pennsylvania©s 1988 law. The law 
was designed to increase the automatic responsiveness of taxes and 
benefits, thus reducing the need for borrowing during recessions. The 
1988 law followed earlier solvency laws in 1980 and 1983 and a his 
tory of large-scale borrowing from the U.S. Treasury. 24 Of the 37 state
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UI programs that borrowed sometime during the 1970s and 1980s, 
Pennsylvania©s $5.5 billion total was the largest.
Pennsylvania©s 1988 solvency provisions provided for additional 
employer taxes, variable employee taxes, and benefit reductions. All 
adjustments to taxes and benefits are activated by a single trigger. That 
trigger is calculated as the ratio of the fund balance at the end of the 
current fiscal year (June 30th) to the average benefit amount for the 
current and the two previous fiscal years, with the ratio measured as a 
percentage.
There are two flexible employer taxes. An employer surcharge is 
imposed as a flat amount that can assume seven different values. Trig 
ger ratio percentages of 150 or larger (trigger-level seven) cause a tax 
reduction. The largest surcharge is levied when the trigger percentage 
falls below 50 (trigger-level one). Employers are also subject to gradu 
ated "additional contributions" when the trigger percentage falls below 
95. There is also a trigger-activated employee surcharge with a range 
of possible values from 0.0 to 0.2 percent of total covered wages. 
Finally, weekly benefits (for claimants paid above half the maximum 
WBA) drop by 5 percent whenever the trigger ratio falls below 50. 
Pennsylvania©s flexible financing provisions specify effects as fixed 
dollar amounts. Thus, as economic growth occurs, the size of these 
effects automatically declines relative to statewide macroeconomic 
variables such as covered employment and total wages.
The effects of these automatic provisions were studied using a sim 
ulation model that included detailed equations for determining UI 
taxes and UI benefits. 25 Model simulations were conducted for the 
years 1991 to 1999. The analysis specified a series of unemployment/ 
inflation scenarios and simulated benefits, taxes, and trust fund bal 
ances with the flexible financing provisions first off and then on. The 
simulations also used state unemployment rates from earlier periods 
and specified successively higher rates of unemployment. Simulations 
with differing inflation rates were also conducted.
Each simulation tracked total benefit outlays, tax receipts, borrow 
ing from the U.S. Treasury, and the trust fund end balance for the nine 
years. Differences in total borrowing were noted for paired simula 
tions that differed only in the flexible financing provisions being on or 
off. For each pair, the simulation with flexible financing on had a 
higher time path for the trust fund balance and less total borrowing.
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However, the most serious recessions caused large-scale borrowing to 
occur even in the simulations with flexible financing on.
Perhaps the most interesting results were produced by a series of 
simulations that raised the average total unemployment rate by incre 
ments of 0.5 percentage points. Total benefit outlays grew consistently 
for increments to the TUR. However, the added taxes and reduced 
benefits reached their upper limits, causing the fund balance to fall fur 
ther and cumulative borrowing to rise, despite flexible financing. Even 
when all provisions were fully turned on, benefit outflows exceeded 
taxes by wide margins.
The distribution of sacrifices by workers and by employers were 
sensitive to the assumed rate of inflation. 26 At low rates of inflation, 
the burden of flexible financing was roughly 50:50, with most of the 
employee share arising from employee taxes. At higher rates of infla 
tion, the employee share rose to more than half, with employee taxes 
still accounting for most of the increased employee share. This finding 
is a direct consequence of the limitation on employer taxes caused by 
the fixed tax base. The tax base for employees, however, is unlimited. 
Additional simulations suggest that indexing both the employer tax 
base and other solvency provisions (rather than using fixed absolute 
dollar amounts) would substantially improve the effectiveness of flexi 
ble financing in preventing indebtedness and in reducing the scale of 
insolvency.
Four of the principal findings of the simulations are straightfor 
ward.
1. Pennsylvania©s flexible financing provisions reduced its scale 
of borrowing but did not prevent insolvency.
2. Flexible financing was more effective in small downturns than 
in more serious recessions (measured in terms of the increase 
in the average total rate of unemployment for 1991-1999).
3. Inflation weakened the effectiveness of flexible financing in 
the later years of the period simulated.
4. Indexing the employer tax base and the trigger would remedy 
most of the effects of high inflation.
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However, flexible financing could not forestall large-scale borrowing 
during periods of high unemployment, even when the system was fully 
indexed. Tax increases and/or benefit reductions would require more 
"bite" to prevent large-scale indebtedness during a major recession.
Pennsylvania benefited from its flexible financing during the 
1990-1992 recession. Following two consecutive years of 1.5 percent 
employer tax reductions (1990 and 1991) under the highest of the 
seven trigger thresholds, there were five consecutive years of higher 
taxes. The thresholds were number five in 1992, number three in 1993 
and 1994, number four in 1995, and number five in 1996. 27 The maxi 
mum solvency taxes levied during 1993 and 1994 raised the employer 
levy by 14.74 percent, while employees paid a 0.15 percent employee 
payroll tax on total wages. By the end of 1996, the state©s trust fund 
stood at $2.03 billion. Its reserve ratio for 1996 was 1.78 percent, 
essentially the-same as at the end of 1990, a year that flexible financing 
actually reduced employer taxes.
The downturn of the early 1990s was comparatively mild in Penn 
sylvania. The state©s TUR averaged 7.2 percent during 1991-1993, 
compared with an average of 5.0 percent during 1988-1990. Benefit 
payouts during 1991-1993 averaged $1.57 billion, or 1.65 percent of 
covered wages. Average payouts during 1991-1993 were about 70 
percent higher than during 1988-1990; however, payouts during 1991- 
1993 were not especially high by historic standards. From 1970 
through 1989, benefit payout rates exceeded 1.65 percent in 7 years 
and exceeded 1.50 percent in 11 years. The 1991-1993 downturn was 
comparatively mild in terms of Pennsylvania©s history.
On the other hand, note that Pennsylvania did not need to draw on 
the full potential of its flexible financing system for a single year dur 
ing 1992-1996. In the face of a single, albeit mild, recession, flexible 
financing successfully accomplished its purpose in Pennsylvania.
SOME FINAL COMMENTS ON FLEXIBLE FINANCING
In deciding whether to follow a funding strategy with a strong ele 
ment of flexible financing, it is important for a state to look at the trade 
offs. The chief argument in favor of flexible financing is that trust fund
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reserves can be kept low and the risk of borrowing can simultaneously 
be minimized. The negative aspects of large balances have been 
stressed, in recent years, especially by employers. Some state officials 
also judge that the "opportunity cost" of holding balances exceeds the 
interest earnings on reserves. For any given level of benefit payouts, a 
state may prefer to hold smaller trust fund balances than it would have 
in the past, on the grounds that the rate of return is higher for funds 
held by employers. 28 Second, large trust fund balances may lead to 
pressures for liberalizing benefits or for diverting UI taxes to other 
uses. Either use of the trust fund is easier to argue politically if the 
fund balance is perceived to be larger than necessary. 29
It is clear that, in the aggregate, states now have smaller desired 
trust fund levels than in the past. Although pre-recession balances in 
1989 were high relative to those of the 1970s, they were only about 
half of 1969 balances. 30 (This is an appropriate comparison because 
both 1969 and 1989 fell at the end of long periods of economic growth, 
and that growth presumably allowed state trust funds to rise to desired 
levels.)
A second impetus towards flexible financing is that, even if a state 
chooses to have a low trust fund balance, there are disincentives that 
encourage a state to avoid or minimize borrowing. Since 1982, interest 
has been charged on loans (except those repaid the year they are 
made). The interest must be paid from sources outside the trust fund, 
either from a separate tax or from a state©s general revenues. A further 
disincentive is the automatic repayment provision in the FUTA tax, a 
provision which is activated after two years of borrowing. The FUTA 
tax repays the loan through a flat surcharge on the low federal tax base, 
rather than through the experience-rated state UI tax.
The chief argument against flexible financing is that the timing of 
benefit decreases and tax increases hurts both claimants and employ 
ers. Claimants suffer reduced benefits at a time when their need is 
greatest. Businesses undergo tax increases before they have fully 
recovered from the recession. The traditional rationale for forward or 
advance funding rests on the argument that such adjustments should 
not be occurring at such times or should, at least, be minimized.
Two additional arguments against relying on flexible financing 
should also be noted. First, a state may implement flexible financing 
but the provisions may not be strong enough to prevent insolvency.
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Flexible tax provisions, for example, simply may not generate enough 
additional revenue in time to counteract the effects of a serious reces 
sion. The simulations reported above indicate that this is the case for 
Pennsylvania, even though the state did not have financing problems 
during or after the 1990-1992 downturn. Second, there may not 
enough political will to let strong flexible financing operate as 
intended. When the time comes, the state©s executive and/or its legisla 
ture might decide to nullify the automatic response to satisfy prefer 
ences of claimants or businesses, or both. Without a large trust fund 
reserve, a state may find it needs large-scale loans. The result may be a 
legislated, discretionary, pay-as-you-go response brought in during a 
crisis, rather than the automatic pay-as-you-go response advocated by 
proponents of flexible financing.
From a national perspective, even if individual states find flexible 
financing an attractive option, its widespread use would be cause for 
concern. In national terms, the main problem with flexible financing is 
that it reduces the counter-cyclical performance of the UI system. One 
of the original objectives of the UI system was that it act as an auto 
matic stabilizer of the macroeconomy, primarily by maintaining con 
sumer purchasing power. Flexible benefit provisions undercut this 
stabilizing effect. Taxes that respond too quickly may cut business 
spending at the wrong time and harm the recovery. The long-term 
decline in the proportion of the unemployed who receive benefits has 
already diminished the stabilizing role of the UI. The increased use of 
flexible financing would further erode UI©s stabilizing role.
During the 1950s, when UI trust fund balances were much more 
substantial, there was a great deal of debate about and experimentation 
with ways to make tax rates more counter-cyclical. In the past 10 or.15 
years, a time of relatively low trust fund balances, there has been a sig 
nificant shift in the opposite direction, towards a more immediate 
recovery of benefit costs through flexible financing.
In any event, it appears that the shift towards flexible financing is 
not yet of sufficient importance to have a large quantitative effect. This 
conclusion emerges both from an analysis of UI statutes and from the 
empirical studies reviewed in this chapter.
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Notes
1. The two main sources used throughout this chapter are Comparison of State 
Unemployment Insurance Laws (U.S. Department of Labor 1996) and Highlights 
of State Unemployment Compensation Laws (National Foundation for Unemploy 
ment Compensation and Workers© Compensation 1996). The Comparison and its 
predecessors has been published for roughly 50 years, while Highlights has been 
available since 1982. Both use information assembled by the staff of the UI Ser 
vice, with the Highlights being less comprehensive but more readily accessible.
2. Other experience-rating features of potential interest include the number of expe 
rience-rating schedules, the range of triggers that the schedules encompass, and 
the average distance between schedules (the change in the tax rate for an 
employer in a given experience-rating category when the rate moves from one 
schedule to the next). Changes in noncharging (benefit payments not assigned to 
an individual employer) and ineffective charging (failure to assign a benefit 
charge because the employer is already paying the maximum tax rate) could also 
be important.
3. Payments in Massachusetts are due on the fifteenth of the month following the 
end of each quarter.
4. In a reserve-ratio state, this would mean a lower reserve ratio (reserves as a per 
centage of covered payrolls), while in a benefit-ratio state this would be a higher 
benefit ratio (charged benefits as a percentage of covered payrolls).
5. Note that a second effect arises from moving to a higher tax schedule once the 
fund balance decreases.
6. Aggregate net reserves decreased from $10.5 billion (at the end of 1974) to $1.0 
billion (at the end of 1977) and from $8.6 billion (at the end of 1979) to -$5.8 bil 
lion (at the end of 1983). The most recent drawdown, shown in Table 1-4, was 
from $36.9 billion (at the end of 1989) to $25.8 billion (at the end of 1992).
7. An even wider range of maximum rates would appear if the maximums from the 
highest state tax rate schedules were shown rather than the actual rates in effect.
8. For completeness, note that benefit-wage ratios are used in two states (Delaware 
and Oklahoma) and payroll declines are used in one state (Alaska). These experi 
ence-rating systems operate much like benefit-ratio systems.
9. All five states in which the TWP was higher in 1996 than in 1986 have indexed 
tax bases.
10. For other programs, the trigger changed in ways that left the direction of the 
change unclear. In Kansas, for example, the 1986 top schedule trigger was a fund 
balance reserve ratio of less than 1.5 percent. In 1996, however, Kansas had no 
explicit trigger for its top schedule because it no longer had a set of explicit sched 
ules. Employers with a negative balance were taxed up to a top rate of 6.4 per 
cent, while the top rate was 5.4 percent for others.
11. The estimate of tax capacity for 1996 uses the TWP from 1995. Since the TWP 
has shown a downward trend in nonindexed states, the 1996 estimates overstate 
the tax capacity of most states.
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12. In California, the solvency tax is levied as an additional 15 percent on the highest 
experience-rated schedule.
13. Prior to 1980, federal legislation had twice prevented automatic tax increases in 
states with long-term trust fund debts. The increases would have raised the fed 
eral tax component of UI taxes in these states (see Vroman [1986], Chapter 1).
14. New Hampshire has an emergency tax of 0.5 percent that can be activated when 
the UI commissioner determines that an emergency exists.
15. Eight of the nine that brought in solvency taxes in the 1970s also borrowed from 
the U.S. Treasury during the 1970s, and five had loans that equaled or exceeded 
1.0 percent of covered payrolls in 1975 (Connecticut, Hawaii, Michigan, Pennsyl 
vania, and Rhode Island). See Vroman (1986), Table 3-1.
16. Note that New Jersey©s employee tax was diverted to another purpose from April 
1996 through December 1997.
17. The three elements of the Illinois trigger are the level of the trust fund, the average 
employer tax rates, and the growth in the payment of initial claims.,
18. This analysis is described in Miller, Pavosevich, and Vroman (1997). Mike Miller 
and Robert Pavosevich of the U.S. Labor Department©s UI Service did the analy 
sis.
19. In formulas:
Rl = (Tax, - TaxM ) / (BenM - Ben,_2).
R2 = [(Tax,+1 -TaxM ) + (Tax,-TaxM )] / [(Ben, - Ben,_2) + (BenM - Ben,_2)].
R3 = [(Tax,+2 - TaxM ) + (Tax,+1 - TaxM ) + (Tax, - TaxM )] / [(Ben,+1 - Ben,_2)
+ (Ben, - Ben,_2) + (Ben,_j - Ben,_2)].
"Tax" represents annual UI tax receipts; "Ben" stands for annual benefit pay 
ments; and the subscripts refer to periods measured from the current year.
20. See Vroman (1990), pp. 106-111. The six states were New Jersey, Michigan, 
Ohio, Florida, Texas, and California.
21. The maximum solvency rates for both the Ohio and Michigan simulations were 
higher than shown in Table 2-6. The higher solvency tax rates that had applied 
before 1988 were used in the simulations. Thus, for both states, the maximum 
effects of solvency taxes would be smaller if the analysis were repeated using the 
solvency taxes of 1996.
22. The solvency tax in Florida was its fund balance adjustment factor, part of the 
variable adjustment factor in the state©s tax structure. Unlike the other states, the 
tax is part of experience-rated taxes in Florida.
23. This consistent one-two ranking for Ohio and Michigan also appeared when taxes 
and other financing variables were measured in absolute levels and as percentages 
of covered wages.
24. Pennsylvania©s earlier law is described in Vroman (1986), Chapter 2.
25. The model©s equations are shown in Worden and Vroman (1991a), Appendix A.
26. Sacrifices by workers have two potential components: increased employee taxes 
and reduced benefits to claimants.
27. See Worden and Vroman (1991a) for the detailed tax and benefit provisions which 
were activated under each of the seven thresholds.
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28. There is no significant research showing comparative rate of return calculations to 
buttress the presumption that rates of return are higher on employer-controlled 
assets, but the presumption is probably correct. Arguments to reduce UI taxes on 
employers that emphasized this differential would be weakened if UI trust funds 
were invested in a broader range of assets than federal government debt.
29. Again, rhetoric and casual observation provide much of the basis for this asser 
tion. It would be useful to investigate the issue in a formal statistical (regression) 
framework.
30. See Table 1-1. See also Miller, Pavosevich, and Vroman (1997), Table 9.1.

3 Tax-Base Indexing
Eighteen UI programs tie the taxable wage base to the average 
weekly wage in covered employment. This chapter focuses on the 
experiences of those states and compares them with the remaining 
states, in which the tax-base changes must be explicitly legislated. 
The chapter is divided into two sections. The first describes the main 
features of tax-base indexing. The second studies some effects of tax- 
base indexing with an emphasis on two groupings of the states, those 
with indexed tax bases and those with fixed tax bases. The second sec 
tion includes comparative analyses of trends in tax capacity and tax 
rates, as well as analyses of performance over time and during the 
recessionary phase of the business cycle.
AN OVERVIEW OF TAX-BASE INDEXING
Persistent growth in money wages is a ubiquitous feature of market 
economies. During the 1990s, money wage growth has been low by 
historical standards, but the average weekly wage in Ul-covered 
employment has grown in each year. From 1990 through 1996, the 
annual percentage growth in the AWW for taxable covered employers 
ranged from a low of 1.5 percent (1993) to a high of 5.6 percent 
(1992). The cumulative growth in the AWW during those years was 
28.1 percent, or from $428.02 in 1989 to $548.17 in 1996.
Roughly two-thirds of state UI programs set their taxable wage 
base through discretionary action, raising it only periodically, and typi 
cally setting the tax base only slightly higher than the minimum base 
mandated by the federal tax base conformity requirement. The feder 
ally mandated taxable wage base has been $7,000 since 1983. In 1996, 
12 states had tax bases of $7,000, 20 had tax bases between $7,001 and 
$10,000, and 21 had tax bases above $10,000.
Low tax bases are characteristic of many large states. Taxable cov 
ered employment exceeded 3.0 million in seven states during 1995. 
Three of the seven (California, Florida, and New York) had tax bases of
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$7,000 in 1996, while the other four (Illinois, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and 
Texas) had tax bases of either $8,000 or $9,000.
Low taxable wage bases are strongly associated with low taxable 
wage proportions. For the 12 states with $7,000 tax bases in 1996, the 
average TWP was 0.270, compared with the national average of 0.342. 
These 12 UI programs accounted for 33.9 percent of covered wages in 
1996. For states in which the 1996 tax bases ranged from $7,001 to 
$10,000, the TWP averaged 0.328, while the TWP averaged 0.472 for 
states where the tax base exceeded $10,000. The latter two groups 
accounted for 42.6 percent and 23.6 percent of covered wages, respec 
tively. States with high taxable wage bases had much higher TWPs, 
but they were generally smaller states and accounted for about 40 per 
cent of all UI programs (21 of 53) but only 23.6 percent of covered 
wages. As shown below, states with high tax bases are disproportion 
ately the states with indexed tax bases.
Theoretically, a state could achieve a high taxable wage base either 
through discretionary action or through tax-base indexing. In practice, 
states with fixed tax bases have not raised their bases in line with the 
growth in average wages. Taxable wages have persistently tended to 
grow more slowly than total covered wages, and the TWP has tended 
to decline in most states. For example, between 1989 and 1996, total 
wages for taxable covered employers grew by 40.7 percent. Over the 
same period, taxable wages grew by only 25.1 percent. Nationwide, 
the TWP declined from 0.385 in 1989 to 0.342 in 1996.
The decrease in the TWP between 1989 and 1996 is a continuation 
of a long-term trend that goes back to 1940. Annual changes in the 
TWP were negative in 49 of the 56 years between 1941 and 1996. The 
federal taxable wage base increased three times during that time, from 
$3,000 to $4,200 in 1972, to $6,000 in 1978, and to $7,000 in 1983. 
Three of the years when the TWP increased were years when the fed 
eral tax base was raised: the increases in the TWP were 0.064 in 1972, 
0.046 in 1978, and 0.024 in 1983. The four other years when TWP 
increased were 1945, 1976, 1993, and 1994. Those increases were all 
small, 1 and for 1976, 1993, and 1994 they reflect recession-related state 
action that raised tax bases in several states. The increases were large 
enough to offset the persistent tendency for TWP to decrease. 2 Fixed 
tax bases in the majority of states have been the most important factor 
causing the long-term decline in the TWP. The nationwide decrease
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was from 0.928 in 1940 to 0.342 in 1996. In 1996, only about one- 
third of covered wages were taxable. In New York, a high-wage state 
with a $7,000 tax base, the TWP was only 0.213 in 1996.
Increases in prices and wages have two important effects on UI 
programs. The discussion to this point has emphasized only the effect 
on the TWP when a state has a fixed tax base or adjusts its tax base 
only through legislation. Legislated adjustments have generally been 
too small to keep the TWP constant. Over time, UI programs must 
raise revenues from ever-declining proportions of covered wages.
The second important effect of rising wages is to erode benefit 
payment levels relative to pre-unemployment wages. All states limit 
the maximum weekly benefit amount. If the maximum WBA is not 
periodically adjusted upward, an increasing share of recipients will be 
paid the maximum, and the average benefit replacement rate (average 
weekly benefits as a proportion of average weekly wages) will fall over 
time. National data and data from individual states, however, show 
that UI replacement rates have been remarkably stable. The national 
average replacement rate was 0.361 for the 27 years between 1970 and 
1996. The annual replacement rate was between 0.354 and 0.372 for 
all but three of those years. Over the same time, the TWP decreased 
from 0.477 to 0.342, despite three increases in the federal taxable wage 
base.
Fifty-two of the 53 UI programs follow one of three approaches in 
adjusting the maximum weekly benefit and taxable wage base. During 
1996, there were 17 UI programs in which both the tax base and the 
maximum WBA were explicitly tied, through indexing, to average 
wages; 19 programs with indexed changes in the maximum WBA but 
not the tax base; and 16 in which neither was indexed. The remaining 
program (Alaska) indexed its UI tax base but not its maximum WBA. 
The shares of overall covered wages for these programs in 1995 were 
as follows: both the tax base and the maximum WBA indexed, 0.167; 
the tax base nonindexed but the maximum WBA indexed, 0.384; nei 
ther indexed, 0.447; and the tax base indexed but the maximum WBA 
fixed, 0.002. Thus, roughly 83 percent of covered wages were found in 
states without an indexed tax base. The 18 states with an indexed tax 
base accounted for only 16.9 percent-of covered wages. States with 
indexed maximum WBAs accounted for 55.1 percent of covered 
wages. On average, tax-base indexing was present in small states.
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Twice as many programs use indexed maximum WBAs as use 
indexed tax bases, 36 versus 18 in 1996. The indexing of the maxi 
mum WBAs also occurred earlier. The first state to index its maximum 
WBA was Kansas, in the early 1950s. By 1966, 15 UI programs had 
indexed maximum WBAs and just one (Hawaii) had an indexed tax 
base. The numbers increased to 30 and 3, respectively, in 1975. By 
1986, there were 35 states with indexed maximum WBAs and 18 with 
indexed tax bases. Thus, most states with an indexed maximum WBA 
adopted the provision between the mid 1950s and mid 1970s, but the 
adoption of indexed tax bases occurred mainly between the mid 1970s 
and the mid 1980s. Since the mid 1980s, the prevalence of either kind 
of indexing has not changed in any important way. 3
The number of UI programs with indexed tax bases has remained 
constant at 18 since 1986, with no state adding or discontinuing 
indexing. Details of these states© indexing provisions are shown in 
Table 3-1. Note that both Montana and Washington experimented 
with fixed annual tax base increases before adopting explicit index 
ing formulas that tie the tax base to lagged average wages. Most 
states that have adopted indexing did so between 1975 and 1986. 
Often, this was part of solvency legislation motivated by the trust 
fund financing problems of 1975-1977 or 1980-1983. Each state that 
adopted tax-base indexing has retained it.
The 18 states with indexed tax bases are generally small and gener 
ally lie west of the Mississippi River. Their programs accounted for 
16.9 percent of covered wages and 17.7 percent of covered employ 
ment in 1996. Employment in those states averaged 931,000 in 1996, 
compared with 2,227,000 in nonindexed states. Only four (Minnesota, 
New Jersey, North Carolina, and Washington) had total employment 
that exceeded 1,787,000, the national average for state-level covered 
employment, in 1996. Fourteen states with indexing lie west of the 
Mississippi River. However, because California and Texas have not 
indexed their tax bases, the 14 represent only about 29 percent of 
employment in the 24 western states. 4 Indexing is less common in the 
East, and the four states with indexed tax bases (out of 29 programs) 
accounted for only 11 percent of Ul-covered employment in 1996.
The percentage of indexing ranges from 100 percent of annual 
wages (Hawaii and Idaho) to 50 percent (North Carolina and Okla 
homa). Six programs have changed their percentage, with increases
Table 3-1 Tax-Base Indexing in Individual States through 1996
Indexing
First % of 
year annual wage
Alaska
Hawaii
Idaho
Iowa
Minnesota
Montana
Nevada
New Jersey
New Mexico
North Carolina
North Dakota
Oklahoma
Oregon
Rhode Island
1981
1965
1976
1978
1982
1979
1975
1976
1978
1984
1979
1986
1976
1980
75
60
100
90
100
66.7
60
80
75
66.7
53.8
65
50
60
70
50
80
70
Years 
in effect
1983-96
1981-82
1977-96
1965-76
1976-96
1978-96
1982-96
1986-96
1979-853
1975-96
1976-96
1978-96
1995-96
1984-94
1979-96
1986-96
1976-96
1980-96
Lag 
(months)
18
18
24
12
12
12
12
24
18
12
18
12
24
12
1996
Tax 
base
24,400
25,800
21,600
14,700
15,800
15,800
16,600
18,000
13,900
11,600
13,900
10,900
20,000
17,000
Tax base 
rank
2
1
3
12
11
10
9
6
14
17
15
19
5
8
Taxable wage 
proportion (TWP)
1986
0.681
0.686
0.693
0.582
0.471
0.714
0.590
0.456
0.549
0.515
0.567
0.462
0.629
0.554
1996
0.654
0.711
0.673
0.531
0.477
0.686
0.579
0.458
0.541
0.455
0.548
0.457
0.607
0.556
TWP
rank, 
1995
4
1
3
13
15
2
8
17
12
19
11
18
5
10
(continued)
Table 3-1 (continued)
Indexing
Utah
Virgin Islands
Washington
Wyoming
First 
year
1977
1985
1971
1984
%of 
annual wage
75
100
60
100
80
55
Years 
in effect
1985-96
1 977-8 l b
1995-96
1985-94
1989-96
1971-88C
1984-96
Lag 
(months)
18
18
24
24
1996
Tax 
base
17,200
13,900
20,300
12,100
Tax base 
rank
7
13
4
16
Taxable wage 
proportion (TWP)
1986
0.576
0.778
0.532
0.508
1996
0.575
0.590
0.584
0.485
TWP
rank, 
1995
9
6
7
14
©Maximum increase in tax base limited to $200 per year from 1979 to 1985. 
b Tax base frozen at $12,000 from 1981 to 1983 and increased to $13,300 in 1984.
c Tax base increased by $1,200 in 1972, by $600 per year from 1973 to 1984, and by 15 percent above the previous year©s value from 
1986 to 1988.
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occurring in Alaska, Hawaii, and Montana but decreases occurring in 
North Carolina, Utah, and the Virgin Islands. Two of those decreases 
occurred in 1995. The lags between changes in the average annual 
wages of the reference period and the tax base increase range from 12 
to 24 months.
Indexing has raised taxable wage bases considerably above the 
federal taxable wage base. The lowest tax base for the 18 programs in 
1986 was $10,900 in Oklahoma. The 1996 tax base equaled or 
exceeded $20,000 in five indexed states (Alaska, Hawaii, Idaho, Ore 
gon, and Washington), while it was between $15,000 and $19,900 in 
another five (Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Utah). 
The 17 highest UI tax bases in 1995 were in indexed states, while the 
tax base in the remaining indexed state (Oklahoma) ranked 19th.
Recall from the earlier discussion that 21 states had tax bases 
above $10,000 in 1996. The three nonindexed states in this group and 
their tax bases were Connecticut ($11,000), Massachusetts ($10,800), 
and Wisconsin ($10,500). In the early 1990s, Connecticut and Massa 
chusetts had financing problems that led to increases in their taxable 
wage bases. Because of those increases, Connecticut©s 1996 tax base 
was the only one in a nonindexed state that exceeded the tax base of 
any of the 18 indexed states, and that was only by $100 ($11,000 ver 
sus Oklahoma©s $10,900). In short, indexing has been the means 
whereby individual states have achieved high tax bases.
The high tax bases in the indexed states are associated with high 
taxable wage proportions. In 1996, the TWPs in these states ranged 
from 0.711 to 0.455, compared with the national average of 0.342 and 
an average of 0.306 in nonindexed states. Note also that the lowest 
TWPs among the indexed states were found in Oklahoma and North 
Carolina, states whose indexing percentages were lowest, at 50 percent 
of lagged average annual earnings. The average TWP across the 
indexed states was 0.519 in 1996, essentially identical to the average 
percentage of 0.523 in 1986 (see Table 2-5).
The final column in Table 3-1 shows the 1995 rankings of TWPs 
across the 53 UI programs. Of the 19 highest rankings, 18 were in 
states with indexed tax bases. 5 The 1996 TWP rankings are similar. 
Indexing the tax base has resulted in high TWPs.
For most states in Table 3-1, the TWPs for 1986 and 1996 are quite 
similar. Decreases occurred in North Carolina and the Virgin Islands,
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two states that reduced their indexing percentages in 1995. The large 
change in Washington can be attributed to use of a system for changing 
the tax base between 1986 and 1988 that differed from the one used in 
later years. The indexing percentage was effectively lower than 80 per 
cent in 1986, but since there were 15 percent annual tax-base increases 
during 1986-1988, one would expect a higher TWP after 1988.
For 11 of the remaining 15 states in Table 3-1, the TWP was lower 
in 1996 than in 1986. This may reflect growing inequality in earnings 
during the period when workers towards the top of the wage distribu 
tion range realized above average wage gains. This inference is consis 
tent with other data on annual earnings but cannot be verified here 
since the TWP estimates are based on aggregate (rather than on micro) 
data.
Recall from Table 2-5 that the TWP in nonindexed states fell mark 
edly between 1986 and 1996, from 0.386 to 0.306. By 1996, the aver 
age TWP in nonindexed states averaged only 0.590 of the average 
TWP in indexed ones. The implications this has for tax capacity, effec 
tive UI tax rates, and maintaining trust fund reserves are examined in 
the next section.
To summarize, 18 states have indexed taxable wage bases. Sixteen 
of the 18 adopted indexation between 1975 and 1986. The percentage 
of indexing the tax base as a percentage of lagged average annual 
wages ranges from 50 percent to 100 percent across those jurisdic 
tions. Between 1986 and 1996, the taxable wage proportion remained 
virtually unchanged in the indexed states, but it dropped markedly in 
the nonindexed states.
SOME EFFECTS OF TAX-BASE INDEXING
An indexed tax base can affect a UI program©s financing, both in 
the long run and during recessions. This section investigates four 
issues: 1) UI tax capacity, 2) the distribution of tax rates along tax rate 
schedules, 3) maintaining reserves in the long run, and 4) maintaining 
reserves during recessions. The analysis focuses on the period after 
1986, a period with no change in the number of indexed and nonin 
dexed programs.
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Maintaining Tax Capacity
Tax capacity, as defined in Chapter 2, is the product of the taxable 
wage proportion and the average tax rate for the top tax rate schedule. 
Besides the taxes implied by a state©s top experience-rating schedule, 
about half the states also have solvency taxes. The contribution of sol 
vency taxes to a UI program©s total tax capacity is the product of the 
TWP and the average rate for its solvency tax. Since solvency taxes 
are often levied at a single rate, their contribution to total tax capacity 
is easy to calculate.
Total tax capacity is defined by the following expression:
Eq. 3-1 TCap = TWP(TRTop + TRSolv),
where TCap is tax capacity,
TWP is the taxable wage proportion,
TRTop is the average tax rate on the top tax schedule, and
TRSolv is the average tax rate for the solvency tax.
The tax rates in Eq. 3-1 are often expressed as percentages, as in Tables 
2-2 through 2-5.
There is an ambiguity in expression Eq. 3-1 that merits discussion. 
The average tax rate for the top tax schedule (TRTop) depends both on 
the progression of rates between the minimum and the maximum rates 
and on the distribution of employers and their taxable wages across 
individual tax rate categories. The distribution of employers changes 
at different stages of the business cycle. After a recession, a higher 
fraction of taxable wages will be concentrated near the maximum rate, 
but after a long expansion, more will be concentrated towards the min 
imum rate. Moving to a higher schedule will cause the average tax rate 
to increase, not only because higher rates are in effect for each experi 
ence category but also because relatively more taxable wages will be 
located in categories near the maximum tax rate.
The difficulty can be avoided if states use array allocations to set 
employer rates along a given tax rate schedule. Each schedule has a 
fixed number of categories (for example, 20 in Washington), but tax 
able wages in each category are equalized (5 percent in Washington). 
Employers are ranked on the state©s experience indicator (benefit ratios 
in Washington). Cumulative distributions (from low to high) then
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determine the tax rate for each employer. Within each rate category, 
employers are taxed at a single tax rate. Because the percentages of 
taxable wages in each category are controlled, the average tax rate 
across all categories is also known, regardless of the distribution of 
employer-experience indicators. Using array allocations allows a state 
to make more accurate revenue projections because the average tax rate 
can be projected with a high degree of accuracy. 6
In states that do not use array allocations, the assessment of tax 
capacity can be inaccurate because the average tax rate for the top 
schedule is not precisely determined. The estimates shown in Table 
2-5, for example, probably understate the tax capacity for experience- 
rated taxes, because the procedure did not allow the average tax rate 
for the top schedule to increase relative to the simple average of the 
minimum and maximum rates.
Regardless of this shortcoming, it is clear that a decrease in the 
TWP reduces a state©s tax capacity. Between 1986 and 1996, the TWP 
fell in nonindexed states while it remained constant in indexed states. 
Nor did the average statutory rate for the top experience-rated schedule 
increase much between 1986 and 1996. Thus, for experience-rated 
taxes, tax capacity did not decline in indexed states, but it did decline 
in nonindexed states.
Table 3-2 shows state-level estimates of total tax capacity in 1986 
and 1996, including solvency taxes. The columns for each year show 
the four separate elements of Eq. 3-1 for total capacity. Table 3-2 also 
shows the maximum tax rate from the top tax schedule. In each state 
with a solvency tax, the tax was assumed to be turned on. Where a 
range of solvency rates is possible, the average solvency tax rate is esti 
mated the same way as the average experience-rated tax rate as the 
simple average of the minimum and maximum solvency tax rates. The 
states are identified according to the presence or absence of tax-base 
indexing.
The measures of total tax capacity shown in Table 3-2 closely 
resemble those in Table 2-5. In other words, most of the UI tax capac 
ity is generated by experience-rated taxes. The national tax rate aver 
ages in 1986 were 3.72 percent for experience-rated taxes in the top 
schedule and 0.64 percent for solvency taxes. Solvency taxes 
accounted for just under 15 percent of total tax capacity in 1986 and 
for about 14 percent in 1996.
Table 3-2 Total Tax Capacity for the Top Rated Tax Schedules Plus Solvency Taxes, 1986 and 1996
1986
Top schedule
State
Alabama
Alaska3
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii3
Idaho3
Illinois
Indiana
Iowaa
Kansas
TWP
0.460
0.681
0.405
0.477
0.353
0.415
0.324
0.402
0.351
0.428
0.412
0.686
0.693
0.378
0.372
0.582
0.483
Max. 
rate
(%)
5.4
6.5
5.4
6.0
5.4
5.4
6.4
7.0
5.4
5.4
5.7
5.4
6.8
6.6
5.4
7.0
5.4
Avg. 
rate 
(%)
2.95
3.75
4.15
3.05
3.35
3.05
3.95
3.55
3.10
2.75
3.21
4.00
4.85
3.40
3.35
3.75
2.71
Top 
solv. tax 
rate 
(%)
0.70
0.75
1.00
0.50
1.00
2.00
0.90
1.62
1.20
0.60
1996
Top schedule
Total tax 
capacity
(%)
1.68
3.06
1.68
1.93
1.36
1.27
1.60
2.23
1.40
1.18
1.99
3.57
3.36
1.51
1.25
2.18
1.31
TWP
0.352
0.654
0.316
0.426
0.250
0.383
0.305
0.300
0.267
0.319
0.331
0.711
0.673
0.303
0.293
0.531
0.416
Max. 
rate 
(%)
6.8
6.5
5.4
6.0
5.4
5.4
6.9
8.0
7.4
5.4
8.1
5.4
6.8
6.6
5.7
9.0
6.4
Avg. 
rate 
(%)
3.73
3.75
4.15
3.05
3.35
2.75
4.45
4.05
4.65
2.75
4.08
3.90
4.85
3.40
3.55
4.50
3.20
Top 
solv. tax 
rate 
(%)
0.75
0.80
0.50
0.55
1.50
2.00
1.35
0.60
Total tax 
capacity 
(%)
1.31
2.94
1.31
1.64
0.96
1.26
1.81
1.82
1.24
0.88
1.80
2.77
3.26
1.21
1.04
2.39
1.33
Table 3-2 (continued)
1986
Top schedule
State
Kentucky 
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland 
Massachusetts
Michigan 
Minnesota
Mississippi 
Missouri
Montana3
Nebraska
Nevada3
New Hampshire 
New Jersey3 
New Mexico3
New York
North Carolina3
TWP
0.443 
0.396
0.445
0.373 
0.385
0.394 
0.471
0.465 
0.406
0.714
0.421
0.590
0.408 
0.456 
0.549
0.322
0.515
Max. 
rate
10.0 
6.0
6.5
6.0
7.2
9.0
7.5
6.4
7.8
6.4
5.4
5.4
6.5 
6.2 
5.4
6.4
5.7
Avg. 
rate
5.50 
3.15
4.45
4.40 
5.10
4.50 
4.25
3.25 
3.90
4.05
2.75
3.25
4.65 
3.70 
4.05
4.25
2.90
Top 
solv. tax 
rate
0.90
1.00 
0.60
1.00 
0.90
0.50 
0.80
1.00
0.57
1996
Top schedule
Total tax 
capacity
2.44 
1.60
1.98
1.64 
1.96
2.17 
2.28
1.98 
1.95
2.89
1.16
1.92
2.10 
2.05 
2.22
1.69
1.79
TWP
0.349 
0.339
0.330
0.316 
0.358
0.308 
0.477
0.365 
0.333
0.686
0.326
0.579
0.308 
0.458 
0.541
0.213
0.455
Max. 
rate
10.0 
6.0
7.5
8.9 
9.3
9.0 
9.0
6.4 
7.8
6.4
5.4
5.4
6.5 
6.9 
5.4
5.4
5.7
Avg. 
rate
5.50 
3.15
4.95
5.45 
6.35
4.65 
4.80
3.25 
3.90
4.05
2.75
2.83
3.28 
4.00 
4.05
3.25
2.85
Top 
solv. tax 
rate
0.90
0.40
2.00
1.00 
0.68
0.90
0.54
0.50 
0.35
1.20
0.57
Total tax 
capacity
1.92 
1.37
1.77
2.35 
2.27
1.74 
2.61
1.19 
1.60
2.78
1.07
1.64
1.16 
1.99 
2.19
0.95
1.56
North Dakota3
Ohio
Oklahoma8
Oregon3
Pennsylvania
Puerto Rico
Rhode Island3
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah3
Vermont
Virginia
Virgin Islands3
Washington3
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming3
U.S. total
Indexed states
Nonindexed states
0.567
0.390
0.462
0.629
0.402
0.588
0.554
0.436
0.465
0.414
0.377
0.576
0.469
0.392
0.778
0.532
0.423
0.500
0.508
0.408
0.523
0.386
5.0
5.4
6.2
5.4
9.2
5.4
8.4
5.4
10.5
10.0
6.0
8.0
8.4
6.2
9.0
5.4
7.5
6.7
8.5
6.4
6.3
6.5
2.75
2.80
3.35
3.80
5.35
4.18
5.35
3.35
6.00
5.25
3.05
4.15
4.85
3.45
4.55
3.94
4.50
3.35
4.88
3.72
3.75
3.72
1.60
1.15
0.50
1.08
0.70
0.80
0.35
1.00
0.20
0.75
1.55
0.85
0.64
0.50
0.66
1.56
1.72
2.08
2.39
2.35
2.45
3.56
1.77
3.16
2.32
1.53
2.39
2.27
1.43
4.12
2.10
2.56
2.10
2.48
1.77
2.21
1.69
0.548
0.334
0.457
0.607
0.297
0.466
0.556
0.327
0.364
0.306
0.337
0.575
0.351
0.315
0.590
0.584
0.357
0.392
0.485
0.342
0.519
0.306
5.4
6.5
9.2
5.4
9.2
5.4
8.3
5.4
9.5
10.0
6.0
8.0
8.4
6.4
9.0
5.4
7.5
8.9
8.8
6.8
6.8
6.8
2.95
3.30
4.75
3.80
5.35
3.95
5.20
3.32
5.50
5.25
3.00
4.15
4.85
3.35
4.55
3.88
4.50
4.59
4.55
3.85
3.94
3.82
1.28
1.53
0.80
0.30
0.70
0.80
1.00
0.20
0.75
0.45
0.62
0.62
0.35
0.68
1.62
1.53
2.87
2.31
1.83
1.84
3.06
1.31
2.29
1.61
1.35
2.39
1.70
1.12
3.13
2.27
1.61
1.97
2.51
1.53
2.23
1.38
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Comparison of State Unemployment Insurance Laws. 
3 State with indexed tax base.
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Total tax capacity in 1986 was noticeably higher in states with 
indexed taxable wage bases. The overall average was 2.21 percent of 
total wages in indexed states and 1.69 percent in nonindexed states. 
On average, total tax capacity was about 24 percent lower in nonin 
dexed states. By 1996, the average difference in total tax capacity for 
indexed and nonindexed states had grown to 38 percent. (The average 
tax rate was 2.23 percent for indexed states but 1.38 percent for nonin 
dexed states.)
Note also that the average maximum solvency tax had fallen in 
indexed states but remained essentially unchanged in nonindexed 
states. In other words, from 1986 to 1996, when the number of 
indexed and nonindexed states did not change, indexed states main 
tained their total tax capacity, but nonindexed states did not. The latter 
were somewhat more exposed to the risks of recession-related indebt 
edness in 1996 than they had been a decade earlier.
The Distribution of Actual versus Statutory Tax Rates
Since the mid 1980s, UI benefit costs have fallen below long-term 
averages. From 1986 through 1995, for example, benefits averaged 
0.894 percent of covered wages. The average cost rate for the preced 
ing 10 years was 1.197 percent, and for the preceding 40 years (1946 
through 1985), 1.128 percent. Thus, from 1986 through 1995, UI costs 
were about 25 percent below those of the preceding decade and 20 per 
cent below those of the preceding four decades.
The effect of experience-rating during a period of below-average 
costs should be to reduce average effective tax rates. However, the past 
decade was also a period when the federal taxable wage base remained 
at $7,000, and the TWP fell in nearly all nonindexed states. Those 
states raised revenues from an ever-smaller share of total wages, which 
undoubtedly acted to restrain reductions in their average tax rates.
Table 3-3 summarizes tax rate developments from 1986-1996. 
The table shows five data items for both 1986 and 1996: 1) the average 
statutory tax rate, 2) the average effective tax rate (on taxable wages), 
3) the ratio of the average effective tax rate to the average statutory 
rate, 4) the taxable wage proportion (TWP), and 5) taxes as a percent 
age of total wages. Each state with an indexed tax base is identified
Table 3-3 Statutory Tax Rates, Effective Tax Rates, and Taxable Wage Proportions, 1986 and 1996
State
Alabama
Alaska3
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia 
Hawaii3
Idaho3
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa3
Kansas
Kentucky
Avg. 
stat. rate
2.95
3.20
2.75
3.55
2.85
2.85
3.95
5.55
4.00
2.75
4.35 
2.80
3.65
4.05
2.85
4.50
3.23
5.50
Effective 
tax rate
2.22
2.86
1.54
2.37
2.34
2.08
2.32
3.06
2.97
1.10
1.61 
1.68
2.98
3.99
1.44
3.19
2.00
3.22
1986
Effective 
rate/ 
stat. rate
0.753
0.894
0.560
0.668
0.821
0.730
0.587
0.551
0.743
0.400
0.370 
0.600
0.816
0.985
0.505
0.709
0.619
0.585
TWP
0.460
0.681
0.405
0.477
0.353
0.415
0.324
0.402
0.351
0.428
0.412 
0.686
0.693
0.378
0.372
0.582
0.483
0.443
Taxes/total 
wages
1.02
1.95
0.62
1.13
0.83
0.86
0.75
1.23
1.04
0.47
0.66 
1.15
2.07
1.51
0.54
1.86
0.97
1.43
Avg. 
stat. rate
3.73
3.75
4.15
3.05
3.35
2.75
4.45
4.05
4.65
2.75
4.08 
3.90
4.85
3.40
3.55
4.50
3.20
5.50
Effective 
tax rate
0.96
2.70
1.65
1.94
3.76
1.04
4.04
2.42
2.95
1.56
1.36 
2.05
1.79
2.56
1.29
0.96
0.30
2.06
1996
Effective 
rate/ 
stat. rate
0.258
0.720
0.398
0.636
1.122
0.378
0.908
0.598
0.634
0.567
0.333 
0.526
0.369
0.753
0.363
0.213
0.094
0.375
TWP
0.352
0.654
0.316
0.426
0.250
0.383
0.305
0.300
0.267
0.319
0.331 
0.711
0.673
0.303
0.293
0.531
0.416
0.349
Taxes/total 
wages (%)
0.34
1.77
0.52
0.83
0.94
0.40
1.23
0.73
0.79
0.50
0.45 
1.46
1.20
0.78
0.38
0.51
0.12
0.72
Table 3-3 (continued)
State
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota3
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana3
Nebraska
Nevada3
New Hampshire
New Jersey3
New Mexico3
New York
North Carolina3
North Dakota3
Avg. 
stat. rate
4.30
3.95
3.90
3.30
5.50
4.25
2.95
3.90
4.15
2.75
2.85
3.26
4.05
3.15
3.85
3.48
3.85
Effective 
tax rate
3.81
2.70
2.76
2.07
5.44
2.71
1.93
2.29
2.30
1.90
1.84
0.82
2.98
1.98
3.25
1.85
2.86
1986
Effective 
rate/ 
stat. rate
0.887
0.684
0.708
0.627
0.989
0.638
0.654
0.587
0.554
0.691
0.646
0.252
0.736
0.629
0.844
0.532
0.743
TWP
0.396
0.445
0.373
0.385
0.394
0.471
0.465
0.406
0.714
0.421
0.590
0.408
0.456
0.549
0.322
0.515
0.567
Taxes/total 
wages
1.51
1.20
1.03
0.80
2.14
1.28
0.90
0.93
1.64
0.80
1.09
0.33
1.36
1.09
1.05
0.95
1.62
Avg. 
stat. rate
3.15
4.95
5.45
6.35
4.65
4.80
3.25
3.90
4.05
2.75
2.83
3.28
4.00
4.05
3.25
2.85
2.95
Effective 
tax rate
1.69
3.72
2.45
3.65
3.53
1.38
1.32
1.99
1.27
0.92
1.54
1.01
2.53
1.33
4.41
0.22
0.83
1996
Effective 
rate/ 
stat. rate
0.537
0.752
0.450
0.575
0.759
0.288
0.406
0.510
0.314
0.335
0.545
0.308
0.633
0.328
1.357
0.077
0.281
Taxes/total 
TWP wages (%)
0.339
0.330
0.316
0.358
0.308
0.477
0.365
0.333
0.686
0.326
0.579
0.308
0.458
0.541
0.213
0.455
0.548
0.57
1.23
0.77
1.31
1.09
0.66
0.48
0.66
0.87
0.30
0.89
0.31
1.16
0.72
0.94
0.10
0.45
Ohio
Oklahoma3
Oregon3
Pennsylvania
Puerto Rico
Rhode Island3
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah3
Vermont
Virginia
Virgin Islands3
Washington3
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming3
U.S. total
Indexed states
Nonindexed states
4.40
4.75
3.80
6.15
4.18
5.35
3.35
4.55
5.08
4.36
4.15
4.85
4.55
3.15
3.94
6.00
5.20
5.00
3.96
3.94
3.97
3.61
2.34
3.11
5.03
5.34
3.73
2.01
1.44
1.72
2.04
1.80
3.98
1.29
3.44
4.03
4.52
4.62
3.40
2.77
2.74
2.78
0.820
0.493
0.818
0.818
1.279
0.697
0.600
0.316
0.339
0.468
0.434
0.821
0.284
1.092
1.023
0.753
0.888
0.680
0.700
0.696
0.701
0.390
0.462
0.629
0.402
0.588
0.554
0.436
0.465
0.414
0.377
0.576
0.469
0.392
0.778
0.532
0.423
0.500
0.508
0.408
0.523
0.386
1.41
1.08
1.96
2.02
3.14
2.07
0.88
0.67
0.71
0.77
1.04
1.87
0.51
2.68
2.14
1.91
2.31
1.73
1.13
1.43
1.08
3.30
4.75
3.80
5.35
3.95
5.20
3.32
5.50
5.25
3.00
4.15
4.85
3.35
4.55
3.88
4.50
4.59
4.55
3.85
3.94
3.82
2.27
0.87
2.10
4.26
3.34
3.68
1.90
0.55
1.63
1.53
0.87
2.60
1.16
2.83
1.88
2.97
2.02
1.49
2.28
1.60
2.51
0.688
0.183
0.553
0.796
0.846
0.708
0.572
0.100
0.310
0.510
0.210
0.536
0.346
0.622
0.485
0.660
0.441
0.327
0.592
0.405
0.657
0.334
0.457
0.607
0.297
0.466
0.556
0.327
0.364
0.306
0.337
0.575
0.351
0.315
0.590
0.584
0.357
0.392
0.485
0.342
0.519
0.306
0.76
0.40
1.27
1.27
1.56
2.05
0.62
0.20
0.50
0.52
0.50
0.91
0.37
1.67
1.10
1.06
0.79
0.72
0.78
0.83
0.77
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Comparison of State Unemployment Insurance Laws. 
3 State with indexed tax base.
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and overall averages are shown for both indexed and nonindexed 
states.
Two comments are needed. First, the average statutory rate is mea 
sured as the simple average of the minimum and maximum rates for 
the year and includes solvency taxes if they were activated. Second, 
the ratio of the average effective rate to the average statutory rate is not 
constrained to fall below unity. The ratio shows where the central ten 
dency of the actual tax rate distribution falls relative to the center of the 
statutory tax rate schedule. As the distribution of actual rates moves 
downward towards the minimum rate, this ratio will decrease.
Three contrasting patterns for indexed and nonindexed states are 
apparent in Table 3-3. First, the overall averages for the statutory rates, 
the effective tax rates, and the ratio of the effective rates to statutory 
rates were quite similar in 1986; the latter ratios were 0.696 and 0.701 
for indexed and nonindexed states, respectively. However, because the 
TWP was systematically higher for the indexed states in 1986 (0.523 
versus 0.386), taxes as a percent of total wages were considerably 
higher in the indexed states (1.43 percent versus 1.08 percent).
Second, the average statutory rate did not change much in either 
the indexed (unchanged at 3.94 in both years) or the nonindexed states 
(decreasing from 3.97 to 3.82 percent). However, during the same 
period, the effective tax rate for indexed states dropped sharply (from 
2.74 to 1.60, or by 42 percent), while the decrease was much smaller in 
nonindexed states (from 2.78 to 2.51, or by 10 percent). As a result, 
the decline in the ratio of effective tax rates to statutory tax rates in 
indexed states was 42 percent (from 0.696 to 0.405), while in nonin 
dexed states it was only 6 percent (from 0.701 to 0.657). The effective 
tax rate distribution moved significantly towards the minimum rate in 
the indexed states, while it was little changed in nonindexed states. On 
average, employers in indexed states were being taxed at much lower 
rates along their tax schedules in 1996 than were employers in nonin 
dexed states.
Third, as noted previously, the average TWP was roughly stable in 
the indexed states, while it fell by 20 percent in nonindexed states 
(from 0.386 to 0.306). Because the TWP was so much higher in 
indexed states, average taxes on total wages were higher in those states 
(0.83 percent) than in nonindexed states (0.77 percent). This repre 
sents a much smaller average effective tax rate differential than in
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1986. The key difference between the indexed and nonindexed states 
in 1996 was that indexed states had a much higher capacity for increas 
ing revenues. That increase could be accomplished within their experi 
ence-rating systems, which allowed a greater range for moving the 
average effective tax rate towards the maximum statutory rate (as 
reflected by the lower ratio of the average effective tax rate to the aver 
age statutory rate in indexed states). As shown in Table 2-5, the tax 
capacity for experience-rated taxes in indexed states was much greater 
than that tax capacity in nonindexed states in 1996 (2.05 percent versus 
1.17 percent of total wages).
Maintaining Reserves in the Long Run
In assessing the impact of indexing on UI financing, it is important 
to move beyond the focus on tax rates in Table 3-3. A state©s ability to 
build and maintain adequate reserves is the main indicator of success 
ful program funding.
The reserve ratio multiples for individual states in 1989 and 1996 
are shown in Table 1-4 of Chapter 1. Weighted averages of those mul 
tiples for 1989 and 1996 were computed for indexed and nonindexed 
UI programs. The 1989 and 1996 national averages for those multiples 
were 0.87 and 0.64, respectively. The corresponding averages for 
indexed states in 1989 and 1996 were 1.18 and 0.88, each about one- 
third above the national average. For nonindexed states, the corre 
sponding averages were 0.81 and 0.59, respectively. As indicators of 
reserve adequacy, these multiples show that indexed programs were 
more adequately financed than nonindexed programs in both years.
When the individual RRMs are examined for the 18 programs with 
indexed tax base, the expected patterns emerge. None of the 10 pro 
grams with the lowest multiples in 1989 had an indexed tax base. In 
1996, only one of the bottom 10 (Rhode Island) had an indexed tax 
base. Of the top 10 multiples in 1989 and 1996, numbers five and six 
were from programs with indexed tax bases. 7 When states were ranked 
from bottom to top, the average rankings for indexed programs in 1989 
and 1996 were 34.3 and 32.6, respectively, while the corresponding 
averages for nonindexed programs were 21.7 and 22.6, respectively. 
The high average multiples for indexed states reflect a generalized pat-
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tern, not just the effects of high multiples in a few programs with 
indexed tax bases.
As noted, reserve ratio multiples declined generally between 1989 
and 1996, for both indexed and nonindexed programs. However, 
because indexed programs had higher multiples in 1989, the declines 
for those programs had less serious implications for future borrowing 
and indebtedness.
A cautionary comment about interpreting the differences in the 
average reserve positions: some states may be more proactive in accu 
mulating substantial reserves (placing greater emphasis on advance 
funding as opposed to pay-as-you-go). These states may also be proac 
tive in a second area, that is, in instituting and maintaining an indexed 
tax base. With indexing, however, the need for other proactive mea 
sures for maintaining large balances is reduced, for the tax base auto 
matically grows with average wages in the state.
Distinguishing between a proactive public policy that leads to 
larger trust fund reserves and indexed taxes bases that also lead to 
larger reserves might not be easy, but that indexed states have higher 
reserve ratio multiples is clear. In both 1989 and 1996, the average 
reserve ratio multiple for indexed states was almost 50 percent above 
the average multiple for the nonindexed states. 8
Maintaining Reserves During Recessions
An indexed tax base can help states compensate for recession- 
related losses in reserves. The automatic growth in taxable wages per 
employee helps to offset the revenue losses caused by the lower levels 
of employment.
Appendix B reports the results of a regression analysis of the effect 
of indexing on trust fund reserves. The analysis examines recession- 
related drawdowns for 1974-1976, 1981-1983, and 1990-1992. Mul 
tiple regressions were fitted for each period to test for the partial effect 
of tax-base indexing on the size of trust fund drawdowns.
The results support the hypothesis that tax-base indexing has a 
positive effect on trust fund reserves during recessions. States with 
indexed tax bases (identified with dummy variables) had significantly 
smaller losses in reserves for each of the three recessions. The size of
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the dummy variable coefficients, 0.16 to 0.54 in 10 of 12 regressions, 
suggests that the effects of tax-base indexing are significant.
Nonetheless, caution is advised in interpreting these results. States 
with indexed tax bases may generally be taking a proactive approach to 
trust fund management and may want to maintain large reserves. Thus, 
from a more general perspective, the underlying cause may be that a 
proactive policy leads to larger trust fund balances, and tax-base index 
ing may also serve to indicate a proactive approach to trust fund man 
agement.
SUMMARY
Tax-base indexing has been consistently used in 18 UI programs 
since 1986. Those programs have significantly higher tax bases and 
much higher taxable wage proportions when compared with other UI 
programs. The indexed programs maintained their average taxable 
wage proportions during 1986-1996, but those proportions dropped 
markedly in nonindexed programs.
From the comparative analysis of indexed and nonindexed states 
come three conclusions:
1. UI programs with indexed tax bases were more successful than 
nonindexed ones in maintaining their tax capacity (potential 
taxes as a percentage of total covered wages). The differences 
in average tax capacity for indexed and nonindexed programs 
(as measured in Table 3-2) grew from 24 percent in 1986 to 38 
percent in 1996.
2. Tax-base indexing is associated with higher trust fund 
reserves, as measured by reserve ratio multiples. In both 1989 
and 1996, the average RRM was about 50 percent higher in 
indexed than in nonindexed states.
3. A regression analysis found that tax-base indexing signifi 
cantly helped states maintain trust fund reserves during reces 
sions. Clearly, tax-base indexing offers both short- and long- 
term advantages in maintaining trust fund reserves.
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Notes
1. Respectively, the TWP increased by 0.002, 0.017, 0.001, and 0.003 in those four 
years.
2. It should also be noted that average wages grew very slowly, less than 2.2 percent, 
during both 1993 and 1994.
3. Some states with indexed maximum WBAs have frozen those provisions to pre 
vent insolvency. Of the even-numbered years between 1986 and 1996, the year 
with the highest incidence of such limitations was 1988, when 10 states overrode 
the indexing provision of their maximum WBA.
4. California and Texas accounted for 46 percent of covered employment in the West 
in 1995.
5. Puerto Rico, a low-wage jurisdiction with a 1996 tax base of $7,000, ranked 16th.
6. Seven states use array allocations: Alaska, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, North Dakota, 
Vermont, and Washington. All but Washington have employment levels below the 
national average.
7. States were assigned numbers from 1 (the lowest reserve ratio multiple) to 53 (the 
highest multiple). Simple averages of the ranks were then computed for the 19 
indexed and for the 35 nonindexed programs.
8. In 1989, the reserve ratio multiple for indexed states averaged 1.180, while in 
nonindexed states the multiple averaged 0.807. The corresponding average multi 
ples in 1996 were 0.883 and 0.591, respectively.
4 Financing Unemployment 
Insurance Debts
This chapter examines methods of financing state UI trust fund 
indebtedness. 1 The two main options are the traditional method bor 
rowing from the U.S. Treasury and a recent innovation, the direct 
issuing of bonds by debtor states. The chapter describes the two 
options, assesses their strengths and weaknesses, reviews the history of 
state borrowing and bond issuing, and compares costs.
It is important to state at the outset that, as in many other public 
policy debates, there is no single answer about whether it is better to 
issue state debt instruments than to borrow from the U.S. Treasury. 
The specific circumstances of a debtor state need to be assessed, and 
the issuing of state debt itself entails a number of options. The ques 
tion is thus not either/or, but rather one that considers a number of 
alternatives in issuing state debt.
BACKGROUND
The recession of the early 1990s was mild by history©s standards, 
both in terms of the peak-to-trough decline in real output and in the 
level of overall joblessness. The unemployment rate peaked at 7.7 per 
cent of the civilian labor force in June 1992 and fell steadily after that 
date. The annual average unemployment rate fell from 7.5 percent in 
1992 to 5.4 percent in 1996 and reached even lower levels in early 
1997.
Because state UI trust funds had grown substantially between 1984 
and 1989, and because the recession was comparatively mild, state 
trust fund reserves were generally high enough to meet the increased 
demand for benefits during the recession of the 1990s. Only seven UI 
programs needed loans from the U.S. Treasury, and only Connecticut 
and Massachusetts experienced substantial indebtedness. Connecticut 
and Massachusetts borrowed in 1991, the District of Columbia and 
Michigan in 1992, and Maine, Missouri, and New York in 1993. All
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loans were fully repaid by June 1995. Borrowing during 1991-1995 
totaled $4.8 billion, with Connecticut ($1.66 billion) and Massachu 
setts ($1.72 billion) accounting for 70 percent of the national total. The 
experience of the 1990s contrasts sharply with that of the mid 1970s 
and of the early 1980s. Between 1980 and 1987, 32 UI programs bor 
rowed a total of $24.2 billion.
Traditionally, UI trust fund debts have been financed by loans from 
the U.S. Treasury. After these loans started to carry interest charges in 
the early 1980s, states began to repay their loans much more rapidly. 2 
This pattern of rapid loan repayment continued in the 1990s. During 
1991 and 1992, for example, $2.2 billion was borrowed, but $1.4 bil 
lion was repaid.
Another change in debt repayment dating from the 1980s was 
direct bond issuing by debtor states to repay their U.S. Treasury loans. 
Louisiana and West Virginia issued tax-free bonds for that purpose. 
Those bonds were later retired using the proceeds of state payroll 
taxes.
Several states explored state bond financing during the recession of 
the early 1990s. Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan, and Maine 
held discussions with potential underwriters. The lower interest rates 
associated with tax-free bonds was a major point of emphasis in those 
discussions. In June 1993, Connecticut authorized a bond issue of 
about $1.0 billion as one element of its UI solvency legislation. Mas 
sachusetts considered a bond package during its 1992 legislative ses 
sion but did not enact it.
Because state bond issues will undoubtedly be considered in future 
recessions, the following analysis may be useful to states considering 
issuing bonds.
FINANCING WITH U.S. TREASURY LOANS
Title XII of the Social Security Act sets the legal requirements that 
states must satisfy when borrowing to finance UI trust fund debts. 
Essentially, loans are available on an "as needed" basis, with interest 
charges accruing if advances still remain outstanding after certain 
dates. Repayment of the principal can be made on a voluntary basis,
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but if a minimum rate of repayment is not achieved, automatic repay 
ment is accomplished through special taxes added to each employer©s 
federal UI tax.
Several legal requirements are imposed on debtor states by Title 
XII, by other parts of the Social Security Act, and by the Federal 
Unemployment Tax Act. A useful starting point is to look at the trust 
fund withdrawal standard. Each state maintains a trust fund account at 
the U.S. Treasury. Inflows come from two sources: state UI taxes and 
interest earnings on account balances that are invested in specialized 
U.S. Treasury debt instruments. Outflows are reserved for a single pur 
pose: to pay benefits to UI claimants. 3
The withdrawal standard and associated regulations limits the 
choices available to a debtor state. Monies in the state trust fund 
accounts cannot be used to pay interest on outstanding debts. 4 Also, 
although the proceeds of a bond issue can be used to repay outstanding 
Title XII debts, they cannot be deposited into a state©s UI trust fund 
account in anticipation of future debts. In other words, a debtor state 
owing $500 million on September 30th but expecting to borrow 
another $100 million during October-December can deposit only $500 
million from a bond issue on September 30th. Additional proceeds 
from a bond issue can be deposited only as new trust fund debts accrue.
Interest charges on Title XII debt are calculated as the product of 
average daily indebtedness times the interest rate on long-term U.S. 
Treasury debt. The average daily balance is a simple average of 
indebtedness at the end of each business day in the year. Debtor states 
can minimize that balance by following a daily debt management strat 
egy. The optimal strategy is to borrow each day that withdrawals 
exceed receipts and repay on days that receipts exceed withdrawals. 
The strategy minimizes the average daily balance and leaves the fund 
balance at zero at the end of each day. The interest rate charged on 
debt is the average interest rate earned by states with positive UI trust 
fund balances during the fourth quarter of the previous calendar year 
and is subject to a maximum rate of 10.0 percent. 5
States that borrow after January 1st of a given year can avoid inter 
est charges altogether if the loans are fully repaid by September 30th, 
the last day of the fiscal year. Loans taken and fully repaid within a fis 
cal year are commonly referred to as "cash-flow" loans. If, however, 
there is additional borrowing between October 1st and December 31st,
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the state is then subject to full interest charges on the earlier 
borrowing6 as well as interest on the October-December borrowing.
Interest payments on loans for a given fiscal year are due on Sep 
tember 30th, but interest payments for loans received after April 30th 
can be deferred until December 31st of the following year. Additional 
interest continues to accrue, adding to the state©s interest liability; for 
example, under an annual interest rate of 10.0 percent, a state that bor 
rowed during May-September and owed $12 million in interest on 
September 30th would owe $13.5 million if it deferred all repayments 
until December 31 of the following year.
States also need to consider monthly patterns of trust fund receipts 
and expenditures. Benefit payments in most states exhibit a pro 
nounced seasonal pattern because the average number of beneficiaries 
during January and February is typically much larger than during July 
and August. The normal seasonal variation in claims can cause Janu 
ary and February benefit payments to be 40 to 50 percent higher than 
July and August payments.
Trust fund tax receipts are also highly seasonal, but their month-to- 
month patterns are much more irregular than those of benefit pay 
ments. Employers© tax obligations accrue in each quarter, with pay 
ments usually due early in the following quarter. 7 Thus, tax receipts 
are heavily concentrated in February, May, August, and November. 
Also, because of the low taxable wage base, receipts in May (based on 
first-quarter taxable wages) are by far the largest, followed in descend 
ing order by receipts in August, November, and February of the next 
year. In states with tax bases close to the federal tax base of $7,000 per 
worker, receipts in May can be four to eight times the receipts of the 
following February.
These seasonal patterns are generally predictable, even though tax 
receipts and benefit outlays can both be quite volatile in the short run. 
Since the patterns of receipts and outlays are so different, a debtor state 
will typically make substantial loan repayments in some months and 
borrow large amounts in others. Borrowing during January and repay 
ing during May are to be expected, even for a state whose annual 
receipts fall substantially short of its annual withdrawals.
The experiences of Massachusetts and Connecticut during 1991 
and 1992 vividly illustrate this point. 8 Connecticut started borrowing 
in January 1991, and Massachusetts secured its first loan in August
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1991. During 1991 and 1992, benefit outlays substantially exceeded 
tax revenues in both states. Connecticut©s year-end debt totaled $354 
million in 1991 and $653 million in 1992; the corresponding levels for 
Massachusetts were $234 million and $380 million. Yet, both states 
made sizeable loan repayments during the two years. Connecticut, 
which had the more serious funding imbalance,9 repaid $148 million in 
1991 and $202 million in 1992, while borrowing about $500 million in 
each year. Massachusetts borrowed $732 million in 1992, while repay 
ing $589 million. In both states, loan repayments were concentrated in 
months of high tax receipts. However, because receipts arrive irregu 
larly during the month, borrowing occurred even in these months.
To summarize, after a state exhausts its trust fund and starts to bor 
row, it typically borrows in every month and makes loan repayments in 
at least four months, for example, in February, May, August, and 
November. This pattern of borrowing and repaying is rational, because 
it minimizes the average daily level of debt.
Connecticut and Massachusetts addressed their funding problems 
through legislation. In January 1992, the taxable wage base in Massa 
chusetts increased from $7,000 to $10,800, and new tax rate schedules 
came into effect. Tax receipts in May 1992 reflected the effects of 
Massachusetts© higher tax base and higher scheduled tax rates. Large 
loan repayments occurred during May 1992 ($319 million) and May 
1993 ($334 million). A repayment of $257 million in May 1994 fully 
eliminated the debt.
Connecticut, on the other hand, had a serious funding imbalance 
which it did not address until June 1993. Its 1993 legislation raised the 
taxable wage base (to $9,000 in 1994 and eventually to $15,000 in 
1999), increased the maximum solvency tax (from 1.0 percent to 1.5 
percent), and made modest benefit reductions. It also authorized bor 
rowing through a state bond issue. Roughly $1.0 billion in state bonds 
was issued during August-September 1993, both to repay its outstand 
ing Title XII loans and to cover possible later borrowing. This bond 
issue is discussed below.
Title XII also specifies debt repayment requirements. As noted, for 
any period when receipts exceed outlays, the excess can be used to 
retire the outstanding debt instead of remaining in the state©s trust fund 
account. If debt has been outstanding on January 1st of two consecu 
tive years and has not been fully repaid by November 10th of the later
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year, automatic repayment begins. On January 1st of the following 
year, 0.3 percent is added to the federal part of the tax obligation (the 
FUTA tax) for each covered employer in the state. In other words, the 
rate rises from 0.8 to 1.1 percent of federal taxable wages (the first 
$7,000 of annual earnings). 10 The proceeds of this "penalty tax" 11 go to 
repay the oldest portion of the state©s outstanding debt.
If a state continues to carry outstanding debt, additional FUTA 
penalty taxes are imposed in subsequent years. The proceeds are used 
to retire debt, always starting with the oldest remaining debt. The rate 
of the penalty tax increases in the second and subsequent later years. 12 
Thus, if a state does not take steps to repay its debt, an automatic 
mechanism will eventually bring about full repayment.
FUTA penalty taxes for each year are imposed at a single flat rate 
on all covered employers. A state may prefer to make loan repayments 
by using taxes for which rates vary across employers. To do this, it 
may either divert part of its regular tax receipts into voluntary repay 
ments (if receipts exceed outlays by a sufficient margin) or impose 
additional taxes (as a fixed proportion of regular state UI taxes). Vol 
untary repayments of either kind may be made in lieu of mandatory 
FUTA penalty taxes, but they must at least equal the yield of the FUTA 
penalty tax.
STATE BOND ISSUES
Another method for financing UI debts is to issue state-backed 
debt instruments, with the proceeds primarily going to repay outstand 
ing Title XII loans. State debt instruments are free from federal 
income tax, so the interest rate on state instruments is usually much 
lower than on Title XII loans. Debt repayment takes place in later 
years, typically using the proceeds of a separate payroll tax on UI cov 
ered employment. 13
State debt issues are usefully seen as a generic alternative to Title 
XII borrowing. There are, however, many variations. Louisiana and 
West Virginia issued state debt in 1987 and Connecticut in August- 
September 1993. Those issues covered only part of the range of poten 
tial borrowing arrangements. States must decide the volume of needed
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borrowing, the breakdown between immediate and anticipated needs, 
the maturity structure, and the source of repayment. Arrangements that 
are appropriate for one state may not be appropriate for another.
In deciding whether to issue its debt, a state will be influenced by 
the costs of different borrowing arrangements. Cost comparisons must 
consider both the future interest rate spreads between Title XII loans 
and state debt and the costs of issuing state debt. Moreover, once a 
state issues its debt, there can be no forgiveness of interest costs (unlike 
Title XII loans fully repaid by September 30th). Finally, there are 
questions about the appropriate, or optimal, lag between the date that 
the need for borrowing is recognized and the date that the debt should 
be issued.
Proponents of state debt issues note that interest rates on state 
bonds are typically at least 100 basis points lower than interest rates on 
long-term U.S. bonds. 14 Table 4-1 provides summary data for selected 
short- and long-term interest rates from 1975 to 1996. It also shows 
differences in interest rates, or spreads, for these years. The table 
begins with 1975 because that was the first year of substantial Title XII 
borrowing during the 1970s. Even though loans were interest-free 
until 1982, covering a longer period provides a more complete picture 
of the variability in interest rates and of the spreads between selected 
pairs of interest rates. The table gives the interest rates for Title XII 
loans, 15 the rates for Aaa municipal bonds, and two short-term rates.
Aaa municipal bonds are the highest-grade state and local govern 
ment long-term debt instruments. They carry lower interest rates than 
bonds in higher risk categories (such as Aa, A, and Baa). From 1975 
through 1996, the average spread between the rates on Aaa bonds and 
A bonds, for example, was 48 basis points. The ratings to be expected 
for Ul-related debt would generally be in the Aaa to A range. A lower- 
risk (and thus a higher-rated) issue would be expected if the bonds 
were insured or supported by a bank letter of credit, and if the state©s 
overall finances were judged to be strong. Another factor influencing 
the rating for a state©s debt issue is whether the state©s regular method 
of collecting its UI taxes can also be used to collect the state taxes 
designed to repay the principal of a bond issue.
In each year from 1985 to 1996, the Title XII rate exceeded the 
Aaa municipal bond rate by more than 100 basis points. During that
Table 4-1 Selected Interest Rates and Interest Rate Spreads, 1975-19963
Interest rates:
Year
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
Title XII 
loans
5.92
4.68
5.26
5.56
6.25
7.17
8.80
10.00
10.00
9.78
10.00
9.96
9.33
8.54
8.33
Moody Aaa 
munic. 
bonds
6.42
5.66
5.20
5.52
5.92
7.85
10.43
11.33
8.80
9.51
8.60
6.95
7.14
7.35
6.99
6 mo. 
taxable 
comm. paper
6.32
5.34
5.61
7.99
10.91
12.29
14.76
11.89
8.89
10.16
8.01
6.39
6.85
7.68
8.80
1 mo. tax- 
free comm. 
paper
NAb
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
4.25
4.45
5.28
6.23
Title XII 
less bonds
-50
-98
6
4
33
-68
-163
-133
120
27
140
301
219
119
134
Basis point spreads:
Title XI Title XII 
less taxable less tax-free 
comm. comm. 
paper paper
^0
-66
-35
-243
^66
-512
-596
-189
111
-38
199
357
248
86
-41
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
571
488
326
210
Bonds Bonds 
less taxable less tax-free 
comm. comm. 
paper paper
10
32
-41
-247
^99
-444
^33
-56
-9
-65
59
56
29
-33
-181
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
270
269
207
76
oOS
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
8.70
8.60
8.05
7.45
6.90
6.83
6.71
6.96
6.56
6.09
5.38
5.77
5.80
5.52
7.95
5.85
3.80
3.30
4.93
5.93
5.42
5.77
4.21
2.62
2.19
2.60
3.62
3.19
174
204
196
207
113
103
119
75
275
425
415
197
90
129
293
439
543
526
430
321
352
-99
71
229
208
84
-13
10
119
235
347
319
317
218
233
SOURCE: Table B-71 of the Economic Report of the President, January 1997; the UI Service; and Goldman, Sachs and Co. 
a All data are annual averages. There are 100 basis points in each percentage point of an interest rate. 
b NA = data could not be obtained for 1975-1986.
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time, the spread ranged from 103 basis points (1995) to 301 basis 
points (1986) and averaged 169 basis points.
Note that the spreads between Title XII and Aaa interest rates 
spreads were much smaller before 1985 and that the Aaa rate exceeded 
the Title XII rate in five of the earlier years. The average Aaa rate was 
actually higher by 32 basis points from 1975 through 1984 (7.66 per 
cent versus 7.34 percent). In years of high interest rates like 1980- 
1985, the 10.0 percent ceiling on Title XII loans is an important con 
sideration.
Assessing future interest rate spreads between Title XII loans and 
Aaa municipal bonds involves a number of uncertainties. From the 
data shown in Table 4-1 ("Title XII less bonds" column), it is clear that 
spreads in favor of Aaa municipal bonds were especially large in 1986 
and 1987 and again in 1990 through 1993.
However, there are several other factors to keep in mind when eval 
uating future interest rate differentials. First, spreads between short- 
and long-term interest rates can also be large, such as during the early 
1990s. Both short-term rates were less than 4.0 percent in 1992 and 
1993, and neither exceeded 6.0 percent between 1993 and 1996. Note 
that the interest rate for one-month tax-free commercial paper is con 
sistently the lowest short-term rate (Table 4-1). That rate was more 
than 200 basis points below the rate for Aaa municipal bonds for every 
year between 1991 and 1996. States with short-term and intermediate- 
term needs can take advantage of very low short-term interest rates. 
Second, states needing to finance UI debts during the 1980s and the 
1990s typically paid off their debts quite rapidly. 16 Clearly, the need 
for long-term financing must be carefully evaluated. Issuing debt 
instruments with, say, 10-year maturities would not be prudent if state 
indebtedness were to last only two or three years. Third, a comparison 
of the costs of state bond issues and Title XII loans must factor in the 
costs of underwriting fees (commissions and insurance) along with 
interest rate spreads.
A state that issues its own debt instruments would be motivated 
primarily by the prospect of reducing its debt-related interest costs. 17 
Key to a state©s deliberations are its expectations about the time-pattern 
of its borrowing as well as Title XII loan repayment rules. Finally, 
since spreads between short- and long-term rates can be large, the cost 
advantages of short-term debt issues also need to be considered.
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The following strategy could prove very useful for a state that is 
starting to need loans:
  Borrow and repay Title XII loans on a daily basis.
  Pay off all outstanding Title XII loans obtained between Janu 
ary 1st and September 30th by issuing tax-free commercial 
paper on September 30th.
  Issue additional paper as needed during the period from Octo 
ber 1st to December 31st. (At 1996 interest rates, the annual 
rate of interest on such borrowing would be about 3.2 percent, 
about 230 basis points lower than the 1996 Aaa municipal 
bond rate of 5.52 percent.)
  As short-term debts mature, consolidate the borrowing into 
tax-free six-month commercial paper.
The strategy takes advantage of both the interest-free feature of 
Title XII loans in the first year of the debt and the interest rate spread 
favoring short rates in the first and subsequent years (for as long as 
short-term rates are considerably lower than long-term rates). The 
costs of the issue need to be factored into the calculations, but they are 
comparatively modest for short-term commercial paper. Brokerage 
fees and insurance combined would probably add less than 50 basis 
points to the annual interest rate. In other words, the issue and re-issue 
of six-month tax-free commercial paper would have an annual cost 
(including underwriting fees) of 4.0 to 4.5 percent at 1996 interest 
rates.
In structuring a debt-issuing strategy, a state needs to consider gen 
eral obligation bonds, revenue bonds, fixed maturity bonds, callable 
bonds, notes and commercial paper. 18 All are free from federal income 
taxes when issued by states. States can achieve flexibility in repaying 
their debt by issuing short-term instruments (commercial paper and 
notes) and/or by having a portion of the long-term debt (bonds) be call 
able.
The underwriting fees (commissions plus insurance) associated 
with various debt instruments are roughly as follows (all measured at 
annual rates): fixed bonds and callable bonds with 10-year maturities, 
80 to 100 basis points; three-year notes, 50 to 60 basis points; and
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commercial paper, 35 to 50 basis points. 19 Typically, interest rates are 
higher for callable bonds than for fixed maturity bonds (30-50 basis 
points) and higher for revenue bonds than for general obligation bonds. 
To achieve flexibility and minimize costs, it would seem that a 
state should issue a mixed portfolio of debt instruments. States with 
substantial debts (for example, Connecticut in early 1993), would 
probably need different portfolios than states just starting to borrow. 
Whether a state is likely to enact solvency legislation to improve the 
balance between its revenues and benefit payments is also important. 20 
Finally, the spread of interest rates by maturity that favored short-term 
debt issues in 1992 and 1993 cannot necessarily be expected in the 
future. The "best" package would depend heavily on the structure of 
interest rates at the time of the issue.
STATE EXPERIENCES WITH BOND ISSUES
During the mid 1970s and the early to mid 1980s, many UI pro 
grams received Title XII loans. Between 1980 and 1988, state borrow 
ing totaled $24.2 billion, of which $19.4 billion secured after April 1, 
1982, was interest-bearing.
As noted, repayment patterns changed sharply in 1982 after new 
loans started to carry interest charges. 21 For each year between 1984 
and 1988, annual loan repayment rates (repayments as a fraction of 
new loans plus interest-bearing debt at the start of the year) exceeded 
0.50. Rapid repayments also occurred for loans secured during the 
1990s.
After emerging from the back-to-back recessions of the early 
1980s, most states experienced a long and sustained economic recov 
ery that lasted through 1988 or 1989. However, states dependent on 
energy extraction (petroleum and coal) suffered another downturn in 
the mid 1980s. The unemployment rate in Texas, for example, 
increased from 5.9 percent of the labor force in 1984 to 8.9 percent in 
1986 and remained substantially above the national average through 
1989.
Three states still having interest-bearing debts at the end of 1986 
were energy producers: Louisiana, Texas, and West Virginia. All three
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strongly considered issuing state bonds to repay their Title XII loans, 
and Louisiana and West Virginia did issue bonds in 1987. The third 
state to issue bonds was Connecticut, which did so in 1993. Louisiana 
and West Virginia have fully paid off their bonds. An analysis of the 
comparative costs of bond issues versus the use of Title XII loans is 
undertaken later in this chapter.
Both Louisiana and West Virginia had very high unemployment in 
the early 1980s and then a second downturn associated with the energy 
glut of 1985-1986. 22 Following the 1985-1986 downturn, both states 
issued municipal bonds to fully repay their Title XII advances in 1987. 
The bonds were subsequently repaid by payroll taxes on Ul-covered 
employers in Louisiana and by payroll taxes on both employers and 
workers in West Virginia. West Virginia completed its repayments in 
1991 (two years earlier than initially anticipated), and Louisiana com 
pleted its bond repayments during 1993.
Table 4-2 shows the summary data for Louisiana for 1979 to 1994. 
Note how benefit payments increased sharply to $482 million and $596 
million in 1982 and 1983, respectively. The state©s net trust fund bal 
ance dropped from $210 million at the end of 1981 to -$476 million 
two years later. Borrowing during 1983 alone totaled $427 million. 
Although taxes increased following the 1982-1983 trust fund draw 
down, they remained below benefit outlays until 1988. There was not a 
single year between 1980 and 1987 that taxes exceeded benefit pay 
ments.23
Because unemployment and benefit outlays remained high after 
1983, Louisiana did not make substantial inroads into its debt. In fact, 
its net indebtedness continued to rise during 1984 and 1985. High 
unemployment remained a problem and unemployment rose again dur 
ing the energy crisis of 1985. The annual unemployment rate for the 
civilian labor force age 16 and older, which never fell below 10.0 per 
cent between 1982 and 1988, rose during 1985 and 1986 and peaked at 
13.1 percent in 1986. Benefit outlays also rose during 1985 and 1986, 
and Louisiana©s borrowing during 1986 totaled $423 million, nearly 
equaling its borrowing during 1983.
Louisiana©s bond issue of-1987 fully repaid its outstanding Title 
XII loans. Since 1987, the state has gradually rebuilt its trust fund. 
Fund accumulations were rapid from 1993 through 1996, reaching 
$869 million at the end of 1994 and $1,131 million at the end of 1996
Table 4-2 Summary of Louisiana©s UI Trust Fund Activities, 1979 to 19948 ($ millions)
UI trust fund flows
Year
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995-2002
Taxes
250
178
192
182
288
357
362
315
306
315
285
236
216
200
193
208
Interest
12
20
21
6
0
0
0
0
0
7
20
34
43
45
46
54
Benefits
140
208
227
482
596
397
446
538
355
205
151
120
158
204
158
145
UI trust fund reserves
Gross 
reserves
238
223
210
0
0
0
0
0
1
154
306
456
560
601
689
869
Net 
reserves
238
223
210
-102
^76
-521
-577
-787
1
154
306
456
560
601
689
869
U.S. 
Treasury 
debt
0
0
0
102
476
521
577
787
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Title XII loans
Loans
0
0
0
102
427
132
252
423
184
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Repay 
ments
0
0
0
0
53
88
196
213
971
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Debt
0
0
0
102
476
521
577
787
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
State bonds
Scheduled 
repayments
NAb
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
0
49
56
59
63
67
72
77
872
Bond 
taxes
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
130
192
197
207
211
209
212
0
SOURCE: Data on trust fund transactions including Title XII activities from the U.S. Department of Labor. Data on the scheduled repay 
ment of the state bonds is from the state of Louisiana. Estimates of state bond taxes are made by the author. 
a Reserves and debt are measured at the year end. 
b NA = not applicable, as state bonds were issued in 1987.
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(see Table 1-4). Louisiana©s trust fund balance, however, did not reach 
a reserve ratio multiple of 1.0 until the end of 1995.
Louisiana issued $1,315 million in serial revenue bonds in Septem 
ber 1987, with maturities in each year from 1988 through 2002. The 
issue consisted of $921 million of fixed maturity bonds (with due dates 
from 1988 through 1999) and $394 million of callable bonds (with due 
dates from 2000 through 2002). Even the fixed maturity part of the 
issue had call options that could be exercised as early as 1994 for 
bonds with later maturities.
To finance the bond issue, Louisiana levied a flat-rate employer 
payroll tax of 1.4 percent on each employee©s annual earnings, up to a 
maximum of $15,000 for each year between 1988 and 1993. 24 The 
tax, called a "special assessment for debt service," generated about 
$200 million in annual revenues from 1988 through 1993.
Tax collection and debt management services were performed by a 
trustee bank. There were three main trust accounts: a benefit transfer 
account (originally established to cover possible additional borrowing), 
a reserve fund (mainly a hedge against unexpected tax shortfalls), and 
an interest fund. At the time of the initial issue, $780 million was used 
immediately to repay Title XII loans. The rest of the $1,315 million 
was used to defray issue costs or was deposited into the trust 
accounts. 25 The three trust accounts were managed with the objective 
of paying off the bonds as soon as possible so that the special employer 
tax assessment could be discontinued. To cover the costs of collecting 
the special assessment tax, the trustee transferred $250,000 to the Lou 
isiana Department of Labor each year.
Louisiana discontinued its special tax assessment after 1993. By 
that year, its bond liabilities were fully covered. Repayment of the 
bonds was accomplished by retiring the serial bonds, exercising 
options on the callable bonds, and establishing an escrow account for 
serial bonds that became callable in September 1994. Repayment of 
callable bonds was completed in 1994.
To summarize, Louisiana repaid its Title XII loans with a bond 
issue in 1987. The total transferred to the state©s UI trust fund account 
was approximately $820 million. Louisiana borrowed a total of $1,315 
million in the bond market, with bond maturities spread from 1988 
through 2002. In fact, all bond obligations were met in 1993, nine
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years before the last of the original maturity dates. Debt repayments 
were completed in 1994.
Table 4-3 gives summary data for West Virginia©s trust fund from 
1979 to 1994. The state began with low reserves at the end of 1979 
($39 million), first borrowed in 1980, and did so in every subsequent 
year through 1987. The maximum borrowing, $152 million in 1983, 
coincided with the high benefit outlays of the 1982-1983 recession.
In the three years after 1983, the state©s net reserve position im 
proved somewhat. However, net reserves were still negative, -$225 mil 
lion, at the end of 1986, a three-year improvement of only $62 million. 
The time series of taxes and benefits in Table 4-3 shows that both 
remained around $150 million per year from 1984 through 1986. The 
excess of taxes over benefits during that period remained too low to 
restore the trust fund balance.
West Virginia considered issuing bonds during 1987 and issued 
$259 million in serial revenue bonds on September 1st. The issue 
completely repaid the state©s outstanding Title XII loans. Subse 
quently, its trust fund was rebuilt somewhat. The balance reached 
$146 million at the end of 1989 and remained near $150 million 
through 1996.
At the time of the bond issue, West Virginia planned to repay the 
bonds over a six-year period. The bonds for the final two years, 1992 
and 1993, were all callable. Financing came from two sources: a flat- 
rate employee payroll tax of 0.35 percent on the total Ul-covered 
wages and an equivalent-yielding flat-rate employer payroll tax levied 
on the first $21,000 of annual earnings. Those taxes yielded sufficient 
revenues between 1988 and 1991 to complete West Virginia©s repay 
ments by July 1991, two years earlier than anticipated. The adminis 
trative costs of collecting the taxes were paid from the state©s UI 
administrative allocation, which it received from the UI Service.
West Virginia©s trust fund balance in recent years, roughly $150 
million, is not large when compared to the state©s past rates of benefit 
payouts. Note the 1982 and 1983 levels of benefit payments: $234 and 
$259 million, respectively. The level of the state©s trust fund is not 
high enough to prevent renewed borrowing. The 1996 level of reserves 
was $157 million (see Table 1-4). The associated 1996 reserve ratio 
multiple was only 0.33, the fifth lowest in the United States and 
roughly half of the national average.
Table 4-3 Summary of West Virginia©s UI Trust Fund Activities, 1979 to 1994a ($ millions)
UI trust fund flows
Year
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
Taxes
81
79
131
166
142
150
149
150
152
157
100
86
104
112
119
122
Interest
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
9
12
13
12
11
11
10
Benefits
101
158
150
234
259
146
145
143
114
98
91
92
146
138
117
125
UI trust fund reserves
Gross 
reserves
39
3
29
0
0
33
0
0
65
133
146
153
157
141
155
162
Net 
reserves
39
-44
-71
-144
-288
-275
-256
-225
65
133
146
153
157
141
155
162
U.S. 
Treasury 
debt
0
47
100
144
288
308
256
225
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Title XH loans
Loans
0
47
53
45
152
37
44
102
40
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Repay 
ments
0
0
0
1
8
17
96
132
265
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Debt
0
47
100
144
288
308
256
225
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
State bonds
Scheduled 
repay 
ments
NAb
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
0
30
37
43
46
49
53
0
Bond 
taxes
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
0
60
62
67
68
0
0
0
SOURCE: Data on trust fund transactions, including Title XII loans, is from the U.S. Department of Labor. Data on the scheduled repay 
ment of state bonds is from the state of West Virginia. Estimates of state bond taxes are made by the author. 
a Reserves and debt are measured at the year end. 
b NA = not applicable, as state bonds were issued in 1987.
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Connecticut entered the 1990s with a small UI trust fund balance 
of $274 million. Its reserve ratio multiple, 0.22 at the end of 1989, was 
the second lowest in the United States. The state©s unemployment rate 
had dropped below 4.0 percent in every year between 1986 and 1989 
but rose to 5.2, 6.8, 7.6, and 6.3 percent from 1990 through 1993. 
While its unemployment rates were not noticeably higher than the U.S. 
national average, increases in unemployment in the late 1980s were 
greater in Connecticut. Annual UI benefit payments from 1990 
through 1993 averaged $519 million, compared with $196 million 
from 1986 through 1989.
The state©s UI trust fund was exhausted at the end of 1990. Bor 
rowing from the U.S. Treasury totaled $502 million in 1991, $502 mil 
lion 1992, and $363 million in 1993. Total indebtedness was $760 
million at the end of July 1993.
In mid 1993, Connecticut enacted solvency legislation that 
increased employer taxes, reduced benefits, and authorized the issuing 
of state revenue bonds to pay its outstanding debts to the U.S. Treasury. 
The legislation included substantial increases in the taxable wage base, 
an increase in the solvency tax associated with regular UI taxation, and 
a special tax assessment, starting in 1994, to pay off the state bonds. 26 
Benefit reductions included a change in the computation of the weekly 
benefit amount, increased penalties for "willful misconduct" disqualifi 
cations, broadened severance pay disqualifications, and a lower mone 
tary threshold for "larceny" disqualifications.
The legislation established a new Unemployment Compensation 
Advance Fund for revenues from the bond issues plus employer bond 
assessments (taxes) and investment income. The fund pays the admin 
istrative costs of bond issues and the costs of collecting bond taxes.
Connecticut issued a total of about $1.0 billion in revenue bonds 
between August and September 1993. The issues included both fixed- 
maturity and callable bonds. The proceeds of the bond issues com 
pletely repaid the outstanding debt to the U.S. Treasury. 27 Special bond 
tax assessments started in August 1994, and bond repayments began in 
November 1994. Scheduled repayments are to occur at six-month 
intervals through the year 2001. However, the callable bonds may be 
paid off earlier.
By the end of 1996, $154 million of the total issues had been 
repaid. This included $115 million in scheduled repayments and $39
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million in repayments of callable bonds. 28 Fixed-maturity obligations 
will continue to fall due through 2001, so a full evaluation of the suc 
cess of the bond issue cannot be made at this time.
Connecticut©s bond issues were timed to avoid interest charges on 
borrowing from January to September 1993. The state considered sev 
eral options, but then issued a series of bonds and notes rather than 
instruments of shorter duration, such as tax-free commercial paper. 
There were three types of bonds: fixed-rate, synthetic fixed-rate, and 
variable-rate, with the latter accounting for about one-third of the 
total. 29 Repayment of the fixed-rate bonds began in November 1994 
and is scheduled to last through November 2001. Callable issues fall 
ing due between 1998 and 2001 can be called earlier than their matu 
rity dates.
The interest rates on Connecticut©s bonds and notes range from 
2.75 percent to about 5.0 percent. As shown in Table 4-1, the 1993 
interest rate on Title XII borrowing was 7.45 percent. Clearly, Con 
necticut saved on the interest rate it actually paid. To this point, it 
appears that the bond issues were over-financed, and revenues in 
excess of the amounts needed to repay its fixed-bond obligations then 
became available to repay its callable bonds. 30 However, it is not obvi 
ous that Connecticut will realize a net saving on its total interest 
charges. The question of savings on total interest charges can be more 
fully addressed when all of Connecticut©s debt has been repaid.
Despite the bond issues, Connecticut has modestly rebuilt its UI 
trust fund. The fund balance at the end of 1996 was $278 million (see 
Table 1-4), and the reserve ratio multiple was only 0.18, or slightly 
lower than it had been at the end of 1989, just before the downturn of 
the 1990s. At the end of 1996, Connecticut had a substantial outstand 
ing state-issued debt and only a modest UI trust fund balance. The fis 
cal condition of the state©s UI program was not strong. 31
Three conclusions emerge from the experiences of Louisiana, West 
Virginia, and Connecticut:
  All had low levels of UI trust fund reserves when the reces 
sions began. When high unemployment caused large draw 
downs of their trust funds, all quickly developed large debts 
and then resorted to an innovative form of financing bond 
issues.
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  Louisiana and West Virginia repaid their debts more rapidly 
than either had anticipated at the time of the bond issues. This 
was also true for Connecticut, at least through mid 1997. The 
bond programs can be described as "over-financed," in as 
much as the anticipated annual tax revenues exceeded the 
annual retirement of the fixed-maturity debt contemplated at 
the time the bonds were issued.
  After issuing bonds to pay off UI indebtedness, the three states 
had different experiences with UI trust fund accumulation. 
Connecticut and West Virginia have not rebuilt their UI trust 
fund balances to high levels. Both states may need Title XII 
loans during the next recession. From 1993 through 1996, 
Louisiana raised its UI trust fund balance substantially. The 
state©s reserve ratio multiple stood at 1.10 at the end of 1996, 
or 72 percent above the national average. It appears that both 
Connecticut and West Virginia need to improve the basic bal 
ance between UI program revenues and benefit payments. 
Innovative borrowing arrangements are no substitute for 
underlying financial soundness in UI program financing.
To help compare different methods of debt financing, this section 
reviews four topics. Three deal directly with the costs of indebtedness, 
and the fourth also has cost implications. The discussion repeats some 
points made earlier but emphasizes a comparison of the alternatives.
Interest Rate Spreads
Many types of state debt can be issued. This discussion is confined 
to the interest rates on the four types of debt discussed earlier (see 
Table 4-1) and the associated interest-rate spreads. The four are Title 
XII loans, Aaa municipal bonds, six-month taxable commercial paper, 
and one-month tax-free commercial paper. The latter two are proxies 
for short-term interest rates, but it should be noted that the gamut of
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short-term instruments runs from one-month commercial paper to 
three-year notes.
As noted earlier, Title XII rates have consistently exceeded Aaa 
municipal bond rates since 1983, with the spread being variable but 
often larger when interest rates are lower. The spread between Aaa 
municipal bonds and six-month taxable commercial paper also varies 
widely, but it is generally smaller than the Title XII-Aaa spread. 
Between 1989 and 1996, however, the spread ranged from -181 basis 
points (1989) to 229 basis points (1992). Even larger spreads occur 
between Aaa municipal bond rates and the rates on one-month tax-free 
commercial paper. In 1992, the spread was 347 basis, but it exceeded 
200 basis points in each of the six years from 1991 through 1996 and in 
nine of the last eleven years (see Table 4-1). Even greater volatility in 
interest rate spreads would appear if monthly data were examined.
For the foreseeable future, Title XII rates are likely to exceed Aaa 
municipal bond rates. It also is highly likely that interest rates on very 
short-term instruments will remain far below Aaa municipal bond 
rates. Moreover, as shown in Table 4-1, annual interest rate spreads 
vary widely. The differences are even greater and more varied in the 
monthly data. If cost comparisons could be made solely on the basis of 
interest rates, Title XII rates would clearly be the highest and short- 
term tax-free rates the lowest.
The Costs of Issues
The costs of issuing affect the relative attractiveness of state debt. 
There are no underwriting fees on Title XII loans from the U.S. Trea 
sury. Underwriting fees vary according to the type of state debt instru 
ment and are generally higher for longer-term obligations, higher for 
obligations with call features, higher for smaller issues, and higher for 
revenue bonds than they are for general obligation bonds. 32
An appropriate comparison of state debt and Title XII loans would 
add issuing fees to the interest rate for each type of instrument. The 
fees make state debt more expensive and raise the interest rate spread 
required to save on the costs of state debt issues.
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The Costs of Debt Repayment
At present, states can treat the administrative costs of debt repay 
ment identically under each of the four alternatives. Title XII loans 
repaid by state payroll taxes have their administrative costs defrayed by 
the administrative finance allocation from the U.S. Department of 
Labor. According to current interpretations, administrative finance 
allocations can also be used to defray the cost of collecting the state 
bond taxes levied to repay state-issued debt instruments. There may be 
small differences in the scale of the state-tax-related costs, but states 
can treat this aspect of tax administration like any other UI tax collec 
tion.
Of the three states that have issued state debt instruments, only 
one, West Virginia, has used its UI administrative allocation to cover 
the cost of collecting bond taxes. Connecticut©s reliance on its own 
resources is especially interesting, given that it received a written inter 
pretation that federal monies could be used to collect bond taxes.
Note, too, that the federal monies distributed to states for UI pro 
gram administration can be used to pay for the administration of a 
purely state tax. This suggests a question: if states can issue tax- 
exempt bonds to minimize their interest costs, why should the federal 
government pay for the costs of administering such state taxes? If the 
current federal interpretation were to change, the cost of issuing state 
debt would also have to include administrative costs.
Positions on the question vary, and at the end of 1996, that of the 
UI Service differed from that of Louisiana officials in 1987. As noted, 
Louisiana law explicitly provided for state financing to administer its 
state tax, through an annual transfer from the trust account to the 
state©s Department of Labor. West Virginia had no such provision. 
Connecticut, despite having received written authorization to use its 
federal UI administrative allocation to collect bond taxes, opted to use 
its own resources.
Flexibility
Flexibility in borrowing and repaying clearly differs according to 
the method of debt financing. Title XII loans and repayments can and 
do take place daily. Essentially, the process operates on demand for
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debtor states, allowing them to maintain a zero balance, which mini 
mizes the average amount of outstanding debt.
State debt issues, however, are inherently less flexible than Title 
XII borrowing. States must plan for an issue and must have contin 
gency plans, for unexpected developments can alter the projected time 
paths for benefit payments, tax receipts, and/or interest rates. Unex 
pected developments affecting receipts and expenditures (hence affect 
ing the trust fund balance) can be addressed in two ways: by issuing 
short-term debt and by issuing callable long-term debt. Most forms of 
issuing debt require preparation time, but it is possible to issue com 
mercial paper daily.
Another aspect of flexibility is the ability to call bonds. After 
bonds have been issued to pay off Title XII loans, any excess in a 
state©s annual bond tax receipts over its maturing fixed-maturity bonds 
can be used to repay callable bonds.
Including callable bonds in a state debt issue gives the state the 
ability to speed up its debt repayment if its economy performs better 
than anticipated. Issuing callable bonds also provides flexibility when 
performance falls below anticipation. Uncertainty can be addressed by 
making the total issue larger than the state©s "best" estimate of its bor 
rowing needs. However, this strategy has its costs, i.e., the interest 
charges and costs of issuing for any "excess" bonds.
Alternatively, the state can resort to new debt issues as needed. 
Following this strategy would mean the first issue would be smaller, 
but the cost of a potential second issue would also have to be consid 
ered.
Thus, while Title XII loans are clearly the most flexible, issuing 
short-term state debt, issuing of callable bonds, and planning for a sec 
ond debt issue also offer considerable flexibility.
UNCERTAINTIES FOR DEBTOR STATES
A state faces several uncertainties when it considers how best to 
finance its UI debt. This section reviews some of the uncertainties 
already noted and adds other considerations.
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The future performance of the state©s economy is an obvious 
uncertainty affecting the volume and timing of borrowing. Unexpected 
increases in unemployment raise benefit outlays and reduce tax 
receipts. There are also uncertainties about interest rate spreads.
What has not been emphasized up to this point, however, is the 
uncertainty associated with state and federal legislation. A state facing 
debt or additional debt may enact legislation designed to improve sol 
vency. In such situations, the volume of future indebtedness will be 
reduced or eliminated. The three states that have used bond issues 
enacted solvency legislation at the time the bond issue was authorized. 
All three states were already substantially indebted to the U.S. Trea 
sury.
Developments in Maine, a state facing first-time borrowing during 
early 1993, are instructive. Actuarial projections made at the end of 
1992 showed borrowing would begin in early 1993 and would be 
chronic for the rest of the 1990s. 33 After some deliberation, Maine 
crafted temporary legislation that included an emergency solvency tax, 
an increase in the maximum tax rate, a continuation of a freeze on the 
maximum benefit, and a reduction in weekly benefits for new claim 
ants. The legislation, effective during 1993 and 1994, was designed to 
avoid major indebtedness for that period, build a modest balance by the 
end of 1994, and give Maine time to develop a long-term solution to its 
UI funding imbalance. The temporary legislation became effective on 
April 1st, but its tax provisions were retroactive to January 1st. A two- 
year improvement in solvency was expected. The improvement totaled 
$60 million, with tax increases accounting for about 80 percent. 
Because of the legislation, Maine did not accumulate a large debt dur 
ing 1993 and 1994. Subsequently, Maine enacted other solvency mea 
sures in 1995, 1996, and 1997.
Experiences in Massachusetts in the early 1990s also illustrate how 
legislation can affect the scale of future debt. Provisions of 1991 legis 
lation that came into effect in 1992 included a higher taxable wage 
base, a higher maximum tax rate schedule, and selected benefit reduc 
tions. As a result, tax receipts grew substantially in 1992. Whatever 
the previous prospect had been, Massachusetts anticipated that its debt 
accumulation would be smaller following the 1991 legislation. The 
bond issuance that had been considered before to the 1991 legislation
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did not take place. The state©s indebtedness to the U.S. Treasury fell 
during 1993, and all loans were fully repaid in May 1994.
Federal legislation can also affect a state©s decisions about whether 
to issue debt instruments. The uncertainties are of a different magni 
tude, however. State preferences are not as influential in framing UI 
legislation and/or administrative guidelines at the federal level. One 
can argue that current federal guidelines favor state debt issues over 
Title XII borrowing. There are three factors to look at here, each of 
which could change. 34
First, states can "game" the Title XII cash-flow borrowing proce 
dures. Cash-flow loans were originally intended to cover low trust 
fund balances, where tax receipts and benefit outlays are roughly equal 
but differ in their seasonal patterns. Thus, borrowing and repayment 
would roughly balance over the fiscal year, leaving no debt on Septem 
ber 30th. Foregoing federal interest charges associated with cash-flow 
borrowing can be justified. However, at present, a state may borrow 
repeatedly during the fiscal year, accumulate a sizeable debt, and then 
issue a state debt instrument to pay off all borrowing on September 
30th. The state avoids all federal interest charges on the debt accumu 
lated through September 30th and starts to pay interest on the state debt 
issued on September 30th. This use of cash-flow borrowing differs 
from the intended use.
Second, a state can use its federal grant for UI program administra 
tion to defray the cost of collecting the state taxes used to-retire state- 
issued debt. If the debt is truly state debt and hence is eligible for tax- 
free status, why should a state be allowed to use federal monies to 
administer the collection of a state tax?35 As noted, Louisiana and Con 
necticut used state resources to defray these costs of tax administration, 
but West Virginia used its federal UI administrative allocation.
Third, the current interpretation of the trust fund withdrawal stan 
dard on repaying state-issued debt can be questioned. At present, if a 
state issues debt and then deposits the proceeds into its trust fund 
account, it may later make withdrawals from the trust fund to repay the 
principal on the loan. 36 The argument behind this interpretation is that 
since the principal was used to pay benefits, repaying the principal is a 
use of the trust fund for the same purpose.
In the three-areas outlined, the current federal administrative 
guidelines confer financial and/or administrative advantages on states
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that issue state debt instead of using Title XII loans. Given the federal 
budget deficit and the pressure to reduce it, it is conceivable that the UI 
Service, the Secretary of Labor, or the Office of Management and Bud 
get could change one or more of the guidelines. If there were changes, 
the relative cost of issuing state debt would be higher in the future.
To summarize, though uncertainties about the economy and about 
interest rate spreads are clearly important, the potential for changes in 
both the state and federal legislation must also be taken in to account. 
Further, current federal administrative interpretations could change. 
Any of these uncertainties can affect a state©s decision about the best 
way to repay its trust fund indebtedness.
SOME COST COMPARISONS
The main reason for issuing state debt is to save on interest costs. 
This section compares the cost of state bond issues and Title XII loans 
for Louisiana and West Virginia, the two states that have repaid their 
state-issued bonds. The summary information presented is based on 
annual spreadsheet models for the bond issues and for Title XII loans.
To keep the discussion focused, the comparisons involve states that 
have long-term debts rather than states that are just starting to incur 
debts. The comparisons are illustrative but do not attempt to convey 
the full reality. The emphasis is on three factors: interest rate differen 
tials, the duration of indebtedness, and the share of the bond issue 
deposited in the state©s UI trust fund.
Each of the three factors deserves some elaboration. The interest 
rates on a bond issue are fixed over the course of the debt, but Title XII 
interest rates vary by year. The comparisons made here use a single 
interest rate for both, the average rate applicable on the first year of 
bond repayments. Because the Title XII interest rate can rise or fall 
from its first-year level, a comparison based on constant rates might 
violate reality, but it does not necessarily bias the results.
Two factors determine the duration of indebtedness: the size of the 
state©s initial debt and the annual excess of its revenues (regular UI 
taxes plus the state taxes used to repay the bonds, hereafter known as 
"bond taxes") over UI benefit payments during the repayment period.
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The simulations for both methods of financing use past levels of UI 
trust fund tax receipts plus estimates for bond taxes. 37
Any state issuing bonds must use some part of the proceeds to 
cover interest charges, issuing fees, administration, and contingen 
cies. Unlike Title XII borrowing, a part of the loan proceeds is not 
deposited directly into the UI trust fund. Louisiana and West Virginia 
provided information on those amounts.
The simulation follows certain assumptions for both states. Under 
Title XII, the excess of tax revenues over UI benefits went first to repay 
outstanding loans and then to build the trust fund. Thus, the debt was 
paid off faster under Title XII, but because the trust fund balance was 
zero in the early years, the fund did not start to earn interest income as 
quickly. Both Title XII borrowing and state debt issuing eventually 
resulted in positive trust fund balances and trust fund interest earnings.
Table 4-4 provides summary information for Louisiana and West 
Virginia under the two alternatives. Louisiana borrowed $1,315 mil 
lion and deposited only about $820 million directly into its UI trust 
fund,38 with the remainder going to related trust accounts. The deposit 
ratio (0.624) is low, but at the time there was great uncertainty about 
the state©s need for additional loans.
As noted, the state©s bonds were fully defrayed during 1993, and 
bond repayments were completed during 1994. The simulation indi 
cates that Louisiana©s bond taxes generated a total of $1,357 million 
between 1987 and 1993. 39 Thus, the simulation agrees with reality in 
that the last of the debt was covered six years after the issue. Given 
equivalent tax revenues during those years (including bond taxes), 
however, the debt would have been fully repaid in 1990 under Title 
XII, and the trust fund balance would have reached $740.8 rather than 
$601.0 million by the end of 1992.
Note the interest totals for the two methods of financing. Bond 
issues earned Louisiana©s trust fund $150.1 million, but total interest 
costs on the bonds were $224.3 million and net interest costs were 
$74.2 million. Under Title XII, the comparable totals were $116.5 mil 
lion in Title XII interest charges, $89.9 million in trust fund interest 
earnings, and a net cost of $26.6 million, or $47.6 million less than for 
the bond issue.40
In the simulations, Louisiana had larger net interest charges and a 
smaller trust fund end balance when it issued bonds. This result
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Table 4-4 Comparisons of Bond Issues and Title XII Loans for Louisiana 
and West Virginia3
Louisiana
Total bond issues
Bonds deposited in 
UI trust fund
Deposits/total issues
Issuance year
Year of full debt
repayment
Interest rate
Interest on borrowing
Trust fund interest
Net interest paid
Trust fund balance, 
December 31, 1992
State 
bonds
1,315
820
0.624
1987
1993
0.0680
224.3
150.1
74.2
601.0
Title XII
NAb
NA
NA
NA
1990
0.0933
116.5
89.9
26.6
740.8
West Virginia
State 
bonds
258
226
0.876
1987
1991
0.0680
32.5
58.5
-26.0
141.0
Title XII
NA
NA
NA
NA
1989
0.0933
22.8
22.1
0.7
119.6
SOURCE: Based on simulations by the author. 
a All dollar amounts are measured in millions.
b NA = not applicable, as the state already had Title XII debts and all borrowing had 
been deposited in the state©s UI trust fund.
obtained even though the bond interest rate was 253 basis points lower 
than the Title XII interest rate. The explanation lies in the combination 
the low deposit-to-total-issuance ratio (0.624) and the longer average 
time over which interest charges accrued on the bonds. Bond interest 
was paid for six years (1988 through 1993), but Title XII interest was 
paid only through 1990.
Different results were obtained for West Virginia even though the 
simulations used the same interest rates as for Louisiana. The deposit- 
to-total-issuance ratio was higher (0.876) and West Virginia©s bonds 
were paid off much more rapidly (in four years rather than six). The 
interest paid on the debt was somewhat larger under bond issue ($32.5 
million versus $22.8 million), but larger trust fund interest earnings 
also accrued ($58.5 million versus $22.1 million). West Virginia paid
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net interest of $0.7 million under Title XII borrowing, compared to net 
interest earnings of $26.0 million under bond issuance. Also note that 
the December 1992 fund balance was higher under the bond issue 
($141.0 million versus $119.6 million).41
Are interest costs lower under bond issues? It depends. For West 
Virginia, the bond issue meant savings on interest costs and a higher 
trust fund balance at the end of 1992. For Louisiana, the results were 
the opposite. The two principal reasons for the contrast are that Louisi 
ana deposited a smaller share of its total bond issue in its UI trust fund 
and that it had a longer period of indebtedness.
It must be emphasized that the simulations assumed away certain 
complications. The interest rate spreads are held to be constant. When 
the states decided to issue bonds, in 1987, both states had long-term 
trust fund indebtedness. Thus, the simulations do not take into account 
cash-flow borrowing (and the associated interest-forgiveness under 
Title XII) or decisions about the length of the debt instruments to issue. 
The simulations also assume identical revenue streams for Title XII 
loans and state bond issues within each state.
SUMMARY
The question of how to finance UI trust fund debts is complex, and 
the appropriate route for a state depends on several factors. Two states, 
Louisiana and West Virginia, issued bonds in the 1987 to pay off accu 
mulated trust fund debts and used state payroll taxes to repay the 
bonds. A third state, Connecticut, opted for a bond issue in 1993. 
However, the experiences of these three states represent but a small 
fraction of the possibilities for issuing state debt as an alternative to 
Title XII loans.
There are eight factors that a state must consider in reaching a pru 
dent decision about the best way to finance its UI trust fund debt:
1. Anticipated future state economic performance
2. The possibility of state solvency legislation
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3. Federal legislation and administrative guidelines on state debt 
issues
4. The expected duration of indebtedness
5. The flexibility of daily borrowing and repayment under Title 
XII
6. The availability of Title XII cash-flow loans
7. Interest rate spreads across various debt instruments, and
8. Underwriting fees and other costs of issuing state debt.
Four of these factors merit additional comment.
  Factor 1: Both the anticipated rate of growth and the degree of 
uncertainty about future growth affect debt financing. If strong 
economic growth is anticipated, then the there is less need to 
issue long-term bonds, for the state can anticipate a rapid 
recovery of its trust fund balance through future revenues asso 
ciated with economic growth. Large debts coupled with uncer 
tainty about future growth, on the other hand, increase the 
appeal of state bond issues.
  Factor 2: If solvency legislation looks likely, the need to 
address debt financing with long-term bond issues is less 
pressing; the solvency legislation itself would provide most of 
remedy for the state©s debt problem. However, the political sit 
uation many make a sharp increase in experience-rated 
employer taxes unattractive, thus increasing the likelihood of 
long-term indebtedness. Bond issues might then have more 
appeal. Note that this factor overlaps with the expected dura 
tion of indebtedness. Solvency provisions were included in 
the three state laws that provided for bond issues. Solvency 
legislation was also a primary factor in obviating the need for 
bond issues in Maine and Massachusetts.
  Factor 7: The point here is that the range of potential debt 
instruments extends far beyond a simple comparison of, for 
example, the Aaa municipal bond rate and the Title XII interest
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rate. The term structure of interest rates, the tax treatment of 
bond interest income, and the issuing costs for different debt 
instruments are all important.
  Factor 8: To the extent there are economies of scale in issuing 
state debt, larger states and states with higher ratios of debt to 
covered wages (more serious debt problems) would find debt 
issues more attractive than would smaller states and states with 
a smaller scale of indebtedness.
During the next recession, some states will undoubtedly seriously con 
sider issuing the state UI debt.
Notes
1. This chapter is based on a report to the U.S. Department of Labor (Vroman 1993).
2. Details of the patterns of UI debt repayment in the 1970s and 1980s are given in 
Vroman (1990), Chapter 1.
3. There are some exceptions to this statement for example, tax refunds for over 
payments and small amounts originally deposited in state trust funds during the 
1950s, under the Reed Act but they are minor.
4. The Secretary of Labor must be satisfied that the funds used to pay interest on a 
state©s trust fund debts do not come, directly or indirectly, from the state©s trust 
fund account. In making this determination, the Secretary requires debtor states 
to identify the source of funds for interest payments and the statutory basis for the 
establishment and use of funds for making interest payments. See U.S. Depart 
ment of Labor (1988).
5. The fourth-quarter interest rate is the interest rate paid on investments in special 
certificates of indebtedness issued by the U.S. Treasury to the Unemployment 
Trust Fund. The interest rate for these special debt instruments is the average rate 
for outstanding Treasury interest-bearing obligations with maturities of four years 
or more.
6. This interest payment is due the day after the first day of borrowing during the 
October-December period. The interest on borrowing between October 1st and 
December 31st is due at the end of the next fiscal year, September 30th.
7. States typically require payments by the end of the month following the end of a 
calendar quarter, a 30- or 31-day delay. Employers usually make tax payments on 
the last day possible, and there are usually a few days before the trust fund 
accounts register the deposits.
8. See Vroman (1993), Table 1 and the associated text, for added details on the two 
states.
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9. The Massachusetts economy is about twice the size of the Connecticut economy. 
Taxable covered employment in 1988, for example, was 2.53 million in Massa 
chusetts, compared with 1.37 million in Connecticut. If the funding imbalances 
were proportionate to each state©s economy, Massachusetts would be expected to 
borrow about twice as much as Connecticut.
10. Debt repayments (including complete repayment) between November 10th and 
the end of the year do not prevent the penalty. There is no avoidance feature anal 
ogous to the interest avoidance feature of cash-flow borrowing repaid by Septem 
ber 30th.
11. The technical phrase for the penalty tax rate is the "FUTA tax credit offset rate." 
States with acceptable experience-rating systems may impose experience-rated 
taxes on their employers in lieu of a flat 5.4 percent state tax. In the first year of 
automatic debt repayment, the maximum permissible tax credit offset rate is 5.1 
percent, hence a 0.3 percent additional federal tax rate.
12. Annual increases in the FUTA penalty tax rate after the first year of penalty taxes 
depend on state-specific circumstances. The increase in the second year may be 
an additional 0.3 percent (for a total federal tax rate of 1.4 percent) or larger.
13. An advisory directive from the U.S. Department of Labor indicates that the states 
can use their financial allocation for UI program administration to collect both the 
separate and the regular UI payroll taxes. The added administrative expenses do 
not have to be financed separately.
14. There are 100 basis points per full percentage point in an interest rate.
15. Interest was first charged on U.S. Treasury loans after April 1, 1982. The Title XII 
rates before 1982 have been calculated in the same way as the rates charged on 
interest-bearing loans. The interest rate (specified in paragraph 904(b) of the 
Social Security Act) is the average rate on public debt for the last three months of 
the preceding calendar year.
16. See Miller, Pavosevich, and Vroman (1997) and Vroman (1990) for summaries of 
borrowing and repayment patterns.
17. Of course, Title XII and other federal statutes governing Ul-related borrowing and 
repayment must be satisfied. Administrative rulings by the U.S. Treasury make it 
difficult for states to issue bonds in anticipation of future indebtedness.
18. General obligation bonds are backed by the full financial resources of the issuer. 
Revenue bonds are backed by a specific asset or tax base. In borrowing to pay off 
UI trust fund debts, a state would be expected to issue revenue bonds or other debt 
secured by future payroll taxes on UI covered employment. Callable bonds have 
a stated maturity date but, under stated conditions, allow the issuer to redeem 
them earlier. A call could occur either because the excess of revenues over bene 
fits surpassed expectations or because changes in interest rates favor the issue of 
another type of debt instrument. The owner of callable bonds usually receives a 
higher interest rate for those bonds relative to fixed bonds of the same maturity. 
Notes often have maturities of six months to three years, while commercial paper 
typically covers one to six months.
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19. To compare the issuing fees for different classes of debt instruments and of instru 
ments of differing maturities, a state would need to make assumptions about sev 
eral features of each instrument being considered. The issuing fees for bonds, 
notes, and commercial paper shown in the text should be seen as illustrating likely 
ranges.
20. The legislation in Maine that became effective April 1, 1993, is a good example of 
state action motivated by a desire to avoid insolvency. A two-year emergency 
package raised taxes retroactive to January 1, 1993, and reduced benefits, starting 
in April 1993. This legislation is discussed below.
21. See Miller, Pavosevich, and Vroman (1997), Table 9.3.
22. From 1980 through 1983, the national unemployment rate averaged 8.5 percent of 
the labor force. The corresponding four-year averages for Louisiana and West 
Virginia were 9.3 and 13.0 percent, respectively. During the next four years, 1984 
through 1987, the national unemployment rate averaged 7.0 percent, but Louisi 
ana©s averaged 11.7 percent, and West Virginia©s averaged 12.7 percent.
23. The disparities between benefits and taxes for 1982 and 1983 are even larger than 
suggested in Table 4-2. The benefit data do not include the state©s share of 
extended benefit payments, which totaled $15 million and $53 million, respec 
tively.
24. The tax was first collected in the last half of 1987. For that year, the taxable wage 
base was $7,500.
25. Of the monies deposited into the benefit transfer account, only about $40 million 
was used to defray additional borrowing from the U.S. Treasury. The bulk of the 
account was eventually used to retire bonds.
26. The taxable wage base rose from $7,100 in 1993 to $9,000 in 1994 and was slated 
to rise by annual increments of $1,000, reaching $13,000 in 1998, and then to rise 
to $15,000 in 1999. The solvency tax rate rose from 1.0 percent in 1993 to 1.5 
percent from 1994 through 1998, and then was scheduled to drop to 1.4 percent in 
1999. The taxes to repay the bonds were to be levied as a portion of each 
employer©s experience rate and were estimated to average from 0.75 percent to 
1.05 percent on the taxable wages paid in the experience-year ending the June 
30th prior to the tax year.
27. The bond proceeds were also used to pay benefits from late September 1993 
through early April 1994, at which time first-quarter regular contributions became 
available.
28. Repayments through July 1997 totaled $224 million, with $155 million in sched 
uled repayments and $69 million in callable bonds.
29. Synthetic fixed-rate bonds can be described as fixed for the state but variable for 
the underwriter. In other words, the underwriter undertook the risk of varying the 
interest rates to be paid to bondholders. These bonds were refunded during 1996 
and replaced with a true fixed-rate issue.
30. This was anticipated in planning Connecticut©s bond issues. Borrowing less 
would have meant risking failing to meet the repayment schedule for the fixed- 
maturity debt.
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31. A factor that will inhibit future trust fund building is a tax provision that reduces 
the solvency tax when the trust fund balance (the net of all borrowing) exceeds 0.8 
percent of total wages. This threshold was $377 million at the end of 1996.
32. Issues that are not insured (or secured by some other means) have lower under 
writing fees, but such savings are largely or totally offset by the higher interest 
associated with a greater risk of default.
33. Like many states, Maine has an indexed weekly benefit maximum but a fixed tax 
able wage base. During the 1990-1992 recession, which was especially severe 
throughout New England, the state©s trust fund balance was almost exhausted. In 
fact, Table 1-4 shows that the 1989-1992 decline in Maine©s reserve ratio multiple 
was the largest for all 53 UI programs.
34. The discussion that follows represents the opinions of the author. To the author©s 
knowledge, the U.S. Department of Labor has no plans to revise its administrative 
guidelines for state debt issues. Some readers may consider the guidelines 
entirely appropriate, but others may argue that the guidelines are not neutral in 
their effect on decisions about state debt issues.
35. There are many points of view on this issue. One perspective (more sympathetic 
to UI programs issuing state debt) can be expressed as follows. If issuing state 
debt is an option, then the administrative costs of collecting the associated taxes 
should be reimbursable, since the ultimate purpose of such taxes is to finance the 
payment of UI benefits.
36. This interpretation was articulated in a letter dated March 29, 1993, from the UI 
Service to the Director of Accounts of the Connecticut Department of Labor.
37. In effect, the assumption is that under the Title XII alternative the state levies 
additional flat-rate payroll taxes. These taxes have an annual yield equal to the 
bond tax receipts and remain in effect for the same number of years.
38. The $820 million consisted of $780 million deposited at the time of the bond issue 
and another $40 million deposited to cover additional borrowing during the fol 
lowing months.
39. The $1,357 million represents about 70 percent of the state©s regular UI taxes for 
the seven years. Note the tax receipts for 1987 to 1993 in Table 4-2.
40. For both Louisiana and West Virginia, the interest costs for bond issues cover all 
years that bonds were outstanding (through 1993 in Louisiana). The UI trust fund 
interest earnings totals cover the years through 1992.
41. The summary for West Virginia is carried through 1992, even though it completed 
its state bonds repayment in 1991. This was done partly to compare the results 
with those for Louisiana. The general findings on bond issues versus Title XII 
borrowing do not change for West Virginia when the analysis stops at the end of 
1991. Under the bond issue, the 1991 trust fund end balance is higher ($157 mil 
lion versus $137 million) and the net interest cost is lower (net interest earnings of 
$14.5 million versus net interest payments of $10.8 million).
5 State Reserve Funds
State reserve funds are a recent UI policy initiative. 1 Reserve 
funds are created by the partial redirection of employer UI taxes into 
specially administered state accounts. The principal in these state 
accounts is dedicated to the payment of UI benefits. However, the 
interest income from reserve funds can be used in several ways: to help 
unemployed workers find new jobs and to help finance UI and/or 
employment service (ES) administrative activities.
A state©s financing situation can make the creation of a reserve 
fund attractive and feasible.
1. Total reserves in the UI trust fund accounts at the U.S. Trea 
sury are high in many states, not only in absolute levels but 
also relative to the size of the state economies. Several states 
judge these balances to be fully adequate for financing draw 
downs in a future recession.
2. Under the UI trust fund withdrawal standard, monies held in 
the U.S. Treasury accounts can be used only to pay UI benefits. 
This standard applies to interest earnings on trust fund bal 
ances, to the principal, and to new deposits.
3. States are increasingly recognizing that training and other 
adjustment activities can speed the reemployment of unem 
ployed workers. By easing the transition to new jobs, such 
state-supported initiatives may also help UI trust funds to real 
ize savings through reduced benefit outlays.
4. State Employment Security Agencies (SESAs) are finding it 
increasingly difficult to cover their traditional UI and ES 
administrative functions with only the federal allocations made 
available for those purposes. Many states now supplement 
their federal SESA administrative allocations with monies 
from other sources. In some states, this supplement takes the 
form of a supplemental payroll tax on Ul-covered employers.
Taken together, these situations make the establishment of a state 
reserve fund attractive. By creating a reserve fund, the state can, in
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effect, gain access to interest earnings that would otherwise lie in its 
U.S. Treasury account, earnings dedicated solely to paying future ben 
efits.
This chapter addresses several questions about creating a state 
reserve fund and how such a fund functions, including its relation to 
the UI trust fund account at the U.S. Treasury and its effect on the sol 
vency of a state©s UI program. The chapter does not offer definitive 
answers to these questions. It does provide partial answers and also 
provides, information important for answering other questions.
The chapter©s three main conclusions are
  State reserve funds represent an alternative use for interest 
earnings that would otherwise go only to paying benefits.
  A state that creates a reserve fund and maintains its balance as 
intended in subsequent years does not significantly increase its 
risk of UI program insolvency. (This conclusion is based 
partly on simulations using a model of Indiana©s UI program, 
which evaluated a 1991 proposal to establish a reserve fund.)
  Regulatory oversight does not, at present, ensure that state 
reserve funds remain dedicated to paying benefits.
A DESCRIPTION OF STATE RESERVE FUNDS
State reserve funds are created by partially redirecting employer 
taxes from their usual destination (the state UI trust fund account at the 
U.S. Treasury) to a special fund set up and administered by the state. 
The reserve fund accumulates assets for several years, until it reaches 
the target level specified in the authorizing legislation. The principal in 
the reserve fund remains dedicated to the payment of UI benefits, not 
by directly issuing checks to claimants, but by acting as a reinsurance 
fund that can make advances to the state©s account at the U.S. Treasury 
should that account become depleted. In contrast to the current situa 
tion, where UI programs borrow from the Federal Unemployment 
Account (the FUA), a state with a reserve fund borrows first from itself 
and then from the FUA. Borrowing from the FUA occurs only if the
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reserve fund is fully loaned out or has already reached an unacceptably 
low level.
The reserve fund©s principal is invested in secure assets, for exam 
ple, U.S. Treasury bonds that generate interest income. States adminis 
ter these investment decisions and thus control the level of risk in 
reserve fund financial assets. The interest income can be used in two 
general ways: for promoting worker adjustments in the labor market 
and for administering either the UI or the ES program, or both. Since a 
new state tax is created, some monies must also be dedicated to collect 
ing reserve fund taxes. The authorizing legislation therefore specifies 
that some part of reserve fund interest income be used to defray the 
cost of administering the reserve fund.
The uses of reserve fund interest for worker adjustments and for 
administering UI and/or ES can vary. The potential range of training, 
for example, is suggested by the following target groups: workers 
recently unemployed or at substantial risk of unemployment; dislo 
cated workers; UI benefit exhaustees and other long-term unemployed; 
persons who do not qualify for other federal or state job training pro 
grams; employers seeking to recruit workers in new and expanding 
industries and occupations; employers facing critical skill shortages in 
selected occupations; employers considering a plant closing unless the 
costs of worker retraining can be at least partially covered by a public 
program; and worker upgrading. Potential trainees would vary in 
terms of their employability and their previous UI history. To the 
extent that a state training program hastens the reemployment of its UI 
claimants, the state may find itself with reduced UI benefit outlays. 2
Reserve fund interest income is also directed to administering UI 
or ES programs, or both. Traditionally, both programs have been 
administered with federal monies allocated to the states under the 
Social Security Act and the Wagner-Peyser Act, respectively. Cutbacks 
in federal allocations mean that states must either reduce SESA 
employment and associated services or supplement federal grants with 
state monies. During 1996, at least five states levied a state payroll tax 
to increase monies available for UI and/or ES administration. Interest 
earnings from a state reserve fund can be another source of supplemen 
tal monies for administration.
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LEGISLATIVE CONSIDERATIONS
The legislation that establishes a state reserve fund can vary in sev 
eral respects, depending on the goals of the state. A state reserve fund 
can be set up to be tax- and revenue-neutral, or it can act as a flexible 
tax that automatically generates less revenue when reserves are high 
and more when reserves fall below a designated threshold.
For states that use the reserve ratio method of experience-rating to 
assign tax rates, a state reserve fund can have a significant effect on the 
total reserves. If a state has a reserve fund, the reserve calculation 
based on the federal fund balance would yield lower ratios and higher 
tax rates because part of the federal trust fund balance has been 
diverted to the reserve fund. A state that creates a reserve fund and 
continues to base its reserve ratio on the federal trust fund has an auto 
matic tax rate increase. However, a reserve ratio based on total (federal 
plus state) reserves does not change, because part of the revenue is 
diverted to the state©s reserve fund but total revenue within the system 
remains the same. 3
During Indiana©s 1991 deliberations on establishing a reserve fund, 
staff at the U.S. Department of Labor informed the state that legislation 
defining a tax rate based on total reserves might not conform to federal 
regulations. In other words, taxes designated for the federal trust fund 
should not be based on reserves outside the federal UI program. How 
ever, Indiana amended its proposed legislation and based its reserve 
ratio on federal UI tax revenue multiplied by 1.25, which effectively 
yielded a tax rate based on total reserves. This method for setting tax 
rates for experience-rated employers was approved by the Department 
of Labor. A state can also adjust the tax rate associated with each level 
of the federal reserve ratio, but such an adjustment is never exactly rev 
enue-neutral. Even if it is known that federal trust fund revenue will 
decrease by a constant percentage each year (assuming that the federal 
tax reduction remains in force in years when the state reserve fund tax 
is inactive), future reserves will not decrease by a constant percentage.
For states that use benefit ratios, benefit-wage ratios, or declines in 
payrolls to experience-rate UI taxes, the balance in the state©s reserve 
fund does not affect the experience-ratings for individual employers. 
However, many states using such experience-rating systems do use
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multiple tax rate schedules. In determining which schedule applies in 
a given year, the reserve level should refer only to the balance in the 
state©s federal trust fund account.
As noted, it can be assumed that drawdowns on reserve fund bal 
ances would happen rarely, if at all. One way to define the maximum 
value or ceiling for a state©s reserve fund is to peg it as a percentage of 
wages and salaries. The state©s reserve fund tax would become inac 
tive when state reserves reached that ceiling. Once the state reserve tax 
is inactive, the tax revenues can be eliminated or be redirected to the 
federal fund account. If revenues are redirected to the federal fund, the 
program remains revenue-neutral because the total tax rate remains 
unchanged: employers no longer have to pay the state tax rate, and they 
no longer receive the federal tax reduction.
If, on the other hand, the revenue is completely eliminated, the 
ceiling implies a tax reduction for employers in the years after the ceil 
ing has been reached. Employers no longer pay the state reserve fund 
tax, and they continue to pay at an unchanging rate into the state trust 
fund at the U.S. Treasury. Lowering the ceiling level reduces total rev 
enue and reserves and also generates earlier and more frequent tax 
cuts. If inactive state taxes are redirected, lowering the ceiling does not 
affect total reserves; it merely shifts the allocation between state and 
federal trust fund balances.
The flexible tax reduction described above is similar to other flexi 
ble tax features used by several states (discussed in Chapter 2). It gen 
erates additional revenue when a state©s reserves (those not on loan) 
fall below a specified threshold. A state©s reserve fund tax would be 
even more flexible if the ceiling on real reserves were flexible, e.g., if it 
were based on a minimum balance in the state©s federal account and on 
a specified percentage of covered wages and salaries. A fund defined 
in this way would accumulate higher reserves during a downturn. 4 If 
the state©s reserve fund tax were levied as a fraction of experience- 
rated taxes rather than at a flat rate, the fund would also accumulate 
reserves at a faster rate as the state©s balance at the U.S. Treasury 
declined to lower levels. Employer experience-rated taxes would rise 
following an increase in unemployment and the associated increase in 
UI benefit payments. The increase in UI tax rates implies a higher tax 
rate for a state©s reserve fund contributions. However, the reserve fund 
would not be subject to increases in benefit payouts and would accu-
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mulate higher reserves. Interest income generated by the fund would 
then increase, as higher unemployment led to higher tax rates and thus 
to larger deposits to the reserve fund.
There are few solvency implications for a reserve fund that specifi 
cally dedicates its principal to UI benefits. Total reserves and taxes 
(state plus federal) would remain nearly unchanged and would go to 
largely the same purpose, with the majority of future revenue deposited 
in the state©s account at the U.S. Treasury and a percentage deposited 
in the state©s reserve fund. The decrease in interest income earned by 
the federal trust fund account would depend on the percentage of 
future revenue diverted to the state©s fund. 5 The state would, in turn, 
gain the use of interest income generated by its reserve fund.
States are free to choose the percentage of future revenues to be 
diverted to the reserve fund and to set the ceiling for the fund. The per 
centage diverted determines the rate at which the reserve fund grows. 
For a given percentage, the ceiling then determines the number of years 
that the reserve fund tax would be active. If the intention is to leave the 
level of total (federal plus state) reserves unchanged, the desired level 
of reserves in the fund would be influenced by the level of interest 
income targeted by the state.
However, if state tax revenue were not redirected to the federal 
account after the ceiling had been reached, the ceiling would determine 
the frequency of reductions in total taxes (more frequently with a lower 
ceiling), and the percentage diverted would determine the size of the 
reductions after the ceiling had been reached. In either case, future 
state reserves might not be available for benefits, and it would be inad 
visable for a state to accumulate a reserve fund in a way that measur 
ably increased the risk of insolvency in its federal trust fund account.
CONFORMITY ISSUES
The discussion to this point has assumed that that principal in a 
state©s reserve fund goes solely toward UI benefit payments. However, 
there are no federal regulations governing this point. The use of state 
reserve fund assets is not subject to federal conformity review, either at
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the time the legislation is enacted or if the state brings in legislation to 
change the use.
It might be argued that the creation of a state reserve fund implies 
diverting some tax revenue from the federal trust fund to the state 
reserve fund and is, therefore, subject to federal conformity review; but 
creating a state reserve fund is a two-step process. First, the state lev 
ies a state reserve fund tax. Clearly, a state can levy any tax it 
chooses no conformity issue here. Second, the state reduces the tax 
rate on UI taxes designated for the state©s federal account also per 
fectly within the bounds of conformity. Conformity requirements 
would have to be tied to the solvency of the state©s federal trust fund. 
Staff at the Department of Labor have indicated it would be difficult to 
draft such a requirement, but the possibility should not be completely 
ruled out.
Given the lack of conformity requirements, the establishment of a 
state reserve fund could threaten the solvency of a state©s federal trust 
fund and increase the need for future borrowing. 6 The legislation cre 
ating a reserve fund in a given state might be widely accepted if it were 
based on the premise that the fund would change the amount of money 
available for benefits but would generate extra revenue for state pro 
grams. However, a change in state government could lead to a change 
in policy and leave reserve fund assets vulnerable to a raid.
Thus far, conformity requires only that the reserve fund be com 
pletely separate from the state©s federal UI account. For example, state 
reserves cannot enter into the calculation of an employer©s UI tax rate. 
As shown in the case of Indiana©s 1991 reserve fund deliberations, the 
requirement can be easily satisfied.
Whether a state may use federal administrative grants to cover the 
costs of collecting its reserve fund tax is not completely resolved. 
General Administration Letter 4-91 specifies that Title III grants can be 
used for the administration of taxes only to the extent that the associ 
ated revenue benefits the UI program. As noted, how a state©s reserve 
fund assets might be used in the future remains unclear. A state might 
be tempted to use the fund©s principal for a purpose other than paying 
UI benefits. If the federal government were to provide full administra 
tive funding for state reserve fund tax collections, it would need to 
recover part of that administrative allocation if the state reserve fund 
were then used for a different purpose. On the other hand, if faced with
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a federal requirement to repay UI administrative grants, states might be 
less likely to change the uses of reserve fund assets.
FOUR STATE RESERVE FUNDS
The first state to create a reserve fund was North Carolina, in 1986. 
Its employers paid reserve fund taxes from 1987 to 1991. The princi 
pal in the reserve fund remained at about $200 million from 1992 
through 1996. Interest from the fund is deposited into the state©s 
Worker Training Trust Fund. Between 1992 and 1995, expenditures 
from the latter ranged from $12 to $14 million annually. The monies 
have been used mainly to finance ES program administration and job 
training. Other states with reserve funds have copied many features of 
North Carolina©s legislation.
To highlight key aspects of state reserve funds, Table 5-1 compares 
funds across the four states that have created such funds. The Idaho, 
North Carolina, and Oregon reserve funds have met their target bal 
ances. Nebraska, which started to collect reserve fund taxes in 1996, 
expects to meet its target balance sometime between 1999 and 2001.
All four states finance the reserve fund by redirecting 20 percent of 
employer taxes from the state©s UI account at the U.S. Treasury into a 
state account. This percentage was originally used in North Carolina 
and was copied by the other states. All four states also set a reserve 
fund ceiling of 1 percent of taxable wages. If the reserve fund exceeds 
this threshold on the computation date, the reserve fund tax is set at 
zero for the next year. In all but North Carolina, the tax continues to be 
collected in such years but is deposited in the state©s U.S. Treasury 
account. North Carolina, in contrast, reduces total UI taxes by 20 per 
cent in years that the reserve fund tax is not needed. 7
The employer taxes that finance the reserve fund are levied at rates 
that reflect employers© experiences. After the taxes enter the reserve 
fund, however, they are commingled, so the fund does not record indi 
vidual employers© contributions. In effect, reserve fund activities are 
financed by experience-rated taxes, not by flat-rate taxes. Flat-rate 
payroll taxes finance many state training funds, including California©s 
Employment Training Panel. 8
Table 5-1 Key Provisions of Reserve Funds in Four States
Provision
Size of UI tax
redirection (%)
Reserve fund ceiling3 
(% of taxable wages)
Rediversion of taxes to U.S. Treasury after ceiling is 
reached?
Reserve fund principal dedicated to UI benefits?
Reserve fund interest earnings deposited into separate 
state fund?
Main use of state interest earnings
Job training
Unemployment insurance administrative costs
Employment service administrative costs
Reserve fund administrative costs
Idaho
20
1
Yes
Yes
Yes
X
X
X
Nebraska
20
1
Yes
Yes
Yes
X
X
North Carolina
20
1
No
Yes
Yes
X
X
X
Oregon
20
1
Yes
Yes
Yes
X
X
X
X
1 The computation used to deactivate the reserve fund tax also considers the balance in the state©s federal trust fund account. In Nebraska, 
the reserve fund tax can also be deactivated if combined taxes would put employers in the lowest tax schedule.
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All four states dedicate the principal in the reserve fund to the pay 
ment of UI benefits. Although the principal resides in the states, its 
uses are limited to making loans to the state©s U.S. Treasury account, 
serving as collateral for FUA loans to the Treasury account, or repay 
ing the principal and interest on Title XII loans. In years when part of 
the reserve fund©s principal is on loan, less interest income will accrue 
to the state.
To establish clear accountability for the use of the reserve fund 
interest earnings, the four states have created separate trust funds to 
receive the interest earnings: the Special Administration Fund in Idaho, 
the Nebraska Training and Support Trust Fund, the Worker Training 
Trust Fund in North Carolina, and the Supplemental Administrative 
Fund in Oregon. Each fund issues an annual report.
The bottom rows of Table 5-1 show the main uses of reserve fund 
interest earnings. Each of the four states uses some monies to adminis 
ter reserve fund taxes. 9 Nebraska, North Carolina, and Oregon finance 
worker training and skill-improvement programs with interest earn 
ings. Reserve fund interest supplements the administrative budgets of 
the UI and/or ES programs in Idaho, North Carolina, and Oregon.
STATE EXPERIENCES WITH RESERVE FUNDS
State experiences with reserve funds have generally been satisfac 
tory. This section briefly discusses these experiences but is restricted 
to a qualitative analysis.
While a state might be tempted to "raid" the principal in its reserve 
fund, there have been no major diversions to date. 10 However, con 
cerns about the potential for raiding can never be fully allayed. The 
state law that created the reserve fund can be amended to divert some 
or all of the assets to other uses; this is a fact of state-level politics. To 
the extent that a state©s finances deteriorate under continued pressures 
for low taxes, reserve funds could be tempting targets for raids.
The interest earnings of reserve funds are substantial. Once the 
funds reached their targets of 1 percent of taxable wages, fund invest 
ments in financial instruments yielding 6.0 to 7.0 percent have meant 
$12-14 million annually in North Carolina and Oregon and about
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$3.0 million annually in Idaho. The annual interest yield is equiva 
lent to a state payroll tax of 0.06 to 0.07 percent. This yield is simi 
lar to tax rates in Alabama, Georgia, Hawaii, Nevada, and South 
Carolina, where payroll taxes finance training and UI and/or ES 
administrations.
Holding assets in a derivative fund also provides a state with a 
margin for planning. Idaho, for example, has not spent all of its 
reserve fund interest but has reinvested the assets of its derivative 
administrative fund. This strategy partly reflects Idaho©s concerns 
about future reductions in federal funding for UI and ES activities. 
Holding assets in an administrative fund gives Idaho the opportunity to 
offset federal funding reductions and maintain administration without 
immediately having to impose a new tax. 11
North Carolina, Oregon, and Idaho, the three states with mature 
reserve funds, have seen reductions in their trust fund reserves held at 
the U.S. Treasury. From the end of 1989 to the end of 1996, North 
Carolina©s federal balance declined from $1,471 million to $1,336 mil 
lion. The associated reserve ratio multiple dropped from 1.26 to 0.77. 
When reserve fund balances are considered, the drop in North Caro 
lina©s total reserves over the same period was from $1,580 million to 
$1,536 million, and the reserve ratio multiple dropped from 1.35 to 
0.89. In Idaho, the combined sum of federal plus state balances rose 
from $220 million at the end of 1989 to $323 million at the end of 
1996. However, the combined reserve ratio multiple decreased from 
1.37 to 1.15. Oregon©s combined reserve ratio multiple decreased from 
1.35 to 1.24 over the same period. 12
All three states still had above-average reserve positions at the end 
of 1996, when the national reserve ratio multiple was 0.64. These 
states, even after declines in their combined trust fund reserve ratio 
multiples, did not face the threat of insolvency at the end of 1996. At 
the same time, the three used monies from state reserve fund interest 
for purposes not permitted for the interest earned on federal trust fund 
accounts.
An earlier report by Worden and Vroman (1991b) analyzed 
whether having a reserve fund increases a state©s risk of insolvency. 
The analysis used a state-specific trust fund model to simulate reserve 
balances during various recessions. There is a slight increase in the 
risk of insolvency, which directly reflects the diversion of interest earn-
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ings from the state reserve fund. However, the report concluded that 
the increased risk of insolvency is very slight.
SUMMARY
A state©s reserve fund interest can have a positive impact on that 
state©s economy. When designing a reserve fund, a state needs to con 
sider both the amount of interest income to be diverted and the implica 
tions that diverting that amount will have for the UI trust fund©s 
solvency. The biggest threat to solvency comes not from the loss of 
interest earnings from the federal account but from diverting the 
reserve fund©s principal to another state-funded activity. To date, this 
has not happened in any of the four states with reserve funds.
A state with a small federal trust fund account (for example, a 
reserve ratio multiple below 0.75) should not consider establishing a 
reserve fund. For a state with a small balance, the transition period 
(when employer taxes are partially diverted into the reserve fund) 
would further threaten the solvency of its federal trust fund account 
while generating insignificant state interest income.
If, however, the state reserve fund principal remains dedicated to 
paying UI benefits, the results of the simulation indicate a very slight 
increase in the risk of insolvency. This finding is logical, for the state 
would be, for the most part, merely shifting reserves from one location 
to another.
Notes
1. This chapter draws on a paper by Worden and Vroman (1991b).
2. Evaluations of reemployment programs in Illinois, New Jersey, and Washington 
suggest that paying reemployment bonuses may be a cost-effective way to reduce 
UI benefit payments. See Woodbury and Spiegelman (1987), Corson et al. 
(1989), and Spiegelman, O©Leary, and Kline (1992). There is less evidence about 
the effects of training and retraining on UI outlays.
3. Tax rates are slightly affected if interest income enters the reserve ratio computa 
tion, because part of total interest income is spent rather than being reinvested in 
the reserve fund.
4. The higher level could come about in two ways. First, if a second condition also 
had to be met, the balance would be higher than, say, 1 percent of wages and sala-
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ries. For example, the state might also require that its federal balance equal a cer 
tain threshold before the reserve fund tax could be turned off. Second, if the state 
reserve fund made loans to the federal account and the ceiling were based on the 
total available reserves (state plus federal accounts), the state would continue to 
levy a reserve fund tax for more years, causing the reserve fund to reach a higher 
level.
5. Note that the amount of interest revenue lost to the federal trust fund would be 
greater than the sum of annual state reserve fund interest income drawn out of the 
system. State withdrawals do not reflect the lost compounding effects that would 
occur if all trust fund reserves were kept in the federal account. The size of this 
interest-on-interest loss is modest.
6. The threat of insolvency could also motivate states to enact legislation to restrict 
future UI benefits.
7. In all four states, the computation of the reserve fund tax also considers the bal 
ance in the state©s federal trust fund account.
8. If a state intends to use its reserve fund interest earnings primarily to finance 
worker training, the distinction between a state reserve fund and other state pay 
roll tax-financed training initiatives is not very sharp. A state facing reduced UI 
taxes because of experience-rating can limit the reduction by simultaneously 
imposing a training tax. This occurred in California when the Employment Train 
ing Panel was first established. Perhaps the crucial distinction has to do with the 
political environment at the time the state creates the fund. If a state wants to cre 
ate a reserve fund but keep its UI tax rates stable, it must reduce its U.S. Treasury 
account. Otherwise, employer taxes will rise.
9. The Employment and Training Administration©s General Administrative Letter 
4-91 discusses the allocation of costs in states that levy both a reserve fund tax 
and regular UI taxes. However, some issues concerning the use of federal 
administrative grants to collect reserve fund taxes are not yet fully resolved. See 
U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration (1991) for 
a discussion of those issues.
10. There were temporary diversions in North Carolina in the late 1980s, but both the 
principal and the associated interest were fully repaid.
11. Of course, a large reduction in federal funding would cause administrative fund 
assets to be quickly depleted. However, having such assets would give the state 
more time to decide how to respond to the reduced funding.
12. Note the balances for the federal accounts and associated reserve ratio multiples 
that appear in Table 1 -4.

6 Conclusions
Overall, the fiscal strength of state UI programs at the end of 1996 
was weaker than it had been at the end of 1989, just before the onset of 
the most recent recession. The national reserve ratio (high-cost) multi 
ple dropped from 0.87 at the end of 1989 to 0.64 at the end of 1996. 
The economic recovery of the 1990s has lasted several years, and it 
appears that trust fund reserves will not be rebuilt to 1989 levels, or 
that rebuilding will occur slowly over many years. States are more at 
risk for insolvency in the late 1990s than they were in 1990. A repeti 
tion of widespread and large-scale borrowing of the past is a distinct 
possibility.
It might be argued that the states now have more flexible financing 
than they had two decades ago. However, the research summarized in 
Chapter 2 does not support such an assertion. UI programs continue to 
need to maintain large trust funds in anticipation of recessions.
The literature review in Chapter 2 cites only three studies on flexi 
ble financing. Clearly, more studies are required. Many states are 
likely to have low reserve positions for the immediate future (even 
without a recession in 1998 or 1999), making further study of flexible 
financing all the more important. Support from the U.S. Department of 
Labor on this important question would seem warranted.
States with indexed tax bases clearly show stronger trust fund posi 
tions than nonindexed states. Between 1986 and 1996, the indexed 
states maintained their taxable wage proportions and tax capacity, but 
nonindexed states had declines in both. During the next recession, it 
would be wise to note the borrowing patterns of states according to 
their indexing arrangements. It appears that the states most at risk of 
needing large loans are those with indexed maximum weekly benefits 
but nonindexed tax bases.
Three states compensate for UI trust fund indebtedness by issuing 
state debt instruments. The interest rates for such financial instruments 
were lower than for Title XII loans, but it is not clear that these states 
realized any savings on interest costs. For each of the three, the size of 
the state debt issue exceeded the amount needed for repaying Title XII 
loans. Each state later exercised call features for some of its long-term
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bonds. These issues were "too large" compared with Title XII loans, 
but to some degree that is inevitable, since the amount needed cannot 
be precisely known at the time a bond is issued. Moreover, the experi 
ences with state bond issues to date represent only a sampling of the 
potential variety of future state debt issues.
For states with large trust fund balances, state reserve funds offer 
interesting potential. A state can use the interest earnings from state- 
held reserves for activities not permitted when reserves are held in 
accounts at the U.S. Treasury. The four states with reserve funds have 
financed worker training and UI and ES program administration 
through reserve fund interest earnings. Other states with healthy trust 
fund balances might want to consider following their example.
Financing UI programs will continue to be a challenge to the 
states, especially in an era of increasingly tight fiscal constraints. 
Undoubtedly, individual states will experiment with setting the mini 
mum acceptable fund balance and with flexible financing. More 
research is needed on minimum adequate trust fund balances, UI tax 
responsiveness, and alternative borrowing arrangements for debtor 
states. If such research were done before the onset of the next reces 
sion, the findings could help states pass more easily through that reces 
sion.
The question of national leadership in defining and encouraging 
large state trust fund balances continues to be important. Publicizing 
state-level details about reserve adequacy (using standard indicators of 
adequacy such as the reserve ratio multiple) could be helpful. Provid 
ing financial rewards to states with large balances would seem useful. 
Such rewards could take the form of higher interest rate payments on 
balances above certain thresholds or reduced borrowing costs if pre- 
recession balances satisfied common actuarial thresholds. Federal 
leadership in this area could help to counter the political forces that 
advocate reducing UI taxes. Success in rebuilding and maintaining 
state trust fund balances would help UI programs better meet their tra 
ditional objectives: maintaining the incomes of households with unem 
ployment and improving the built-in stability of the macroeconomy.
Appendix A
A Simulation Analysis of Potential 
Future Borrowing
A set of simulation projections helps to illustrate the risk of insolvency 
posed by low trust fund balances at the start of 1997. All projections are based 
on the state-level relationship between increases in unemployment and de 
creases in the reserve ratio multiple during 1990-1992. A cross-section regres 
sion with weighted state data was fitted to derive parameters for the 
relationship. The resulting equation was then used to project counterfactual 
trust fund drawdowns during 1990-1992 and 1997-1999. For both periods, 
initial reserve ratio multiples were noted and alternative recession-related 
drawdowns were simulated. The results show that many more states could 
need loans than the seven that actually borrowed during 1991-1995.
The cross-section regression, with states weighted by the size of their labor 
forces, was the following:
Eq. Al RRM92 - RRM89 = 0.3157 - 0.5526 x (TUR9092/TUR8789)
(2.65) (6.01)
Adj./?2 = 0.818
Std. err. = 0.249
where RRM89 and RRM92 are the reserve ratio multiples, TUR9092 and 
TUR8789 are average unemployment rates for 1990-1992 and 1987-1989, 
and t ratios appear in parentheses beneath the coefficients.
The regression shows a strong statistical association between the two se 
ries, with larger decreases in reserve ratio multiples for states in which unem 
ployment rate ratios were higher.
Chapter 1 notes that seven states needed U.S. Treasury loans during the 
1991-1995 period. As shown in Table 1-4, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Mich 
igan, and the District of Columbia had negative net balances at the end of 1992. 
Maine, New York, and Missouri had positive net balances at the end of 1992, 
even though they needed loans. Note, however, that the two states with large- 
scale borrowing during 1991-1994 (Connecticut and Massachusetts) had neg 
ative net reserves at the end of 1992, and their reserve ratio multiples were the 
most negative of all state-level multiples.
A simulation that projects reserve ratio multiples at the end of hypothetical 
recessions would not be expected to identify all states needing loans. Cash 
flow loans would be expected for some states that ended the year with positive 
trust fund balances. Further, the simulations do not attempt to measure the size
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of loans to individual states. However, the simulations would be expected to 
identify states with substantial borrowing needs.
The simulations use actual reserve ratio multiples at the beginning of two 
hypothetical recessions which started at the end of 1989 and at the end of 1996. 
Reserve drawdowns then were simulated for three-year periods. Historic un 
employment rate ratios were used along with Eq. Al to project the size of the 
drawdowns. Subtracting the projected drawdown from the starting reserve ra 
tio multiple yields the simulated multiple three years later.
Each state©s actual unemployment experiences are included in the simulat 
ed trust fund drawdowns. There are four different recessions whose exact 
years are shown in Table 1-2. The number of states with negative end balances 
was then recorded for each of the four scenarios. The results for the 1990-1992 
and the 1997-1999 periods differ due to differences in initial state trust fund 
balances. For the 1990-1992 recession, the number of states with negative bal 
ances at the end of 1992 ranged from 5 to 11. For the hypothetical 1997-1999 
recession, the number of states with negative balances at the end of 1999 
ranged from 7 to 17. Simulated borrowing was more widespread using reces 
sion-related unemployment rate ratios from (1981-1983/1977-1979) and 
(1971-1973/1967-1969) than using ratios from (1990-1992/1987-1989) and 
(1974-1976/1971-1973).
Two inferences may be drawn from the simulations.
1. That there were no widespread financing problems during 1990- 
1992 is attributable both to the mild nature of the recession and to the 
comparatively large initial trust fund balances held by the states. The 
states may not be as lucky in the next recession and may face 
increases in unemployment of much greater magnitude.
2. More states needed loans when they entered recessions with their 
1996 reserves than with their 1989 reserves. Based on 1993-1996 
rates of trust fund accumulation, several states will start the next 
recession with smaller balances than they had at the end of 1989. 
Other things being equal, these smaller balances will cause increased 
borrowing.
Appendix B
Analysis of Trust Fund Reserves 
During Recessions
The cyclical importance of tax-base indexing is examined with data from 
the three most recent recessions. Three periods of recession-related draw 
downs are examined: 1974-1976,1981-1983, and 1990-1992. These three re 
cessions were selected because each had a measurable number of states with 
indexed tax bases for at least part of the three-year period. 1 Changes in year- 
end reserve ratio multiples from the start to the end of the periods indicated 
were the dependent variables. To ensure that small states did not unduly influ 
ence the results, some regressions were fitted with data weighted by the size of 
each state©s labor force (the 1976-1989 average).
The specifications use four independent variables:
1. The growth in the unemployment rate (TUR) was expected to exert a 
negative effect on the three-year change in reserve ratio multiples. 
This is measured as a ratio of the average TUR for the three years of 
heavy drawdowns to the average TUR for the three preceding years 
(for example, the 1990-1992 average TUR as a ratio to the 1987- 
1989 average).2
2. A dummy variable for the presence of an indexed maximum WBA 
was used. This variable measures the fraction of the three recession 
years when indexing was present and was expected to have a negative 
coefficient. Larger reductions in RRMs would be expected in states 
with indexed maximum WBAs, a reflection of continuing growth in 
the average WBA.
3. A dummy variable for tax-base indexing was also used, measured as 
the fraction of the three-year period that an indexed tax base was 
present. It was expected to have a positive coefficient, due to the 
automatic positive effect that an increased tax base has on tax reve 
nues.
4. The level of the RRM at the start of the period was entered. It was 
expected that states with low initial RRMs might enact more legisla 
tion during recessions to avoid large-scale borrowing. This variable 
was expected to have a negative coefficient, that is, larger reductions 
in RRMs in states where RRMs were initially higher. Unfortunately, 
there is also an econometric reason to expect a negative coefficient
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for this variable. Since the lagged RRM is part of the dependent vari 
able with a negative sign of-1.0, the measurement also leads to an 
expected negative sign for the lagged RRM. Because the interpreta 
tion of a negative coefficient is ambiguous, results are shown both 
with and without the lagged RRM.
Table B-l displays 12 regressions, the product of three recessions, two 
specifications, and two weighting schemes for the state-level data. All regres 
sions are based on the 50 states plus the District of Columbia. Overall, the 
equations produce several of the expected results, with adjusted R2 values of 
from 0.34 to 0.63 in unweighted data and from 0.70 to 0.92 in weighted data. 
Generally, the four variables enter with the expected signs, and the majority of 
coefficients are significant at the 0.05 or 0.01 level. 3
In each regression, the unemployment ratio enters with the expected neg 
ative sign and its coefficient consistently has the largest t ratio. Note that the 
TUR ratio coefficients are largest for 1973-1976, intermediate for 1980-1983, 
and smallest for 1989-1992. Higher unemployment rate ratios are associated 
with bigger trust fund drawdowns. However, the size of the effect was consid 
erably smaller for 1989-1992 than for 1973-1976.
Both indexing variables usually enter with the expected signs. The pres 
ence of an indexed maximum WBA enters negatively in eight of 12 regres 
sions, but the indexed tax base enters positively in all 12. Note, however, that 
the indexed maximum positive coefficient is significant in weighted data.
All 12 of the tax-base indexing coefficients are positive; eight are signifi 
cant at either the 0.01 or the 0.05 level, and a ninth just fails to be significant at 
the 0.05 level. The size of the coefficients for the 1973-1976 data seems sur 
prising in light of the small number of states with tax-base indexing during 
those years. For 10 equations, the dummy variable coefficient lies in the range 
of 0.26 to 0.54.
The lagged RRM variable enters negatively and significantly in the first 
two recessions, but its coefficient is essentially zero for the most recent reces 
sion. That the coefficients for the lagged RRM and for the indexing of the max 
imum WBA both change size sharply for the 1990-1992 downturn suggests a 
changed pattern of inter-correlation between the two variables. However, there 
is no obvious explanation for the changed coefficients for this period.
The size of the dummy coefficients strongly suggests that tax-base index 
ing contributes to maintaining trust fund balances during recessions. These co 
efficients consistently fall within a narrow range, especially in the weighted 
data, and suggest a measurably positive effect on trust fund balances.
While such a finding is plausible, a comment made in Chapter 3 bears re 
peating: states with indexed tax bases may generally take a more proactive ap-
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proach to trust fund management. Even so, the regressions suggest that tax- 
base indexing helps to maintain trust fund balances during recessions.
Notes
1. Two states had indexed tax bases in 1974, 6 in 1976, 13 in 1981, 14 in 1983, 18 in 
1990, and 18 in 1992.
2. For the 1981-1983 period, the ratio was the average TUR for 1981-1983 divided 
by the average TUR for 1977-1979. This period had two recessions, with the first 
starting in 1980, but the TURs were highest in 1982 and 1983.
3. Under a one-sided test, the t ratio needs to be 1.68 to be significant at the 0.05 
level and 2.41 to be significant at the 0.01 level.
Table B-l Regressions Explaining Recession-Related Changes in Trust Fund Reserve Ratio Multiples3
Summary Statistics
Change in 
year-end RRM
Unweighted data
1973-1976
1973-1976
1980-1983
1980-1983
1989-1992
1989-1992
Weighted data
1973-1976
1973-1976
Constant
1.231
(3.41)
1.277
(4.21)
0.945
(3.47)
1.031
(4.26)
0.241
(2.36)
0.217
(1.62)
0.971
(4.26)
0.877
(4.18)
TUR
ratio
-1.675
(6.75)
-1.348
(6.11)
-0.864
(4.87)
-0.792
(5.02)
-0.418
(5.47)
-0.418
(5.42)
-1.451
(8.35)
-1.148
(6.24)
Max. WBA 
indexed 
(Yes=l)
-0.188
(1.45)
-0.186
(1.71)
-0.216
(1.66)
-0.357
(2.96)
0.007
(0.10)
0.015
(0.20)
-0.182
(2.04)
-0.241
(2.90)
Tax base 
indexed
(Yes=l)
0.366
(1.66)
0.061
(0.31)
0.014
(0.10)
0.189
(1.39)
0.167
(2.38)
0.157
(1.97)
0.543
(2.84)
0.324
(1.74)
Lagged 
RRM
-0.343
(4.54)
-0.311
(3.76)
0.025
(0.29)
-0.252
(3.25)
Adj. 
R2
0.485
0.636
0.341
0.485
0.441
0.430
0.899
0.916
Standard 
error
0.410
0.344
0.389
0.344
0.211
0.213
0.346
0.316
Mean 
dependent 
variable
-1.054
-1.054
-0.456
-0.456
-0.192
-0.192
-1.044
-1.044
1980-1983
1980-1983
1989-1992
1989-1992
0.631
(2.88)
1.039
(5.48)
0.155
(1.34)
0.207
(1.27)
-0.746
(4.47)
-0.858
(6.42)
-0.483
(5.81)
-0.489
(5.76)
-0.288
(2.64)
-0.565
(5.63)
0.129
(2.81)
0.108
(1.65)
0.478
(2.23)
0.501
(2.95)
0.221
(2.76)
0.250
(2.44)
-0.355
(5.39)
-0.049
(0.46)
0.703
0.814
0.875
0.873
0.439
0.348
0.206
0.208
-0.514
-0.514
-0.289
-0.289
SOURCE: Data on reserve ratio multiples (RRMs), indexed maximum weekly benefit amounts (WBAs), and indexed tax bases are from
the UI Service. Data on unemployment rates (TURs) are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
a Both indexation variables are measured as the fraction of the three years that indexing was in effect. TUR ratios are measured as ratios
of three-year averages. All regressions are based on 50 states plus the District of Columbia. Beneath each coefficient is the absolute
value of its t ratio.
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percentage of indexing, 80, 83 
use of indexing, 80 
High-cost multiple©. See Reserve ratio
multiple
Highlights of State Unemployment 
Compensation Laws, 73nl
Idaho
percentage of indexing, 80 
state reserve fund, 140-144 
use of array allocations, 98n6
Illinois
automatic responses to fund
drawdowns, 12
borrowing during 1980-1987, 16 
flexible benefits triggers, 58 
flexible financing in, 67 
reemployment programs, 144n2 
taxable wage base, 77-78 
unemployment insurance legislation, 
53
Indexed states
average taxes on total wages, 94
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Indexed states (contd.) 
characteristics of, 80-84 
effective tax rates, 94 
high taxable wage base of, 78 
tax capacity, 49, 51, 52-52, 86, 90,
95
taxes/total wages, 94 
tax responsiveness, 50, 52 
trust fund positions, 147 
Indexing
to adjust maximum weekly benefits,
79-80
to adjust taxable wage base, 79-80 
Indiana
method for setting experience-rated
tax rates, 136, 139 
Inflation
effect on flexible financing, 69 
Insolvency
flexible financing and, 69, 71-72
solvency taxes and, 66-67
state reserve funds and, 134, 138,
139,143-144 
states© current risk of, 31-32, 147,
149-150 
Institutional framework for
unemployment insurance, 5-10 
Interest income
from state reserve funds, 133, 135,
141, 142-143
Interest rates and interest rate spreads 
state debt instruments, 106-108, 110, 
117, 118-119, 124-127, 128-129 
Iowa
use of array allocations, 98n6
Job training, 133, 135, 140, 141
Kansas
tax rate schedule trigger, 73nlO 
unemployment tax reductions, 31 
use of array allocations, 98n6 
use of indexing, 80
Legal framework for unemployment
insurance, 5-10
Legislation. See Solvency legislation; 
Reserve fund legislation; 
Unemployment insurance 
legislation
Loans. See Treasury Department loans 
"Long slide," the, 15 
Louisiana
cost of state bond issues and Title XII
loans, 124-127
current state trust fund level, 118 
flexible tax base, 58 
state bond financing, 100, 104,
110-111, 113-114, 117-118, 120 
state trust fund activities 
(1979-1994), 112
Maine
flexible benefits, 61
response to indebtedness, 99-100
solvency legislation, 122, 131n20 
Manufacturing sector, 13-14 
Massachusetts
date of employer tax payments, 73n3
multiple tax rate schedules, 45
1991 legislation, 122-123
reserve ratio multiple (1996), 
33nl3
response to indebtedness, 99-100, 
102-103
taxable wage base (1996), 32n2, 83 
Michigan
borrowing from U.S. Treasury, 15, 16
financing problems in 1970s, 54
high costs example, 13-14
reserve ratio multiples (1989 and 
1996), 33nl2
response to indebtedness, 99-100
solvency taxes, 66, 74n20 
Minnesota
employment rates (1996), 80
flexible benefits, 58
top tax schedule trigger, 58
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Missouri
flexible tax base, 58
response to indebtedness, 99-100
state unemployment rate ratios
(1989-1992), 33nlO 
Montana
percentage of indexing, 83
use of indexing, 80 
Municipal bonds, 105-108, 118-119
issued by Louisiana and West 
Virginia, 111, 113
National Foundation for Unemployment 
Compensation and Workers© 
Compensation, 73nl 
Nebraska
state reserve fund, 140-144 
state unemployment rate ratios
(1990-1992), 30 
Nebraska Training and Support Trust
Fund, 142 
New Hampshire
non-automatic trigger, 74nl4 
state unemployment rate
(1990-1992), 30 
New Jersey
employee tax, 58, 74nl6 
employment rates (1996), 80 
reemployment programs, 144n2 
solvency taxes, 66, 74n20 
New York
reserve ratio multiple (1996),
33nl3
response to indebtedness, 99-100 
taxable wage base, 77-78 
Nonindexed states
average taxes on total wages, 94
effective tax rates, 94
taxable wage bases, 83
tax capacity, 49, 51, 52-53, 86, 90,
95
tax responsiveness, 50, 52 
trust fund positions, 147
North Carolina
1996 employment rates, 80 
percentage of indexing, 80, 83 
state reserve fund, 140-144 
taxable wage proportion, 83-84 
unemployment tax reductions, 31 
use of principle in reserve fund, 
145nlO
North Dakota
use of array allocations, 98n6
Notes (financial), 109, 117
OASI. See Social Security
Office of Management and Budget, 124
Ohio
borrowing during 1980-1987, 16
reserve ratio multiple (1989 and 
1996), 33nl2
solvency taxes, 66, 67, 74n20
taxable wage base, 77-78 
Oklahoma
experience-rating systems, 73n8
percentage of indexing, 80
taxable wage base ranking (1996), 83
taxable wage proportion, 83 
Old Age and Survivors Insurance. See
Social Security 
Oregon
state reserve fund, 140-144
Pay-as-you-go funding, 12-14
Ad hoc, 13
See also Flexible financing 
Payment of Interest on Title XII Loans,
129n4 
Payroll taxes, 6, 10
increases, 19
and job training programs, 140, 143
separate, 104
special, 113, 114
supplemental, 133
tax rate variability, 44 
Penalty tax, 104
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Pennsylvania
automatic responses to fund 
drawdowns, 12
borrowing from U.S. Treasury, 15, 16
employee tax, 58
financing problems in 1970s, 74nl5
flexible benefits, 58
flexible benefits trigger, 58, 68
flexible financing, 67-70
taxable wage base, 77-78
unemployment insurance legislation,
53, 67-68 
Price increases
effect on unemployment insurance,
79
Public Law 97-248, 40 
Puerto Rico
taxable wage proportion, 98n5
Recession (1974-1975)
borrowing by states during, 20 
difference from 1990-1992
recession, 64 
and large-scale state borrowing, 16
Recession (1980-1983)
borrowing by states during, 16, 20
Recession (1990-1992)
difference from 1974-1975
recession, 64
importance of solvency taxes, 61 
in Pennsylvania, 70 
as predictor of future recessions, 3 
state bond financing during, 100 
state borrowing during, 1, 17, 21, 23 
state trust fund reserves during, 10 
state unemployment rates, 30 
total unemployment rates, 23, 30
Recessions
average state unemployment rate
ratios during, 24 
benefit reductions during, 19 
empirical measures of, 62-63 
in energy producer states, 110 
and flexible financing, 36, 68-70
maintaining reserves during, 96-97
predictions about future, 14, 32, 147
reserve ratio multiples compared 
across, 23, 25
state borrowing during, 10-11
states© responses to, 35
state trust fund reserves during, 
151-155
static vs. dynamic indicators of, 
11-12
tax responsiveness during, 64
and temporary benefits, 6
unemployment rate ratios during, 23, 
24
See also Solvency provisions 
Reed Act, 129n3
Reserve fund legislation, 136-140 
Reserve fund tax, 129, 141 
Reserve funds, 3, 8, 133-144, 148
factors affecting adequacy of, 10-11
maximum value for, 137, 140, 141 
Reserve ratio, 11
historical trends, 16
and tax responsiveness, 65
triggers, 50, 59-60
See also Aggregate reserve ratio 
Reserve ratio multiple (RRM)
and borrowing by states, 19-22, 151
compared across recessions, 23, 25, 
151,154-155
components of, 11
effect of total unemployment rate, 
151
for indexed vs. nonindexed states, 
95-96
as measure of fund adequacy, 11-12, 
14,30
1989 national, 16
1992-1996,17,30
recommended levels, 11, 12
by state (1989-1996), 26-29
state reserve funds and, 143, 144
triggers, 50, 59-60
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See also Aggregate reserve ratio 
multiples
Reserve-ratio states
solvency provisions, 53 
and state reserve funds, 136
Revenue bonds, 109, 110, 113, 114
Rhode Island
financing problems in 1970s, 74nl5 
reserve ratio multiple (1996), 95
RRM. See Reserve ratio multiple
Simulations
potential future borrowing, 149-150 
risks of insolvency, 31-32 
solvency provisions, 68-70 
solvency taxes, 65-67 
state bond financing vs. Treasury
Department loans, 125-127 
See also Empirical analyses 
Social Security
taxable wage base, 7, 9 
Social Security Act (1935), 6, 100-101,
103-104, 135 
Solvency legislation, 100, 110, 116,
122-123, 127, 128, 151 
Solvency provisions, 53-61
indexing, 69
Solvency taxes, 2, 9-10, 45 
Connecticut, 116 
importance to states, 53-61 
Maine, 122
simulation analysis of, 65-67 
as supplement to experience-rated
taxes, 61
and tax capacity, 85, 86-90 
and tax responsiveness, 63 
vs. use of benefit reductions, 61 
Special Administration Fund (Idaho),
142 
State Employment Security Agencies
(SESAs), 133, 135 
State government
unemployment insurance 
responsibilities of, 5, 8-9
State loans. See Treasury Department
loans
States. See also names of specific states 
experiences with bond financing,
110-118 
experiences with reserve funds,
142-144 
having flexible financing features,
59-60 
future economic performance, 127,
128
with largest payroll taxes, 30 
maximum potential revenues, 45 
net reserves and reserve ratio
multiples, 26-29 
risks of unemployment insurance
insolvency, 31-32, 147 
solvency taxes (1988 and 1996),
55-57
with state reserve funds, 140-142 
taxable wage proportion (1986 and
1996), 46-49 
tax-base indexing through 1996,
81-82
tax capacity (1986 and 1996), 46-49 
tax rates and TWP (1986 and 1996),
91-93 
total tax capacity (1986 and 1996),
87-89 
See also Benefit-ratio states; Indexed
states; Nonindexed states;
Reserve-ratio states 
State©s size of economy
as RRM factor, 10-11 
State taxation capacity. See Tax capacity 
Supplemental Administrative Fund
(Oregon), 142 
Synthetic fixed-rate bonds, 117, 131n29
Taxable wage base, 7, 77-79 
effects of indexing, 84-97 
federal, 77, 78, 83 
in 1996, 9 
by state, 81-82
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Taxable wage base (contd.)
state adjustments to, 79-80, 83-84 
state minimum, 8
Taxable wage proportion (TWP), 36 
decreases in, 36, 51, 52 
by state (1986 and 1996), 45-49 
and taxable wage base, 78-79, 83-84 
and tax capacity, 45, 86 
and tax responsiveness, 5C -51 
Tax-base indexing, 2, 3, 77-98, 151,
152-153
See also Tax responsiveness 
Tax capacity, 36, 52- 53 
decreases in, 36, 51 
defined, 45,51 
maintaining, 85-90 
national (1986 and 1996), 49 
of states (1986 and 1996), 45-49 
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act
of 1983, 40 
Taxes. See Employee taxes;
Experience-rated taxes; Payroll 
taxes; Solvency taxes; Reserve 
fund tax; Unemployment 
insurance taxes 
Tax responsiveness, 35
empirical measures of, 62-65
factors limiting, 52
indicators of, 37, 50
during recessions, 54
reserve adequacy dependent on, 11
and tax schedule ranges of rates, 38,
52
See also Tax-base indexing 
TEFRA (Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 1983), 40 
Temporary benefits, 6
See also Flexible benefits 
Texas
employment rates (1996), 80, 98n4 
mid-1980s recession, 110-111 
reserve ratio multiple (1996),
33nl3 
solvency taxes, 66, 74n20
taxable wage base, 77-78 
Title III grants, 139
Title IX of Social Security Act (1935), 6 
Title XII loans. See Treasury Department
loans 
Title XII of Social Security Act (1935),
100-101, 103-104 
Total unemployment rate (TUR)
effect on reserve ratio multiples, 151
flexible financing and, 69-70
during recessions, 23, 152 
Training programs, 133, 135, 140, 141 
Treasury Department
management of trust fund balances, 7 
Treasury Department loans, 9
automatic debt repayment process, 
18-19, 104
availability, 128
collateral for, 142
definition of large, 21
financing state debts with, 100-104
historical overview, 7
interest charge calculations, 101
interest vs. interest-free, 18-19
long-term interest free, 53
repayment patterns, 110
state needs for (1990), 99-100
state repayment of, 18-19, 103-104, 
109, 120-124
statistics about, 20-21, 26-29
Title XII rate vs. Aaa municipal bond 
rate, 105
vs. bond financing, 3, 105-108,
118-119, 124-127 
Triggers
flexible benefit, 58, 59-60
non-automatic, 54
in Pennsylvania, 68
solvency provision, 54, 58
top tax schedule, 50, 52
trust fund drawdown, 12 
Trust fund balances, 11,13
effect of tax-base indexing on, 
152-153
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effects of large, 71
need for federal leadership to
increase, 148
periods of large increases to, 40 
and tax schedules, 37 
Trust fund drawdowns 
dates of major, 40 
state unemployment insurance tax
responses to, 35, 50 
Trust fund financing 
history of, 15-23 
Trust fund reserves
aggregate net reserves (1993-1996),
1.7
and borrowing by states, 20-21 
and choice of tax schedules, 137 
effect of tax-base indexing on, 96-97 
effects of low, 32, 40 
effects of substantial accumulations,
15,17, 19
maintaining in the long run, 95-96 
during 1948-1979, 15 
1983 national low point, 16 
during recessions, 151-155 
slow pace of accumulation
(1993-1996), 30-31 
by state (1989-1996), 26-29 
and tax-base indexing, 97 
Trust funds
adequacy during recessions, 10-11,
18-19,96
debt financing of, 99-132 
drawdown-triggered automatic
responses, 12
federal requirements affecting, 8-9 
funding sources for, 9-10 
investment of, 7 
major historical developments in,
14-23
1997 balances, 1 
reinsurance fund for, 134 
and reserve ratio multiples, 11-12,
19-22 
target level selection, 13
threat to solvency of, 139, 144 
withdrawal standards for, 8, 101, 123 
TUR. See Total unemployment rate 
TWP. See Taxable wage proportion
UI. See Unemployment insurance 
Uncertainties of debtor states, 121-124,
128 
Underwriting fees, 108, 109-110, 119,
128, 129 
Unemployment Compensation Advance
Fund (Connecticut), 116 
Unemployment insurance
claimants, average number of, 5
debt financing of, 99-132
experiments in financing of, 3
financing of, 6, 148
financing debts of, 99-132
funding problems, 1
history, 5-33
objectives, 5, 72
replacement rates, 79
Secretarial standards for, 8
and social security, 9
state government responsibilities, 5,
8-9
tiers of benefit payments, 6 
Unemployment Insurance in the United 
States: Benefits, Financing and 
Coverage, 32n4
Unemployment insurance legislation, 35 
effect on taxable wage proportion, 79 
enacted by states, 53-61, 67-68 
and state bond financing, 100, 103,
123-124, 128
statutory vs. actual tax rates, 90-95 
and tax responsiveness, 63 
See also Social Security Act (1935);
Solvency legislation 
Unemployment Insurance Service, 124 
Unemployment insurance taxes 
aggregate tax receipts, 31 
average rate by state (1986 and 
1996), 46-49
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Unemployment insurance taxes (contd.) 
average rate on top tax schedule, 45,
52,83
computation lag, 37-38 
cyclical responsiveness, 35-36, 44,
72
employers© shares of, 5 
federal component of, 6-7 
federal requirements affecting, 8-9 
gross potential rate, 8 
maximum rate by state (1986 and
1996), 46 
maximum rates (1966-1996), 40, 42,
44,52 
minimum rates (1966-1996), 40, 41,
44 
multiple tax schedules for, 44, 45,
85-86, 137 
in the 1990s, 31 
range of rates (1966-1996), 40, 43,
44,52
reductions of, 31 
response to trust fund drawdowns,
35,50
seasonal patterns of payments, 102 
statutory vs. actual rates, 90-95 
statutory framework for, 5-7 
structure of tax rates, 38-53, 72 
Unemployment insurance trust funds.
See Trust funds. 
Unemployment rates
during recessions, 23, 24, 152 
and solvency taxes, 66 
See also Total unemployment rate 
Urban Institute, 33n9 
U.S. Department of Labor 
Employment and Training
Administration, 33nl4, 129n4,
139,145n9 
support for research on flexible
financing, 147 
Unemployment Insurance Service,
73nl
U.S. Department of Labor ET Handbook
394, 33nl4 
U.S. Department of the Treasury. See
Treasury Department 
U.S. Secretary of Labor, 124
administrative finance allocations, 7,
120, 123, 133 
unemployment insurance
responsibilities, 7, 8 
Utah
percentage of indexing, 83
Variable-rate bonds, 117 
Vermont
borrowing during (1972-1974), 16
flexible benefits trigger, 58
use of array allocations, 98n6 
Virgin Islands
percentage of indexing, 83
taxable wage proportion,
83-84
Voluntary repayment by states to 
Treasury, 18, 104
Wage increases
effect on unemployment insurance, 
79
Wage replacement rate, 58-60
Wagner-Peyser Act, 135
Washington
borrowing during (1972-1974), 16 
1996 employment rates, 80 
reemployment programs, 144n2 
taxable wage proportion, 84 
tax rate schedule categories, 85 
use of array allocations, 98n6 
use of indexing, 80
WBA. See Weekly benefit amount
Weekly benefit amount (WBA), 58-60,
68
changes to, 116 
indexed maximum, 151, 152 
limits to maximum, 79-80
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West Virginia
cost of state bond issues and Treasury
Department loans, 124-127 
current state trust fund level, 114,
118 
state bond financing, 100, 104,
110-111, 113-114, 117-118, 120 
state trust fund activities
(1979-1994), 115 
Wisconsin
taxable wage base (1996), 83 
Worker Training Trust Fund (North 
Carolina), 140, 142
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